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This dissertation combines formal verification techniques in an attempt to reduce the human
effort required to verify large systems formally.
One method to reduce the human effort required by formal verification is to modify
general-purpose theorem proving techniques to increase the number of lemma instances
considered automatically. Such a modification to the forward chaining proof technique
within the ACL2 theorem prover is described.
This dissertation identifies a decidable subclass of the ACL2 logic, the Subclass of
Unrollable List Formulas in ACL2 (SULFA). SULFA is shown to be decidable, i.e., there
exists an algorithm that decides whether any SULFA formula is valid. Theorems from first-
order logic can be proven through a methodology that combines interactive theorem proving
with a fully-automated solver for SULFA formulas. This methodology has been applied to
the verification of components of the TRIPS processor, a prototype processor designed
and fabricated by the University of Texas and IBM. Also, a fully-automated procedure
for the Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) of bit vectors is implemented by combining
a solver for SULFA formulas with the ACL2 theorem prover’s general-purpose rewriting
proof technique.
viii
A new methodology for combining theorem proving and model checking is pre-
sented, which uses a unique “black-box” formalization of hardware designs. This method-
ology has been used to combine the ACL2 theorem prover with IBM’s SixthSense model
checker and applied to the verification of a high-performance industrial multiplier design.
A general-purpose mechanism has been created for adding external tools to a
general-purpose theorem prover. This mechanism, implemented in the ACL2 theorem
prover, is capable of supporting the combination of ACL2 with both SixthSense and the
SAT-based SULFA solver.
A new hardware description language, DE2, is described. DE2 has a number of
unique features geared towards simplifying formal verification, including a relatively sim-
ple formal semantics, support for the description of circuit generators, and support for em-
bedding non-functional constructs within a hardware design.
The composition of these techniques extend our knowledge of the languages and
logics needed for formal verification and should reduce the human effort required to verify
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Even a single bug in a hardware design, if not detected until late in the design process, can
be extremely costly. Intel, for example, estimated the cost of the Pentium R© bug in 1994
as 500 million dollars [14]. Thus, a lot of time and energy is spent attempting to eliminate
bugs in industrial hardware designs as early as possible.
The primary means for verifying hardware today is simulation. Exhaustive simula-
tion is impossible, since the number of input and state combinations in most designs is enor-
mous. Instead, simulations are carefully engineered to catch as many potential problems as
possible. Nevertheless, there is always the potential for a bug to escape all simulated cases.
And as hardware designs become ever more complex, the cost of keeping the possibility of
a bug acceptably low is always increasing.
An alternative to simulation is formal verification, which proves that a design sat-
isfies its formal specification for all possible input and state combinations. The formal
verification of entire processors has been shown to be possible. In 1985, Warren Hunt used
formal verification to prove that the FM8501 processor implements a formal specification
of its instruction set architecture [27]. While the FM8501 was never fabricated, another
processor that was fabricated, the FM9001 processor, was later proven to implement its
specification as well, by Bishop and Hunt [29].
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While the formal verification of entire processor designs is possible, the cost of per-
forming formal verification has always been too high to make it practical for most industrial
designs. The trend, however, because of the increasing complexity of hardware designs, the
increasing power of formal verification tools, and the increasing expertise with formal veri-
fication tools, has been towards more formal verification. After the Pentium R© bug in 1994,
for example, the decision was made by both Intel and AMD to use formal methods to verify
their floating-point units in future designs[60, 72].
In order to continue the trend, we need to develop new hardware description lan-
guages, improve formal verification tools, and build expertise in formal verification strate-
gies for state-of-the-art hardware designs. In this dissertation, we make progress on each
of these fronts. We have developed a new hardware description language, DE2, designed
to simplify formal verification. We have developed new algorithms, combining theorem
proving with decision procedures, to increase the automation and flexibility of formal ver-
ification tools. Finally, we have applied these techniques to components of the TRIPS pro-
cessor, a complex multi-core research processor, with unique features designed to address
future challenges in microprocessor design.
The dissertation begins with an overview of relevant formal methods in Chapter 2.
Chapter 3 provides a more detailed overview of the ACL2 theorem prover in particular, a
powerful interactive formal tool, that has been successfully applied to the verification of
industrial hardware designs [72, 21].
One way to improve the ACL2 theorem prover, and similar theorem provers, is to
decrease the amount of user guidance required to prove theorems. Chapter 4 describes a
relatively small modification which does just that. The modification increases the amount
of search in one of the standard proof techniques, called forward chaining, allowing more
theorems to be proven automatically at the cost of requiring more time to find a given proof.
Chapter 5 defines the Subclass of Unrollable List Formulas in ACL2 (SULFA).
SULFA can be recognized efficiently, verified fully automatically (in principle), and con-
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tains a definition principle that allows it to be extended with user-defined functions. Chap-
ter 5 formally defines SULFA and presents an efficient procedure for determining whether
an arbitrary ACL2 formula is in SULFA. Chapter 6 then shows that SULFA is decidable,
by presenting a relatively simple and inefficient decision procedure for SULFA and a proof
sketch of its correctness. Chapter 7 then describes a more efficient SULFA solver based on
Boolean satisfiability solvers (SAT solvers).
Chapter 8 applies the SAT-based SULFA solver to the formal verification of a data-
tile communication protocol implementation within the TRIPS processor. The data-tile
protocol is unique to the TRIPS processor, and is required directly due to the processor’s
unique method of addressing future architecture challenges. Thus, the verification of the
data-tile protocol shows both the feasibility of our approach and helps build formal verifi-
cation expertise beyond the units verified in industrial microprocessors today.
Chapter 9 describes how we have used our approach to develop a fully-automatic
technique for the standard Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) of bit vectors. The SMT
theory of bit vectors is part of a set of recently developed standard theories. Every previ-
ously created SMT solver uses a special purpose simplifier followed by a fully-automatic
technique. Our approach, however, achieves a greater degree of flexibility by using a gen-
eral purpose theorem prover to simplify the problem before passing the problem to a fully-
automated technique. Furthermore, by creating an SMT solver for bit vectors, we were
able to apply our approach, combining general purpose theorem proving with a SAT-based
solver for SULFA formulas, to a large benchmark suite of problems, mostly derived from
hardware verification.
Chapter 10 describes a different hardware verification approach, which combines
the ACL2 theorem prover with another powerful verification tool, IBM’s SixthSense model
checker. These two tools combine synergistically, since ACL2 is scalable and contains
powerful arithmetic proof techniques, while SixthSense is fully automatic and contains
built-in support for industrial hardware description languages. Chapter 10 describes how
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the two tools are combined and described an application of this approach to the verification
of an industrial high-performance multiplier.
Both Chapter 7 and Chapter 10 involve extending ACL2 with proof techniques that
use external tools. Each of these extensions originally required modifications to the source
code of the theorem prover. Chapter 11, describes a new general-purpose mechanism for
extending ACL2 with external tools at run time, which is powerful enough to support both of
these new proof engines. Furthermore, this mechanism allows users to control and identify
exactly which mechanisms are available in their proofs.
Finally, Chapter 12 describes a new hardware description language, DE2. DE2
has a number of features that make it well-suited for formal verification, including a sim-
ple two-pass semantics, user-defined primitives, and annotations as first-class objects. The
formal semantics of DE2 are specified within the ACL2 logic, allowing the proof of DE2
programs. We have developed an automated procedure for translating DE2 circuits into
simplified ACL2 models, which, along with the ACL2 model, produces a proof of equiva-
lence between the ACL2 model and the original DE2 circuit, relative to the DE2 language
semantics. The DE2 language is also used as part of the verification of the data-tile protocol
implementation described in Chapter 8.
One of the strengths of our work is that lots of future improvements and applica-
tions are possible. Chapter 13 describes a few of these future directions. The decidable
subclass of the ACL2 logic should be enlarged, and a number of optimizations have the
potential to improve the performance of the SAT-based procedure. Also, we feel it would
be worthwhile to continue to apply our techniques to hardware designs beyond the scope of
what is traditionally formally verified in industry.
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Chapter 2
An Overview of Formal Verification
2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents an overview of formal verification and its application to hardware
designs. As is common, we divide formal methods into two categories: fully-automatic
methods, exemplified by model checking, and interactive methods, exemplified by general-
purpose theorem provers.
2.2 Fully-Automatic Methods
Ideally, a hardware design would be proven to satisfy its specification entirely automati-
cally. Thus, the human effort would be limited to formally expressing the design and its
specification. In practice, methods capable of performing such automatic hardware veri-
fication exist, but suffer from problems with scalability and expressiveness. Often small
designs can be verified quickly and automatically, but as the number of input and state bits
increase, exponentially more time and/or memory is required. In order to ensure full au-
tomation, the expressiveness of the logic is limited, which can make expressing a given
design and its specification more difficult or, in some cases, impossible.
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This section provides an overview of various fully-automatic techniques, starting
with those using the least expressive logic and ending with those using the most expressive
logic.
2.2.1 Boolean Satisfiability (SAT) Solvers
Boolean satisfiability solvers, which we refer to as SAT solvers, determine whether a set of
variables can be instantiated with Boolean value such that a formula is true. The formula
solved must be in conjunctive normal form (CNF), such as the one in the following example:
(a ∨ b) ∧ (a ∨ c) ∧ (¬b ∨ ¬c) ∧ (b ∨ c).
The above example has two satisfying instances, [a 7→ true, b 7→ true, c 7→ false] and
[a 7→ true, b 7→ false, c 7→ true]. A SAT solver would return that the above formula is
satisfiable, along with one of the two possible satisfying instances.
In the context of a CNF formula, we say that a literal is either a variable or its
negation. For example, b and ¬b are literals. A clause is then a disjunction of literals, such
as (¬b ∨ ¬c). A CNF formula is then simply a conjunction of clauses.
SAT solving is an NP-complete problem, and therefore suffers from exponential
complexity as the number of Boolean variables increase. Nevertheless, problems from hard-
ware verification are regularly translated into CNF problems with hundreds of thousands of
variables and solved by SAT solvers. Chapter 7 describes such an algorithm, which trans-
lates ACL2 formulas into CNF to be solved by SAT. Furthermore, Chapter 8 uses SAT
solvers, with ACL2, to verify a component of a processor design. SAT solvers are also used
within the SixthSense model checker, which was integrated with the ACL2 theorem prover
as described in Chapter 10.
There is a standard input format for SAT solvers [74] and an annual competition
to compare the performance of SAT solvers [86]. Most of the fastest solvers today use
modifications of the Davis, Putnam, Logemann and Lovel (DPLL) algorithm [11], first
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described in 1962. Some of the more recent modifications to this algorithm are described
by Moskewicz et al. [55]. The SAT solvers used in the implementations discussed in this
dissertation are zChaff [88] and minisat [87].
2.2.2 Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) Solvers
Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) solvers are similar to SAT solvers in that, given a for-
mula, an SMT solver determines whether a satisfying substitution exists under which a the
formula is true. SMT solvers, however, are less restrictive than SAT solvers with respect
to the formulas accepted. Multiple standard SMT theories exist, supporting formulas in-
volving linear arithmetic, arrays, uninterpreted functions, bit vectors, and quantifiers. For
example, the following formula can be represented using the quantifier-free SMT theory of
uninterpreted functions:
f (a) ∧ ¬f (b) ∧ (a = b).
The above formula is unsatisfiable, since all functions return the same value given the same
inputs.
A similar example including linear arithmetic is as follows:
f (a)∧¬f (b)∧ (a = b + 1).
The above formula has an infinite number of satisfying instances, including when a 7→ 1,
b 7→ 0, and
f (x) ,
 false, if x = 0,true, otherwise.
Since SMT solvers have a less restrictive input language than SAT solvers, less
translation is required to translate problems from hardware verification, and other domains,
into SMT problems. Another strength of SMT theories is that solvers for disjoint theories
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Table 2.1: LTL Temporal Operators
Operation Description
^E E is eventually true.
E E is always true.
©E E is true during the next time step.
E1 U E2 E1 is true until E2 is true (and E2 must eventually be true).
E1 R E2 E2 is either true forever or until E1 is true. Thus, E1 releases E2.
often can be combined using the techniques developed by Nelson and Oppen [57] and
Shostak [82]. Since 2005, an annual competition has existed comparing the performance
of SMT solvers in various standard SMT theories. Chapter 9 describes the SMT quantifier-
free theory of bit vectors with uninterpreted functions in more detail, as well as a solver we
have developed for this theory.
2.2.3 Temporal Logic
Fully-automatic techniques have also been developed to determine whether finite state ma-
chines satisfy properties that hold over time using temporal logics [10, 65]. Numerous such
logics exists, including, in order from less expressive to more expressive, Linear Temporal
Logic (LTL), Computation Tree Logic (CTL), and µ-Calculus.
In every temporal logic, the propositional calculus is combined with temporal oper-
ators. The LTL temporal operators are shown in Table 2.1. An example of an LTL formula
then is the following:
(B→ B).
which states that once B is high, then B continues to be high for all future cycles. The
property is satisfied by the circuit in figure 2.1.
CTL expands on LTL by adding operators that reason about program branches.
This allows statements such as “For all time, there exists some program branch on which






Figure 2.1: A simple example circuit, in which a high bit A causes bit B and bit C to be
high for all later times.
concept of least fixpoints. No knowledge, however, of CTL or µ-Calculus is required in this
dissertation.
Another fully-automated technique worthy of note is symbolic evaluation, which
can be seen to verify a subset of LTL. Using symbolic evaluation, properties of the form
(E) can be verified, where E is an LTL term containing no temporal operators other than
©. Thus, (B → ©B), is an example of a symbolic evaluation formula that is satisfied by
the circuit in Figure 2.1. An extension of symbolic evaluation, called Symbolic Trajectory
Evaluation (STE), has been used successfully in the verification of significant industrial
designs at Intel [60]. STE is similar to symbolic evaluation, but beyond the traditional two
values of Boolean logic, STE contains a “do not care” value for wires that are not being
driven to any value and an “over constrained” value for wires that are being driven to both
true and false simultaneously.
Industrially successful solvers have also been developed for LTL and CTL. IBM’s
SixthSense model checker, which is discussed in more detail in Chapter 10, is one example
of an industrially successful LTL model checker [52]. The SMV model checker, designed
by Carnegie Mellon University and Cadence Berkeley Laboratories, is an example of an
industrially successful CTL model checker [47].
Fully-automatic methods for hardware verification generally suffer from scalability
problems. While they may work very well on small designs, as the design gets larger the
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time required to fully verify the design increases at a much faster rate. Furthermore, certain
circuits, such as multipliers are particularly difficult to verify automatically. Thus, no fully-
automatic method can completely verify large industrial processor designs.
2.3 Interactive Techniques
To verify large designs formally, some human guidance is required. Traditionally, this takes
the form of mathematical proof, checked by computer. A number of automated theorem
provers exists that aid in the creation and checking of mathematical proofs. Some examples
of theorem provers that have been used for hardware verification include HOL4 [20], HOL-
Light [25], Isabelle [59], Coq [15], PVS [62], and ACL2 [41]. The ACL2 theorem prover
is described in more detail in Chapter 3.
There is strong evidence that theorem proving can scale to large designs. An entire
processor design was verified by a theorem prover in 1985 [27]. While that design was not
fabricated, a design that was fabricated was later verified [29]. This design was missing
some of the features of modern processors, such as out-of-order execution, but a model of a
more complex processor design containing more features, including out-of-order execution,
has also been verified [75].
Another advantage of theorem proving is that the logics used by theorem provers
are generally more expressive than the logics used by fully-automatic tools. Most automatic
tools, for example, cannot formally verify reconfigurable designs, if an infinite number of
configurations is possible. Such designs are especially important in the development of
hardware design libraries.
The disadvantage of theorem proving is that human guidance is required. Thus,
even proofs about small designs often require considerable amount of human effort to de-
velop. Furthermore, it is common for months of training to be required before someone can
be a productive user of any given theorem prover.
10
2.4 Combined Approaches
While we divide formal verification tools into fully automatic and interactive approaches,
the truth is that there is a lot of interplay between the two techniques. Effective fully-
automatic model checking techniques are often inspired by the methods used during a
mathematical proof of correctness of similar designs. Interactive approaches also often
make use of techniques originating from fully-automatic methods. Furthermore, consid-
erable research has gone into directly combining fully automatic and interactive formal
verification tools.
Too many deductions occur within an automated theorem prover to rely on external
decision procedures to perform those deductions [7]. However, external decision proce-
dures can be used to prove user-generated lemmas efficiently that would otherwise require
user guidance. Thus, most combinations of fully automatic and interactive techniques are
“coarse-grained” solutions, where theorem proving is used to combine user-generated lem-
mas that are verified by fully-automatic procedures. Examples of such integrations include
the integration of the ACL2 theorem prover with UCLID [44] and the integration of the
HOL theorem prover with the VOSS model checker [36].
An industrially successful combination of fully automatic and interactive tools in-
cludes the integration of an STE solver with a theorem prover for higher order logic (HOL),
which was used to verify Intel’s Pentium R© floating-point unit [60]. Due to the relatively
low expressive power of STE, however, significant amount of human guidance is often re-
quired to reduce hardware specifications to STE properties. In particular, a target property
often must be strengthened until it is an inductive invariant. Jacobi addresses this problem
by using a theorem prover to compose more expressive temporal logic properties in the
verification of an out-of-order scheduler implementation [35]. Ray addresses the problem a
different way, by developing techniques to automatically generate inductive invariants [68].
Other work combining theorem proving and fully-automatic tools includes the µ-
calculus model checkers that have been developed within PVS and ACL2 [43, 61]. Also,
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Cadence SMV, an industrially successful model checker [50], includes some support for
user-guided composition.
A disadvantage with most combined approaches is that it often necessitates working
in a logical framework, such as the µ-calculus, that is not ideal for human reasoning. The
logic of automated theorem provers are designed to facilitate human reasoning. The logic
of model checkers, on the other hand, are usually only well-suited for specification, not for
deduction. Our work attempts to address this issue by developing automated techniques
within a natural subclass of a logic developed for human reasoning.
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Chapter 3
The ACL2 Logic and Theorem
Prover
ACL2, or A Computational Logic for Applicative Common Lisp (ACL2), is a programming
language, a mathematical logic, and an automated theorem prover. As a programming
language, it is a subset of Common Lisp; as a logic, it is a form of quantifier-free first-order
logic; and as a theorem prover, it is a tool designed to facilitate the creation and checking of
proofs. ACL2 has been successfully applied to formal verification projects within industry,
including the AMD Athlon TM floating-point unit [72] and the Rockwell Collins AAMP7
Separation Kernel [21]. For a complete introduction to the theorem prover, with exercises
and examples, see Computer-Aided Reasoning: An Approach by Kaufmann, Manolios, and
Moore [41].
Both the ACL2 logic and the theorem prover are heavily incorporated into the work
described in this dissertation. This chapter overviews the key concepts and notation from
ACL2 necessary to understand the rest of the dissertation. We begin with an example of an
ACL2 definition and proof in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 then describes the ACL2 syntax and
the mathematical notation used in most of the dissertation to represent ACL2 definitions and
formulas. Section 3.4 and 3.5 discuss the initial set of axioms in ACL2 and ACL2’s system
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for soundly extending them. Finally, Section 3.6 overviews the ACL2 theorem prover and
some of its proof techniques.
3.1 Example
The ACL2 logic is a form of first-order logic, with recursively defined functions. The
primary data structure is trees, where the function cons (x, y) constructs a tree with the left
branch x and right branch y, car (x) returns the left branch of the tree x, cdr (x) returns the
right branch of the tree x, and consp (x) returns whether the object x is a tree. Lists are
usually represented as trees where the first element of the list is the left branch and the list
containing the remaining elements is the right branch. For example, the predicate in (a, x),
which checks whether an element a is in a list x, and the function del (a, x), which removes
a from x, can be defined in the ACL2 logic using the following recursive definitions:
in (a, x) ,

false, if ¬consp (x)
true, if a = car (x)
in (a, cdr (x)), otherwise.
del (a, x) ,

x, if ¬consp (x)
cdr (x), if a = car (x)
cons (car (x), del (a, cdr (x))), otherwise.
Once in (a, x) and del (a, x) are defined, the predicate perm (x, y), which returns
whether x is a permutation of y, can be defined as:
perm (x, y) ,

¬consp (y), if ¬consp (x)
false, if ¬in (car (x), y)
perm (cdr (x), del (car (x), y), otherwise.
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A property one might wish to prove about the permutation predicate is that permu-
tation is transitive. This can be written as the following first-order property, expressible in
ACL2:
perm-transitivity :
perm (x, y) ∧ perm (y, z)→ perm (x, z)
Note that variables occurring in ACL2 formulas, such as x, y, and z above, are implicitly
universally quantified.
The ACL2 theorem prover cannot prove perm-transitivity automatically. However,
ACL2 does attempt to prove perm-transitivity by induction on the size of the list x, which
is a good strategy. By induction on x and the definition of perm (x, y), we can reduce perm-
transitivity to the following two lemmas:
in-one-but-not-other :
in (a, x) ∧ ¬in (a, y)→ ¬perm (x, y)
perm-implies-perm-minus-a :
perm (x, y)→ perm (del (a, x), del (a, y))
where in-one-but-not-other states that if an element is in x but not y, then x is not a permu-
tation of y and perm-implies-perm-minus-a states that if x is a permutation of y, then x and
y are still permutations after some element a is deleted from both of them.
Neither in-one-but-not-other nor perm-implies-perm-minus-a can be proven auto-
matically by the theorem prover. However, by induction on the size of x and the definitions
of the functions in (a, x) and perm (x, y), in-one-but-not-other can reduced to the following
lemma:
in-minus-a-implies-in :
in (a, del (b, x))→ in (a, x)
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which states that if an element a is in the list x minus some element b, then a is in x
itself. The lemma in-minus-a-implies-in is proven automatically by the theorem prover by
induction on the size of x and the definitions of the functions del (a, x) and in (a, x).
Thus to prove the transitivity of permutation, only the lemma perm-implies-perm-
minus-a still needs to be proven. Again, by induction on x and the definitions of del (a, x)
and perm (x, y), perm-implies-perm-minus-a is reduced to the following two lemmas:
in-implies-in-minus-a :
in (a, x) ∧ a , b→ in (a, del (b, x))
del-symmetry :
del (a, del (b, x)) = del (b, del (a, x))
The lemma in-implies-in-minus-a states that if an element is in the list x and then it is in
x with any other element removed. The lemma del-symmetry states that the order of the
removal of two elements is not significant. Both in-implies-in-minus-a and del-symmetry
can be proven automatically by induction on the size of x and the definitions of the functions
del (a, x) and in (a, x).
Thus, ACL2 can prove perm-transitivity with some user guidance in the form of
five lemmas. Note that the proof closely follows the proof a human might create to prove
the transitivity of the perm (x, y) predicate.
3.2 Syntax
The examples in the previous section use standard math notation for first-order logic to
represent ACL2 formulas, which is possible since ACL2 is a form of first-order logic. The
syntax of the ACL2 logic actually, however, uses Lisp syntax to denote terms. A formula
is created from terms using the equality predicate =, and propositional logic, which are
axiomatized in the standard manner [38]. For example, the following is an ACL2 formula:
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1. ’T , ’NIL
2. X = Y→ (EQUAL X Y) = ’T
3. X , Y→ (EQUAL X Y) = ’NIL
4. X = ’NIL→ (IF X Y Z) = Z
5. X , ’NIL→ (IF X Y Z) = Y
Figure 3.1: A subset of axioms in ACL2’s ground zero theory.
X = Y→ (CONS X Y) = (CONS X X).
Since the axioms shown in Figure 3.1 are a part of every ACL2 theory, every ACL2 formula
can be expressed as a formula of the form:
α , ’NIL
for some ACL2 term α. For example, the ACL2 formula
X = Y→ (CONS X Y) = (CONS X X)
can be written as the equivalent ACL2 formula
(IF (EQUAL X Y) (EQUAL (CONS X Y) (CONS X X)) ’T) , ’NIL.
Thus in this dissertation, we sometimes assume that all ACL2 formulas are of the form
α , ’NIL. In fact, users of the ACL2 theorem prover never create ACL2 formulas, only
ACL2 terms. Also, a term α may be used in place of a formula, with the implicit formula
being α , ’NIL. Note that ’T and ’NIL represent the Boolean constants true and false
respectively.
ACL2 also uses Lisp syntax to specify definitional axioms, such as those in Fig-
ure 3.2. These definitions passed directly to the theorem prover in the same manner that
they would be passed to a Lisp interpreter. Each block of data passed to the theorem prover,
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(DEFUN DEL (A X)
(IF (NOT (CONSP X))
X
(IF (EQUAL A (CAR X))
(CDR X)
(CONS (CAR X) (DEL A (CDR X))))))
(DEFUN IN (A X)
(IF (NOT (CONSP X))
NIL
(IF (EQUAL A (CAR X))
T
(IN A (CDR X)))))
(DEFUN PERM (X Y)
(IF (NOT (CONSP X))
(NOT (CONSP Y))
(IF (NOT (IN (CAR X) Y))
NIL
(PERM (CDR X) (DEL (CAR X) Y)))))
Figure 3.2: The definitions from the example in Section 3.1 in the actual ACL2 syntax,
rather than standard math notation.
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such as each definition in Figure 3.2 is called an event. As in Lisp, a definition event has the
form (name formals body), which defines a function named name with formal parameters
formals and body body.
Another ACL2 event is the DEFTHM event, which passes a conjecture to the theorem
prover. The DEFTHM event has the form (DEFTHM name expr opt), where name is the name
of the theorem, expr is a Lisp expression representing the conjecture, and opt consists of
zero or more optional arguments to the theorem prover. For example, the perm-transitivity
theorem from the previous section, is written as the following DEFTHM event:
(DEFTHM PERM-TRANSITIVITY
(IMPLIES (AND (PERM X Y) (PERM Y Z))
(PERM X Z)))
Note that the conjecture contains variables X, Y, and Z, which are implicitly universally
quantified. The conjecture is said to be valid if there is be no substitution of values in the
variables such that it evaluates to ’NIL.
To be more precise, we define the following terminology:
• An ACL2 symbol is a string of numbers and characters starting with a character, such
as CAR or MY-320463TH-SYMBOL.
• An ACL2 constant is of the form (QUOTE expr) or ’expr, where expr can be a rational
number, symbol, Lisp expression, or various other expressions. The quote may be
omitted for numbers and for the symbols T and NIL, which represent the Boolean
constants.
• A lambda expression is an unnamed function with the same syntax as lambda expres-
sions in Lisp. For example, (LAMBDA (X Y) (+ X Y 4)) represents the function
that, given arguments x and y returns x + y + 4.
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• An ACL2 term is either a variable, a constant, or a function application of the form
(fn-name term-list), where fn-name is a symbol corresponding to a function name
and term-list is a (possibly empty) sequence of terms separated by white space. Thus,
(CAR (FOO 4 X)) is an ACL2 term, which can be written in first-order math nota-
tion as car (foo (4, x)).
• A subterm of an ACL2 term e is any term contained within e including itself. For ex-
ample, the subterms of (CAR (FOO 4 X)) are X, 4, (FOO 4 X), and
(CAR (FOO 4 X)).
• An ACL2 term is grounded or a ground term if it contains no variable symbols.
• An ACL2 constant may also be used more loosely in this dissertation to refer to any
grounded ACL2 term containing only the ACL2 core primitive functions, given in
Figure 3.1. For example, (CONS ’0 ’0) is referred to as an ACL2 constant. All
such constants can be normalized, so it is possible to determine whether any two
constants are equal. Technically, this loose definition is necessary even for many
innocuous looking constants, such as ’3, which technically is an abbreviation for
(BINARY-+ ’1 (BINARY-+ ’1 ’1)).
• LET* is used as an abbreviation for nested lambda expressions that bind variables to
values. For example,
(LET* ((X 4)
(Y (+ X 8))
(Z (+ X Y)))
(* X Y Z))








which we write in math notation as
x ∗ y ∗ z
where z := x + y
y := x + 8
x := 4.
Note that order of the definitions in math notation is the exact opposite of Lisp’s
LET*. In Lisp’s LET* notation, a variable is used below its definition, whereas in
math notation a variable is used above its definition.
3.3 Mixing Math and Lisp Notation
Standard math notation is often used in this dissertation to denote ACL2 functions and
terms. Translation of names present some difficulty, since function and variables names
are usually more than one character, and often contain symbols, such as “-”, which can
be confused with operations. To avoid ambiguity, names are sometimes modified. For
example, ACL2’s BINARY+ function might be renamed bplus , with a note stating that it
implements ACL2’s binary addition. Also, since names and variables are often multiple
symbols, the × symbol is never implied. For example, in this dissertation ab + c means add
the variable ab to c, not a × b + c.
Actual ACL2 notation is also used in places in this dissertation. For the most part,
its use is limited to when functions are defined that input or return ACL2 terms. Such
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functions warrant further discussion, since they can easily be the cause of much confusion.
Consider, for example, the function Fn (E), used in Chapter 5. Given an ACL2 term E,
denoting a function application, then Fn (E) is the function being applied. For example,
Fn (p(CAR (CONS X Y))q) = pCARq.
We use the pq delimiters to enclose an ACL2 term, which is a constant in the surrounding
mathematical term. Thus, in the above example, the function Fn is applied to the argument
p(CAR (CONS X Y))q, which is a constant denoting the ACL2 term (CAR (CONS X Y)).
In Lisp, the QUOTE (or ’) symbol has a similar effect as pq. For example, given the
Lisp definition:
(DEFUN FN (X) (CAR X))
then
(FN ’(CAR (CONS X Y))) = ’CAR,
whereas
(FN (CAR (CONS X Y))) = (FN X) = (CAR X).
Similarly, the ACL2 formula
(CAR (CONS X Y)) = X
is valid, since it is an axiom in ACL2. On the other hand,
p(CAR (CONS X Y))q , pXq,
since p(CAR (CONS X Y))q is literally a different constant than pXq.
When an ACL2 term occurs by itself, without any enclosing first-order math no-
tation, the pq delimiters may be used or they may be omitted. To emphasize that some
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expression is an ACL2 term or ACL2 formula, it is often is enclosed in a box, like the pre-
vious ACL2 examples. first-order math notation, on the other hand, is usually presented
without an enclosing box.
As another example, consider the function (actually set of functions)
MakeFn ( f , x0, x1, ...xn) that, given ACL2 term f and ACL2 terms x0 through xn, returns
the ACL2 term that applies f to the argument list x0 through xn. Thus,
Fn (MakeFn ( f , x0, x1, ..., xn)) = f
For example,
MakeFn (pCONSq, pXq, pYq) = p(CONS X Y)q.
and
MakeFn (pEQUALq,MakeFn (pCARq,MakeFn (pCONSq, pXq, pYq)), pXq).
is equal to the ACL2 term
(EQUAL (CAR (CONS X Y)) X),
which is a valid ACL2 formula (here we implicitly translate the ACL2 term into a formula
as described in Section 3.2).
3.4 Primitives
An ACL2 primitive is a function symbol present in the ACL2 ground-zero theory, i.e., the
theory in which the ACL2 theorem prover begins. We further divide the ACL2 primitives
into core primitives and defined primitives. The core primitives, or undefined primitives, are
the 29 primitives in Table 3.1 1. We call the remaining ACL2 primitives defined primitives.
Note that while ACL2 is an untyped language, its objects are divided essentially into
characters, strings, numbers, symbols, and lists (or trees). ACL2 numbers are the complex
1Table 3.1 is copied verbatim from “A Precise Description of the ACL2 Logic” by Kaufmann and Moore
[38]
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rationals (e.g., 4/11 + 1/2 × i), characters are ASCII characters (e.g., ’a’), lists (or trees)
are lists ACL2 objects (e.g., [1, 2, 3]), strings are essentially lists of characters tagged as a
string (e.g., “abc”), and symbols are essentially strings tagged as a symbol (e.g., abc). For
more information on the constants of ACL2 and how they are constructed, see “A Precise
Description of the ACL2 Logic” by Kaufmann and Moore [38].
The core primitives are defined through a series of axioms. For example, the IF
primitive satisfies the following axioms:
X = ’NIL→ (IF X Y Z) = Y
X , ’NIL→ (IF X Y Z) = Z
The defined primitives are each defined using a single Lisp definition, which represents a
single axiom in the ground zero theory. Some examples of common primitives and their
definitions are shown in Figure 3.3 and described as follows:
• The IMPLIES and IFF functions implement logical implication and Boolean equiva-
lence respectively.
• The (NFIX X) function returns X if X is a natural number, and zero otherwise.
• The (ZP X) function returns true if X is zero or is not a natural number.
• The MIN and MAX functions select the minimum and maximum of their inputs.
• The NTH function returns the nth member of a list.
• The LEN returns the length of a list.
ACL2 also has a built-in representation for ordinals up to ε0. Since ordinals, such as
the natural numbers, cannot decrease forever, they are useful for reasoning about fixpoints.
Primitives involving ordinals include (O-P X), which recognizes whether X is an ordinal in
ACL2’s representation and (O< X Y), which determines whether an X represents an ordinal
less than the ordinal represented by Y.
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Table 3.1: ACL2 Core Primitives
Function Arity Description
BINARY-* 2 multiplies two numbers
BINARY-+ 2 adds two numbers
UNARY-- 1 negates a number
UNARY-/ 1 inverts a number
< 2 less than on the rationals
BOOLEANP 1 recognizes ’T and ’NIL
CAR 1 first element of a list
CDR 1 all but first element of a list
CHAR-CODE 1 maps characters to integers
CHARACTERP 1 recognizes characters
CODE-CHAR 1 maps integers to characters
COMPLEX 2 builds a complex from two rationals
COMPLEX-RATIONALP 1 recognizes a complex number
COERCE 2 maps between character lists and strings
CONS 2 builds a list
CONSP 2 recognizes a non-empty list
DENOMINATOR 1 denominator of a rational
EQUAL 2 equality predicate
IF 3 if-then-else
IMAGPART 1 imaginary part of a complex
INTEGERP 1 recognizes integers
INTERN-IN-PACKAGE-OF-SYMBOL 2 maps a string to a symbol
NUMERATOR 1 numerator of a rational
RATIONALP 1 recognizes rationals
REALPART 1 real part of a complex
STRINGP 1 recognizes strings of characters
SYMBOL-NAME 1 name of a symbol
SYMBOL-PACKAGE-NAME 1 package name of a symbol
SYMBOLP 1 recognizes symbols
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(DEFUN IMPLIES (P Q) (IF P (IF Q ’T ’NIL) ’T))
(DEFUN IFF (P Q) (IF P (IF Q ’T ’NIL) (IF Q ’NIL ’T)))
(DEFUN NFIX (X)
(IF (IF (INTEGERP X) (NOT (< X ’0)) ’NIL)
X ’0))
(DEFUN ZP (X)
(IF (INTEGERP X) (NOT (< ’0 X)) ’T))
(DEFUN MIN (X Y) (IF (< X Y) X Y))
(DEFUN MAX (X Y) (IF (< Y X) X Y))
(DEFUN NTH (N L)




(NTH (BINARY-+ ’-1 N) (CDR L)))))
(DEFUN LEN (X)
(IF (CONSP X)
(BINARY-+ ’1 (LEN (CDR X)))
’0))
Figure 3.3: Some examples of defined primitives that are used elsewhere in the dissertation.
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ACL2 also supports Lisp macros, which are simply abbreviations in the logic. Some
primitive macros used later in the dissertation include:
• Conjunction. Conjunction, like implication is implemented using the IF core prim-
itive. Conjunction, however, is implemented using a macro, AND, so that any num-
ber of arguments may be conjoined. For example, (AND X Y) is an abbreviation for
(IF X Y ’NIL), while (AND X Y Z) is an abbreviation for
(IF X (IF Y Z ’NIL) ’NIL).
• Disjunction. Disjunction is analogous to conjunction, and is named OR. For example,
(OR X Y Z) is an abbreviation for (IF X X (IF Y Y Z)).
• Addition. Addition, named +, is another macro that can take multiple arguments. The
expression (+ X Y Z) is an abbreviation for (BINARY-+ X (BINARY-+ Y Z)).
• Multiplication. Multiplication, named *, is analogous to addition. The expression
(* X Y Z) is an abbreviation for (BINARY-* X (BINARY-* Y Z)).
• Subtraction. Subtraction is a macro, named -, with two arguments. The expression
(- X Y) is an abbreviation for (BINARY-+ X (UNARY-- Y)).
For a complete list of the axioms in the ground-zero theory and ACL2’s standard
abbreviations, see “A Precise Description of the ACL2 Logic” by Kaufmann and Moore.
3.5 The Definition Principle
The ACL2 ground-zero theory can be extended using definition events, such as those in Fig-
ure 3.2. Each such event adds a new axiom to the ACL2 theory defining the corresponding




(IF (NOT (CONSP X))
NIL
(IF (EQUAL A (CAR X))
T
(IN A (CDR X))))
where A and X are again implicitly universally quantified.
It is possible to create a syntactically well-formed Lisp definition that leads to an
inconsistent theory. For example, if (F X) = (NOT (F X)) is added to any ACL2 theory,
then it becomes possible to prove anything. To avoid such axioms, ACL2 requires that every
recursive definition terminate. To do this, for every recursive function f , a measure function
m f , with the same formal parameters as f , must be shown to return an ordinal that decreases
on each recursive application. In other words, if the definition of f (x) contains a recursive
call f (r (x)), under condition p (x), then it must be proven that p (x) → m f (r (x)) < m f (x).
For example, consider the definition of IN again:
(DEFUN IN (A X)
(DECLARE (XARGS :MEASURE (LEN X)))
(IF (NOT (CONSP X))
NIL
(IF (EQUAL A (CAR X))
T
(IN A (CDR X)))))
Normally, ACL2 chooses a measure function heuristically, and in the case of IN, ACL2’s
heuristics succeed. However, in the above example, the body of the measure function is
given explicitly as (LEN X) (where X corresponds to the formal parameter of IN with the
same name). Given the measure function corresponding to IN and its recursive call, the
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proof obligation is:
(AND (O-P (LEN X))
(IMPLIES (AND (CONSP X)
(NOT (EQUAL A (CAR X))))
(O< (LEN (CDR X)) (LEN X))))
which states that (LEN X) is an ordinal and that it decreases when IN is called recursively.
The above proof obligation is a theorem that is proven automatically by the ACL2 theorem
prover. The proof follows from the fact that (LEN X) is a natural number, and all natural
numbers are ordinals. Furthermore, if X is a list, then (LEN (CDR X)) is smaller than
(LEN X) by induction on X and the definition of LEN.
ACL2 also supports the introduction of mutual-recursive functions, but no knowl-
edge of mutual-recursive functions is needed in this dissertation.
3.5.1 Encapsulation
ACL2 also supports constrained functions, which are functions that satisfy a list of proper-
ties, rather than a single axiom corresponding to a definition event. To avoid inconsistent
axioms, such as constraining f to be a function satisfying
f (x) = ¬f (x),
it is required to provide a witness—a function defined using the definition principle that
satisfies the property. For example, a function EQUIV could be introduced satisfying only
the constraints in Figure 3.4. The EQUIV constraints are the constraints required to be an
equivalence relation, and are satisfied by the previously defined PERM function, as well as
the ACL2 primitives EQUAL, IFF, and the function that always returns true, (LAMBDA (X
Y) ’T).
A constrained function may also be introduced with an empty set of constraints,
in which case we call it an uninterpreted function. Uninterpreted functions only have the
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(IMPLIES (AND (EQUIV X Y) (EQUIV Y Z)) (EQUIV X Z))
(IMPLIES (EQUIV X Y) (EQUIV Y X))
(EQUIV X X)
Figure 3.4: The list of constraints for an arbitrary equivalence relation, EQUIV.
implicit constraint that they return the same value given the same arguments. Note that the
proof obligation for an uninterpreted function is trivial.
Constrained functions are implemented using ACL2’s encapsulation feature, which
allows definitional axioms to occur only within an encapsulated block of events. Thus the
witness function need not introduce any new function symbols into the ACL2 theory pro-
duced after the encapsulation block. The encapsulation block also may be used to manage
the complexity of large proofs by introducing function symbols and theorems locally to
the block and then exporting only the key theorems and definitions needed for some larger
proof. The removal of such function symbols is justified in a paper by Kaufmann and Moore
[39], which shows that every definitional axiom in ACL2 is a conservative extension of the
previous theory, i.e., every theorem provable in the extended theory is either provable in the
previous theory or involves the function symbols introduced by the extension.
3.6 The Theorem Prover
The ACL2 theorem prover combines many proof techniques, which are, for the most part,
applied automatically using heuristics. This section presents a brief overview of the tech-
niques, beginning with forward chaining and rewriting. For a more complete overview, see
Computer-Aided Reasoning: An Approach.
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3.6.1 Forward Chaining
At any point during a proof, ACL2 has a set of valid assumptions, known as the context.
For example, ACL2 will attempt to prove f (x) ∧ g (x) → h (x) by proving h (x) within a
context where f (x) and g (x) are assumed. If that fails, it will attempt to prove ¬f (x), within
a context where g (x) and ¬h (x) are assumed (since f (x) ∧ g (x) → h (x) is equivalent to
g (x) ∧ ¬h (x) → ¬f (x)). If that fails, it will similarly attempt to prove ¬g (x), within a
context where f (x) and ¬h (x) are assumed.
ACL2 also keeps a database of previously proven theorems. The forward chaining
technique attempts to use theorems in the database marked as forward chaining rules to
grow the context. For example, if f (x) and g (x) are in the current context, and f (x)→ m(x)
is a forward chaining rule, then m(x) is added to the context. If m(x) is the proof goal,
then forward chaining has succeeded. Otherwise, it still may be useful to know m(x) while
attempting to prove the current goal by additional forward chaining, or other techniques.
Since any instantiation of a theorem is also a theorem, the forward chaining tech-
nique attempts to find useful instances of forward chaining rules. The primary technique
involves unification. We say a term A unifies with a term B, if there exists a substitution
σ mapping the variables in A to expressions such that A/σ = B. Therefore, if A is a uni-
versally quantified theorem and A unifies with some term B, then B is also a theorem. In
the automated theorem proving community, this is sometimes referred to as one-way uni-
fication, but within this dissertation all unification is one-way, so we refer to it simply as
unification.
Each forward chaining rule has an associated trigger term. Before a forward chain-
ing rule is applied the trigger term must unify with some assumption in the context. Then
the forward chaining technique attempts to extend the substitution implied by the unifica-
tion to create an instance of the rule where all hypotheses occur in the context. For example,
if f (g (a)) is in the current context and f (x) → h (x) is a forward chaining rule with trigger
term f (x), then h (g (a)) is added to the context, since f (x) unifies with f (g (a)) under the
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substitution [x 7→ g (a)]. If a user marks a theorem as a forward chaining rule without
specifying a trigger term, then the trigger term is the first hypothesis of the theorem.
Unification on the trigger term may fail to produce a complete substitution mapping
the variables in the forward chaining rule to values. In this case, which is discussed in
Chapter 4, other heuristics are used to complete the substitution.
3.6.2 Rewriting
The rewriting proof technique attempts to use previously proven theorems, marked as
rewrite rules, to simplify the current proof goal. For example, if marked as a rewrite rule, a
theorem of the form:
My-Rewrite:
p (x) ∧ q (x)→ f (x) = g (x)
is treated as an instruction to rewrite instances of f (x) to g (x), when p (x) and q (x) are
true. If f (x) unifies with a term in the current proof goal under a substitution σ, then f (x)/σ
is replaced by g (x)/σ if p (x)/σ and q (x)/σ can be proven from the current context. For
example, using My-Rewrite, ACL2 will rewrite h (f (g (a))) to h (g (g (a))) if p (g (a)) and
q (g (a)) can be proven from the current context.
Rewriting in ACL2 occurs inside out. Thus, using My-Rewrite and assuming the
hypotheses can be proven, a proof goal f (f (a)) will first be rewritten to f (g (a)) and then to
g (g (a)).
Rewrite rules need not conclude with an equality; they can also conclude with any
equivalence relation, which is a binary function satisfying the theorems in Figure 3.4. For
example, if equiv (x, y) is such an equivalence relation, then a rewrite rule can have the
conclusion equiv (f (x), g (x)). Such a rule is treated as an instruction to rewrite f (x) to g (x)
when equiv (f (x), g (x)) is sufficient to ensure that the original proof goal is true if and only
if the rewritten proof goal is true. For example, if the proof goal is h (f (a)), then h (f (a))
can be rewritten to h (g (a)) if equiv (x, y)→ (h (x)↔ h (y)).
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ACL2 relies on theorems marked as congruence rules to justify rewriting based on
equivalence relations other than equality. Congruence rules have the form
equiv 0(xi, yi)→ equiv 1(f (x1, ..., xn), f (x1, ..., xi−1, yi, xi+1, ..., xn))
where equiv 0 and equiv 1 are arbitrary equivalence relations; x1 through xn and y are vari-
ables; and f is an arbitrary function. Since “if and only if” is an equivalence relation
equiv (x, y) → (h (x) ↔ h (y)) is an example of a theorem that can be marked as a congru-
ence rule.
By combining congruence rules, ACL2 can justify equivalence-based rewriting of
complex expressions. For example, if equiv (f (x), g (x)), then the rewriting of h (f (f (a)))
to h (g (g (a))) is justified by the congruence rules equiv (x, y) → equiv (f (x), f (y)) and
equiv (x, y)→ (h (x)↔ h (y)).
By default, all theorems entered into ACL2’s theorem database are marked as
rewrite rules. Theorems with a conclusion Q that is not an equivalence relation can be
considered a rewrite rules with the conclusion Q ↔ true. For example, p (x) → q (x) is
treated as p (x) → (q (x) ↔ true). This leads to a form of backchaining, since ACL2 will
attempt to prove q (a) by rewriting q (a) to true if p (a) can be proven. This backchaining
with the rewriting proof technique is also how the theorem prover is able to use lemmas
automatically in the example proofs of Section 3.1.
3.6.3 Overview of other Main Techniques
Some other techniques used within the ACL2 theorem prover are as follows:
• Evaluation. All of the core primitives in Table 3.1 are executable, meaning that their
value can be determined given any constant inputs. Similarly, any function whose
body contains only executable functions (or itself) is also executable. Thus, many
ground terms, i.e., terms containing no variables—can be evaluated to constants. For
example, car (cons (4 + 5, 7)) is automatically reduced to 9. The evaluation proof
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technique is used to reduce, when possible, all function calls with constant arguments
to constants.
• Expansion. Every application of a function introduced by a definition event can
be expanded into an instance of its body. Performing such expansions is not al-
ways a good idea though, since recursive functions can be expanded infinitely. The
expansion proof technique performs such expansions only when ACL2’s heuristics
determine that such an expansion is likely to lead to a successful proof.
• Linear Arithmetic. ACL2 contains a proof technique for proving linear arithmetic
theorems. While the mechanism does not prove all theorems within the traditional
theory of linear arithmetic, it has the advantage that it can be extended with theorems
involving user-created functions.
• Type Prescription. ACL2 also contains a mechanism specially designed to prove
rules involving the basic types of ACL2, such as lists and Booleans. For example,
when a new predicate symbol p (x) is introduced, ACL2 will likely automatically
deduce booleanp (p (x)), where booleanp (x) is the function recognizing Booleans.
Then, if the hypothesis of some forward chaining rule or rewrite rule requires
booleanp (p (x)), that hypothesis is proven without needing to look at the body of
p (x).
• Case splitting. Case splitting is sometimes used to reduce an IF into two cases
corresponding to its true and false branches.
• Destructor Elimination. The destructor elimination proof technique removes calls
of the destructors CAR and CDR.
• Induction. ACL2 contains heuristics that automatically attempt to prove theorems
by induction. The ACL2 heuristics attempt to find a good induction scheme to prove
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a given formula from the proofs of termination of functions occurring in that formula.
For example,
in-minus-a-implies-in :
in (a, del (b, x))→ in (a, x),
from Section 3.1, is proven automatically by induction on the size of x; which is also
the measure used to prove the termination of del .
• Generalization. Often induction only succeeds when given a more general form of
a property. ACL2’s generalization proof technique attempts to find such generaliza-
tions and perform them prior to induction.
• Functional instantiation. Any theorem proven about a constrained function is also
valid for any function satisfying its constraints. For example, any theorem proven
about the EQUIV function with the constraints in Figure 3.4, can be automatically de-
duced about IFF, EQUAL, and PERM. Functional instantiation is not tried automatically
by the theorem prover, but is accessible through ACL2’s hint mechanism described
in Section 3.6.4.
The above techniques are combined with a few techniques not mentioned, to create
the ACL2 theorem prover. The most straightforward techniques are generally tried first,
such as evaluation and rewriting, and those requiring the most heuristics, such as induction
or generalization, are tried last.
3.6.4 User Guidance
Expert users can control the theorem prover through multiple mechanisms. Most of the
techniques described in Section 3.6.3 can be completely disabled when they are interfering
with other techniques. More commonly though, users guide the theorem prover by proving
lemmas, as described in Section 3.1, and marking those lemmas as rules to be associated
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with various ACL2 proof techniques. Rules are also commonly disabled or enabled based
on whether they are likely to be useful in a given proof.
Users can affect a proof more directly by using ACL2’s hint mechanism. ACL2 typ-
ically divides a proof into many user-accessible goals and the hint mechanism allows users
to provide assistance at a particular goal. The assistance may involve, among other things,
the disabling and enabling of particular rules; the use of a particular strategy, such as ex-
panding a certain function application; or instantiating a particular theorem. In Chapter 11,
a new form of assistance, accessible through the hint mechanism, is described.
3.6.5 Meta Reasoning
Meta reasoning is a proof technique that allows the use of ACL2 functions that directly
manipulate ACL2 terms. This section provides an introduction to meta reasoning, which
is needed for the discussion of a new technique similar to meta reasoning in chapter 11. A
more complete discussion of meta reasoning can be found in Hunt et al. [30].
A simple, but powerful, form of meta reasoning is available through the syntaxp (x)
primitive. Within the ACL2 logic, syntaxp (x) = true, so syntaxp (x) → p (x) reduces to
proving p (x). “Under the hood”, however, syntaxp (x) can prevent proof techniques from
being used automatically. A theorem syntaxp (x) → p (x) will only be applied automat-
ically when x/σ evaluates to true, where σ is a substitution mapping the variables in the
current theorem to constants corresponding to their value after unification. For example,
the rewrite rule
syntaxp (p (x))→ f (x) = g (x)
will rewrite f (h (a)) to g (h (a)) only when p (p(H A)q) is true, where p(H A)q is the ACL2
term representing h (a).
More sophisticated forms of meta reasoning require that an ACL2 evaluator be
defined. Evaluators are constrained functions, with constraints that are satisfied by the
actual evaluation of ACL2 terms. An evaluator ev (e, σ) inputs an ACL2 term e and a
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substitution σ and is either equal to e/σ, as defined by the current ACL2 theory, or is
undefined over the given term e. For example, if the definitional axiom for some function
is f (x) = x + 1, then
ev (p(F X)q, σ) = ev (p(+ X 1)q, σ)
may be one of the constraints defining ev (e, σ). Thus, it is possible to prove theorems about
the evaluation of f (x), such as
ev (pF 10q, σ) = 11,
which states that f (10) evaluates to 11. Another example is
ev (p(F (+ X 1))q, σ) = ev (p(+ (F X) 1)q, σ),
which states that f (x + 1) evaluates to the same value as f (x) + 1.
Once an evaluator ev (e, σ) is defined, a meta rule can be associated with theorems
such as:
termp (x) ∧ alistp (σ) ∧ ev (hyp (x), σ)
→
equiv (ev (x, σ), ev (trans (x), σ)),
where termp (x) recognizes a well-formed ACL2 term x, alistp (σ) recognizes a well formed
substitution σ, equiv (x, y) is any equivalence relation, hyp (x) is any predicate and trans (x)
is any function.
A trigger term, provided by the user, is also associated with the meta rule. The
meta rule is then applied as part of the rewriting proof technique described in Section 3.6.2.
Whenever the trigger term unifies with a term x in the current proof goal, then x is rewritten
by applying the trans function on it if the hyp predicate returns true, and equivalence-
based rewriting using equiv (x, y) is justified as described in Section 3.6.2. For example, if
hyp (p(F (G A))q) = true and trans (p(F (G A))q) = p(G (F A))q, then the proof goal
h (f (g (a))) is rewritten by meta-reasoning to h (g (f (a))), assuming that the equivalence-
based rewriting is justified.
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Meta rules therefore are a more direct way to manipulate terms within the ACL2
theorem prover. Meta rules can, at times, be more efficient than traditional rewriting. They







One way to make large-scale formal verification more practical is to increase the automa-
tion in a tool already capable of large-scale formal verification, such as ACL2. This chapter
describes such a modification to ACL2’s forward chaining proof technique. The modifica-
tion essentially requires more time to prove theorems, but can prove more theorems auto-
matically. The modification became part of ACL2’s default forward chaining technique in
version 2.7, and has been the default since then.
Section 4.2 presents an example of a theorem that used to require user interaction
to prove, but now can be proven automatically. Section 4.3 describes the modification in




Consider the predicate len-equal (x, y), which returns whether two lists have the same
length. In ACL2, len-equal (x, y) can be defined as follows:
len-equal (x, y) ,
 atom (x) ∧ atom (y), if atom (x) ∨ atom (y)len-equal (cdr (x), cdr (y)), otherwise.
Furthermore, let p (x, y) be a constrained function satisfying the following axiom:
len-equal-implies-p:
len-equal (x, y)→ p (x, y)
Given the definition of len-equal (x, y), the ACL2 theorem prover can prove the
following theorem automatically by induction on x:
len-equal-transitive:
len-equal (x, y) ∧ len-equal (y, z)→ len-equal (x, z)
If len-equal-transitive and len-equal-implies-p are marked as forward chaining rules, then
the following theorem can be proven automatically:
len-equal-implies-p-2:
len-equal (a, b) ∧ len-equal (b, c)→ p (a, c)
During the above proof attempt, the ACL2 theorem prover keeps a list of facts, called the
context, that follow from the hypotheses of the theorem being proven (as well as some
other sources). Among the context are the hypotheses themselves, len-equal (a, b) and
len-equal (b, c). The forward chaining technique then adds len-equal (a, c) to the context,
since it follows from the facts in the context and len-equal-transitive under the substitution
[x 7→ a, y 7→ b, z 7→ c]. The forward chaining technique next proves the conclusion,
since p (a, c) follows from len-equal (a, c) and len-equal-implies-p under the substitution
[x 7→ a, y 7→ c].
Now consider the following two theorems, which are the same as len-equal-implies-
p-2, but each contain an extra (unnecessary) hypothesis.
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len-equal-implies-p-3:
len-equal (a, b) ∧ len-equal (b, c) ∧ len-equal (b, d)→ p (a, c)
len-equal-implies-p-4:
len-equal (a, b) ∧ len-equal (b, d) ∧ len-equal (b, c)→ p (a, c)
The theorem len-equal-implies-p-4 is proven automatically by the forward chaining tech-
nique in ACL2 version 2.6, but the theorem len-equal-implies-p-3 is not.
To explain the problem, first we need to explain a little about how the forward chain-
ing proof technique works. The forward chaining proof technique relies on unification with
a single term, known as the trigger term, to find an instance of a forward chaining rule that
is applicable to a given proof. The unification provides an instance of variables to values
for all variables occurring in the trigger term. Another method must be used to instantiate
variables occurring outside the trigger term, which are called free variables. By default, the
trigger term is the first hypotheses of a forward chaining rule. Thus, len − equal − transitive
trigger term is the len-equal (x, y). The variable z in len − equal − transitive is a free vari-
able.
In ACL2 version 2.6, only the first instance found for a free variable is used. Thus,
when attempting to prove len-equal-implies-p-3 and len-equal-implies-p-4, the forward
chaining technique uses len-equal-transitivity either under the substitution
[x 7→ a, y 7→ b, z 7→ c] or under the substitution [x 7→ a, y 7→ b, z 7→ d], but not
both. The chosen substitution depends on the order of the hypotheses in the conjecture
being proven. In theorem len-equal-implies-p-3, [x 7→ a, y 7→ b, z 7→ d] is chosen, and
len-equal (a, d) is added to the context. In theorem len-equal-implies-p-4, on the other
hand, [x 7→ a, y 7→ b, z 7→ c] is chosen, and len-equal (a, c) is added to the context. There-
fore, len-equal-implies-p-4 is proven by forward chaining, but len-equal-implies-p-3 is not.
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The modification described in this chapter is such that all possible instances of free
variables are added to the context. Thus, both len-equal (a, c) and len-equal (a, d) are added
to the context during the proof attempts of len-equal-implies-p-3 and len-equal-implies-p-4,
and both theorems are proven automatically.
4.3 Forward Chaining Implementation
This section describes the modification to the forward chaining proof technique in detail.
We refer to the unmodified forward chaining technique as the match once approach and the
modified forward chaining technique as the match all approach.
First, given two substitutions σ and σ′, we say that σ′ extends σ, or σ v σ′, if σ′
contains every element in σ. For example,
[a 7→ 1, b 7→ 2] v [a 7→ 1, b 7→ 2, c 7→ 3] = true
whereas
[a 7→ 1, b 7→ 2] v [a 7→ 1, c 7→ 3] = false.
The match once approach begins with a substitution σ0 resulting from unification
with the forward chaining rule’s trigger term. Then, given hypothesis Hi, σi is defined, if
possible, as a substitution satisfying σi−1 v σi ∧ Hi/σi = C for some term C in the current
context. If, for any hypothesis, no such σi exists, then the forward chaining technique
fails to use that rule. Otherwise, Q/σn is added to the context, where n is the number of
hypotheses in the forward chaining rule and Q is its conclusion. The addition of Q/σn is
justified since each hypothesis of the forward chaining rule under the substitution σn is in
the context. We illustrate the match once approach, alongside the match all approach, on an
example in Figure 4.1.
The match all approach begins with a list of substitutions Σ0 = [σ0], where σ0
is again the substitution resulting from unification with the trigger term. Then, given hy-
pothesis Hi, a list of substitutions Σi is constructed from Σi−1. A substitution Σi contains a
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Rule: f (w, x) ∧ f (x, y) ∧ f (y, z)→ f (w, z)
Initial Context: f (a, b), f (b, c), f (b, d), f (c, e), f (c, f ), f (d, g)
Initial Substitution: σ0 = [w 7→ a, x 7→ b]
Match Once
Hypothesis σ
f (w, x) : [w 7→ a, x 7→ b]
f (x, y) : [w 7→ a, x 7→ b, y 7→ c]
f (y, z) : [w 7→ a, x 7→ b, y 7→ c, z 7→ e]
Conclusion: f (a, e)
Match All
Hypothesis Σ
f (w, x) : [[w 7→ a, x 7→ b]]
f (x, y) : [[w 7→ a, x 7→ b, y 7→ c], [w 7→ a, x 7→ b, y 7→ d]]
f (y, z) : [[w 7→ a, x 7→ b, y 7→ c, z 7→ e], [w 7→ a, x 7→ b, y 7→ c, z 7→ f ],
[w 7→ a, x 7→ b, y 7→ d, z 7→ g]]
Conclusions: f (a, e), f (a, f ), f (a, g)
Figure 4.1: The above figure illustrates the match once and match all approaches on an
example. The example rule is a weak form of transitivity for some predicate f (x, y). It
has two free variables, y and z. An initial substitution and context are given, which are the
same for both approaches. In the match once approach, a substitution σ is then developed
from each hypothesis, leading to a single conclusion to add to the context. In the match all
approach, a list of substitutions Σ is developed from each hypothesis, leading to multiple
conclusions to add to the context.
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substitution σi if and only if there exists a σi−1 ∈ Σi−1 and a term C in the current context
such that σi−1 v σi ∧Hi/σi = C. The match all approach then grows the context by adding
Q/σn for each σn in Σn, where n is the number of hypotheses in the forward chaining rule
and Q is its conclusion. The addition of Q/σ is justified by the validity of the rule, since
σ maps each hypothesis to an element in the context. The match all approach is illustrated
alongside the match once approach with an example in Figure 4.1.
The number of additions to the context can be exponential in the number of free
variables. For instance, xn conclusions can be drawn from a forward chaining rule of the
form:
f (x1) ∧ f (x2) ∧ ... ∧ f (xn)→ g (x1, x2, ..., xn)
when the initial context [ f (a), f (b)]. If n is 2, for example, g (a, a), g (a, b), g (b, a), and
g (b, b), are derived from [ f (a), f (b)] and the rule
f (x1) ∧ f (x2)→ g (x1, x2).
To avoid this exponential and other performance issues caused by the match all
technique, forward chaining rules can be tagged as match once, in which case the original
match once approach is still used to instantiate them. In practice, however, the match all
approach rarely leads to a large increase in proof time, because of the low number of free
variables in most rules. Since version 2.7, the ACL2 theorem prover uses the match all
technique by default.
4.4 Results
The match all technique has now been part of the prover for over four years. Figure 4.2
compares the time taken to verify ACL2 version 3.1’s regression suite using a prover with
only the match once forward chaining technique versus a prover with only the match all
forward chaining technique. Four files contained theorems that were not provable with the
match once prover, whereas every file could be proven with the match all prover. While
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Figure 4.2: A graph comparing the performance of the theorem prover before and after
increasing free variable instantiation of forward chaining rules. Each point represents a file
in the ACL2 regression suite. The x-axis is the time required when using the old, match
once, approach. The y-axis is the time required when using the new, match all, approach.
A point is on the line if the same time is required by both techniques.
the match all technique can cause an exponential slow-down, Figure 4.2 shows that any
slow-down at all is rare. The total time to prove all the files in the regression suite except
the four files that cannot be proven by the match once approach, was 2 hours, 16 minutes,
and 7 seconds for the match once prover, and 2 hours, 19 minutes, and 2 seconds for the
match all prover—a difference of 2.1 percent 1.
In ACL2 version 2.6, the rewriting and linear arithmetic proof techniques also used
an approach analogous to the match once approach in the forward chaining proof technique.
However, an approach analogous to the match all approach is now the default for all three
techniques. Figure 4.3 extends the comparison to the analogous rewriting and linear arith-
metic proof techniques. Here, the match once prover uses a match once free variable ap-
proach for rewriting, linear arithmetic, and forward chaining, whereas the match all prover
1These results were obtained on a Pentium R© 4, 3.0 GHz, dual processor with 2 gigabytes of random access
memory. ACL2 version 3.1 was used, running under GNU Common Lisp version 2.6.7.
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Figure 4.3: A graph comparing the performance of the theorem prover before and after in-
creasing free variable instantiation in the rewriting, linear arithmetic, and forward chaining
proof technique. Each point represents a file in the ACL2 regression suite. The x-axis is the
time required when using the old, match once, approach. The y-axis is the time required
when using the new, match all, approach. A point is on the line if the same time is required
by both techniques.
uses a match all free variable approach for all of these techniques. One file contained proofs
that could not be completed by the match all prover, due to the slow-down in performance.
Twenty-seven files contained proofs that could not be completed by the match once prover.
Omitting these twenty-eight files, the total time to prove the regression suite for the match
once prover was 1 hour, 53 minutes, 33 seconds versus 2 hours, 10 minutes, and 48 seconds
for the match all prover—a difference of 15.2 percent.
4.5 Summary
ACL2’s forward chaining proof technique has been modified to allow it to prove more
theorem automatically. Furthermore, the modification does not significantly reduce perfor-
mance on any of the existing proofs in ACL2’s regression suite. Based on these results, the
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modified technique is now ACL2’s default forward chaining technique. Similar improve-
ments to the rewriting and linear arithmetic proof techniques were later implemented and
added to the theorem prover as well.
The modification to the forward chaining technique highlights the potential for fu-
ture improvements to the theorem prover. A general purpose theorem prover must balance
a trade-off between proving difficult theorems automatically and proving easy theorems
quickly. The modification to the forward chaining technique adjusts this trade-off by prov-
ing more theorems automatically and the expense of requiring more time to prove other
theorems.
4.6 Development and Bibliographic Notes
This chapter describes joint work with J Moore and Matt Kaufmann. J Moore helped de-
velop the new forward chaining algorithm, I implemented the initial forward chaining mod-
ification, and Matt Kaufmann modified it somewhat before adding it to the theorem prover.
Matt Kaufmann went on to implement similar modification to the rewriting and linear arith-
metic proof techniques.
Automated instantiation of free variables is not always built into general-purpose
theorem provers. PVS [62], for example, has no built-in technique for automating free
variable instantiation, though such a technique may be implemented through user-defined
“tactics.” A contextual rewriting technique that instantiates free variables, called here exis-
tential variables, is part of the Terminating Functional Programs (TFL) environment [83],
implemented for HOL [20] and Isabelle [59]. Techniques for using unification to match free
variables, called here holes, can also be found in the field of logic programming [45, 51].
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Chapter 5
The Subclass of Unrollable List
Formulas in ACL2 (SULFA)
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter describes a method to decrease the amount of user guidance required
in theorem proving by modifying the ACL2 theorem prover’s existing proof techniques.
Another way to decrease the amount of user guidance is to identify ACL2 formulas that
can be verified fully automatically and then use fully-automated procedures to prove or
disprove such formulas. Such a technique not only can significantly reduce the amount of
human effort required to prove valid formulas, but also can inform users when a conjecture
is not provable from the current ACL2 theory.
This chapter defines the decidable Subclass of Unrollable List Formulas in ACL2
(SULFA). Here we say that SULFA is a decidable subclass of ACL2 because:
1. A terminating procedure exists that recognizes whether any ACL2 formula is in
SULFA.
2. A terminating procedure exists that decides whether any formula in SULFA is prov-
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able in ACL2.
This chapter addresses the first requirement, by showing that there exists a terminating
procedure that recognizes whether any ACL2 formula is in SULFA. Chapter 6 addresses
the second requirement, by presenting a terminating procedure that decides any SULFA
formula.
Note that “decidable subclass” is a pretty weak term. Any terminating proof pro-
cedure is a decision procedure for a decidable subclass, namely the subclass of formulas
that it proves. The SULFA subclass is a meaningful subclass in that it is significantly easier
to recognize than it is to solve. We have successfully applied the SULFA recognizer to all
the theorems in ACL2’s regression suite. On the other hand, solving SULFA formulas is an
NP-hard problem.
Furthermore, SULFA is distinguished from most other meaningful decidable sub-
classes in that it is not restricted to a finite set of functions, but, like ACL2, can be ex-
tended by a function definitional principle. Furthermore, SULFA is defined entirely using
the primitives of ACL2, along with a definitional principle to support additional functions.
Thus sometimes ACL2 formulas are in SULFA even when created by users unaware of it,
including 3.2% of the formulas in ACL2’s regression suite.
This chapter begins by describing the intuition behind SULFA and why it is decid-
able in Section 5. Section 5.3 then explains some simplifications we make to the ACL2
logic. Section 5.4 rigorously defines SULFA and Section 5.5 shows how to create an
efficient recognizer for SULFA. Section 5.6 presents the results of applying the efficient
SULFA recognizer to ACL2’s regression suite of theorems.
5.2 Intuition Behind SULFA
SULFA is based primarily on the theory of list structures, which, as defined by Nelson and
Oppen [58], corresponds to ACL2 formulas formed by terms in the following grammar:
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E ::= (CAR E) | (CDR E) | (CONS E E) | (CONSP E) | ’NIL | ’T | var
where var is any symbol, denoting a universally quantified variable.
The axioms of the theory of list structures, aside from the standard axioms of equal-
ity and conjunction, are shown in Figure 5.1. Nelson and Oppen show not only that this
theory is decidable, but that, if limited to formulas involving conjunctions of equalities and
negated equalities, it can be decided with complexity O(N × Log (N)), where N is the size
of the formula. The size of a formula here is equal to the sum of the sizes of all terms in
the formula, where a term’s size is the number of leaves in its parse tree (e.g., A has size 1,
(CONS A B) has size 3, and (CONS (CONS A B) (CAR X)) has size 6).
Nelson and Oppen also show, in a separate paper, that decision procedures for any
two theories sharing only equality and propositional symbols can be combined into a de-
cision procedure for the combined theory. Thus, a decidable theory axiomatizing ACL2’s
EQUAL and IF primitives can be combined with the theory of lists to form a decidable the-
ory including CAR, CDR, CONS, CONSP, IF, and EQUAL. The decidable theory can further be
combined with a decision procedure for uninterpreted functions. Also unrollable function
applications, by definition, can be unrolled into expressions involving only previously de-
fined functions and primitives. The SULFA subclass is defined to be exactly this decidable
subclass, including function applications that can be unrolled into CAR, CDR, CONS, CONSP,
IF, EQUAL, and uninterpreted functions.
As suggested by the intuition, the theory of list structures within ACL2 is decid-
able and can be combined with many other decidable theories. In practice, however, some
complications arise:
• The axioms in Figure 5.1 are all theorems provable from ACL2’s ground-zero theory.
Thus, any theorem proven by Nelson and Oppen’s procedure is a theorem in the
ACL2 logic. However, the converse is not true. ACL2 formulas in the language of the
theory of lists may be provable from the ground zero ACL2 theory but not provable
from the axioms in the theory of list structures. For example, (CAR ’NIL) = ’NIL
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1. ’T , ’NIL
2. (CONSP X) = ’T ∨ (CONSP X) = ’NIL
3. (CONSP (CONS X Y)) = ’T
4. (CONSP X) ` (CONS (CAR X) (CDR X)) = X
5. (CAR (CONS X Y)) = X
6. (CDR (CONS X Y)) = Y
Figure 5.1: Axioms in the traditional theory of list structures.
and (CAR ’T) = ’NIL are provable from the ACL2 ground zero theory, but not
provable from the axioms in Figure 5.1.
• We do not want to limit ourselves to the primitives CAR, CDR, CONS, CONSP, IF, and
EQUAL. Since any ACL2 formula involving primitives applied to constants can be
decided with ACL2’s evaluation proof technique, we wish to include all primitives
when applied to constants.
Due to the above complications, Chapter 6 defines a decision procedure for SULFA from
scratch, rather than relying on a combination of previous, well-known decision procedures.
5.3 Simplified ACL2 Logic
This chapter defines SULFA with respect to a simplified version of the ACL2 logic. The
simplified version contains no lambda expressions, contains no mutually-recursive func-
tions, and assumes that all ACL2 formulas are of the form α , ’NIL, for some ACL2 term
α. For example,
(F X) , ’NIL
is in the simplified ACL2, but not the equivalent formula
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(F X) , ’NIL ∧ (F X) , ’NIL.
None of these removals affect the expressiveness of the ACL2 logic or the decid-
ability of SULFA. ACL2 lambda expressions can be substituted for named functions or
removed by β reduction; mutually-recursive set of functions can be defined as a single
function with a flag; and all ACL2 formulas can be expressed as equivalent formulas of the
form α , ’NIL. For example,
(P X)→ (F X) = (G X)
is equivalent to
(IMPLIES (P X) (EQUAL (F X) (G X))) , ’NIL.
The implementation of the SULFA recognizer and SULFA solver available with the
ACL2 distribution does support lambda functions and mutually recursive functions. An
ACL2 formula with lambda functions and mutually recursive functions is in SULFA if it
would be in SULFA were each lambda function replaced with a named function and each
mutually recursive function defined with a flag.
Users of the ACL2 theorem prover only write terms, not formulas. When a user
proves an ACL2 term α, they actually are proving the formula α , ’NIL. Thus there is no
need, in practice, to consider more general ACL2 formulas than α , ’NIL.
5.4 SULFA Recognizer
This chapter provides a procedure that determines whether any ACL2 formula is in SULFA.
The primary primitives of SULFA are ACL2’s list, equality, and if-then-else primitives. We
refer to these primitives (EQUAL, IF, CONS, CAR, CDR, and CONSP) as the SULFA core prim-
itives. SULFA terms may also include uninterpreted functions, which in ACL2, as defined
in Section 3.5.1, are constrained functions with minimal constraints. Terms involving other
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functions may also occur, under the condition that some of the arguments to these functions
are reducible to constants.
The following terminology is necessary before defining SULFA rigorously:
• Define E as the set of all ACL2 terms. Recall that an ACL2 term is either a constant,
a variable, or the application of a function to an argument list composed of ACL2
terms. We denote terms as lisp expressions surrounded by pq, though the pq may be
removed when its removal does not cause ambiguity. For example, f (p(IF A B C)q)
is the value of some function f , given as input the ACL2 term (IF A B C).
• Define S ⊂ E as the set of all ACL2 symbols, representing either functions and
variables in terms. For example, the term (+ 4 X) has a function symbol + and a
variable symbol X.
• An ACL2 function is an ACL2 symbol denoting the name of the function.
• The SULFA core primitives are the ACL2 functions IF, CONS, CAR, CDR, CONSP, and
EQUAL.
• Fn (E), given a function application E ∈ E, is the ACL2 function being applied in E.
For example, Fn (p(IF A B C)q) = pIFq.
• NA (E), given a function application E ∈ E, is its number of arguments. For example,
NA (p(IF A B C)q) = 3.
• Arg (i, E), given a natural number i ∈ N and function application term E ∈ E, is the
ith argument of E. For example, Arg (1, p(IF A B C)q) = pAq.
• |E|, given any E ∈ E, is its size, defined as:
|E| ,

0, if E is a constant




|Arg (i, E)|, otherwise.
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where all grounded ACL2 terms involving only applications of ACL2 primitives are
considered constant. For example, |pAq| = 1 (the size of the symbol A), |p’Aq| = 0
(the size of the ACL2 constant ’A), |p(CONS ’4 ’5)q| = 0 (p(CONS ’4 ’5)q is
also a constant), and |p(IF A B)q| = 4.
• Define an ACL2 history as a sequence of ACL2 events, including events defining
functions and introducing constrained functions. We say that an ACL2 formula is
valid in an ACL2 history, if it is valid in the theory corresponding to that history, i.e.,
the ACL2 ground zero theory plus the axioms corresponding to the ACL2 events in
the history.
• Body (H, f ), given an ACL2 history H and ACL2 function f , is the term denoting the
body of the function f . For example,
Body (H, pIFFq) = p(IF P (IF Q ’T ’NIL) (IF Q ’NIL ’T))q,
which corresponds to the definition of the IFF primitive:
(DEFUN IFF (P Q)
(IF P (IF Q ’T ’NIL) (IF Q ’NIL ’T))).
Note that when f has no body in H, then Body (H, f ) is undefined. In particular,
Body (H, f ) is undefined if f is a constrained function or an ACL2 core primitive.
• Formals (H, f ), given an ACL2 history H and ACL2 function f , is the set of formal
parameters of f . For example, Formals (H, pIFFq) = {pPq, pQq}.
• Meas (H, f ), given an ACL2 history H and an ACL2 function f , is the body of the
measure function of f , if one exists. For example, given that the following definition
is in H
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(DEFUN IN (A X)
(DECLARE (XARGS :MEASURE (LEN X)))
(IF (NOT (CONSP X))
NIL
(IF (EQUAL A (CAR X))
T
(IN A (CDR X)))))
then Meas (H, pINq) = p(LEN X)q.
• Given an ACL2 history H, a set X ⊂ S, E ∈ E, then the predicate Evblp (H, X, E) is
defined as:
Evblp (H, X, E) ,

true, if |E| = 0
E ∈ X, if |E| = 1
false, if evalFn (H,Fn (E))∧
i∈N,1≤i≤NA (E)
Evblp (H, X,Arg (i, E)), otherwise.
where evalFnp (H, f ) returns whether f is an evaluatable function in H, i.e., whether
f is a function that can be evaluated for any constant inputs into a constant. All ACL2
primitives are evaluatable, as are all functions defined from evaluatable functions
(including recursive functions). Constrained functions are not evaluatable.
Intuitively, Evblp (H, X, E) returns whether mapping the variables in X to constants is
sufficient to ensure that E can be reduced to a constant by evaluation. For example,
Evblp (H, X, p(+ 1 A B)q) is true if A and B are in X.
• ConstForm (H, X, E), given an ACL2 history H, a function application E ∈ E, and a
set of symbols X ⊂ S, is a subset of the formal parameters of Fn (E) including the ith
formal if Evblp (H, X,Arg (i, E)).
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Given an ACL2 history H, a set of symbols X ⊂ S, a symbol f ∈ S ∪ {♣}, and
a term E ∈ E, then the predicate SULFAp (H, X, f , E) is defined as follows (where
G , ConstForm (H, X, E), if E is a function application):




¬SULFAp (H, X, f ,Arg (i, E)).
3. true, if Fn (E) is a SULFA core primitive or an uninterpreted function in H.
4. false, if Fn (E) is a constrained function in H.
5. Formals (H,Fn (E)) ⊆ G, if Fn (E) is an ACL2 core primitive or a recursive
function without a valid measure.
6. SULFAp (H,G,Fn (E),Body (H,Fn (E))), if Fn (E) is not recursive.
7. Evblp (H,G,Meas (H,Fn (E))) ∧ SULFAp (H,G,Fn (E),Body (H,Fn (E))), if
Fn (E) , f .
8. true, if X ⊆ G.
9. Evblp (H, X ∩G,Meas (H,Fn (E)))∧SULFAp (H, X ∩G, f ,Body (H,Fn (E))),
otherwise.
Figure 5.2: The definition of the predicate SULFAp (H, X, f , E). If E is a formula in H, then
it is defined to be in SULFA, if and only if SULFAp (H, ∅,♣, E). We use ♣ as a constant not
equal to any ACL2 function name.
ConstForm (H, X, E) thus returns the formals corresponding to the constant argu-
ments of E. For example,
ConstForm (H, {pAq, pBq}, p(IFF (< (+ A B) 0) (< A C))q) = {pPq}.
since the formals of IFF, as previously defined, are P and Q; the argument correspond-
ing to P is (< (+ A B) 0), which is reducible to a constant, given that A and B are
constants; and the argument corresponding to Q is (< A C), which is not reducible
to a constant.
Given the above terminology, a formula E in an ACL2 history H is in SULFA
if SULFAp (H, ∅,♣, E), where the predicate SULFAp (H, X, f , E) is defined in Figure 5.2.
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Note that ♣ is used as a constant that is not equal to (or easily confused with) an ACL2
function. Section 5.4.1 shows that SULFAp (H, X, f , E) terminates.
Intuitively, in the definition of SULFAp (H, X, f , E), f = ♣ if E is a top-level for-
mula; otherwise, f is a function symbol, E is a subterm of the body of f , and X is a set of
variables symbols assumed to be constant. It is probably easiest to understand the definition
of SULFA by considering examples.
By condition 1 in Figure 5.2, any formula that is simply a variable or constant is in
SULFA. Thus, X, Y, ’T and ’4 are all in SULFA.
For a formula to be in SULFA all the terms inside the formula must be in SULFA.
For example, if (F (G X)) is in SULFA, then so is (G X). Thus, there is no reason to make
a distinction between a formula and a term.
By conditions 1, 2, and 3, any formula composed of SULFA core primitives is in
SULFA. Thus,
(CONSP (CAR X)),
(EQUAL (CAR (CONS X Y)) (CDR (CONS Y X))), and
(EQUAL (CAR X) (CDR X))
are in SULFA.
Condition 3 also allows uninterpreted functions (uninterpreted functions, as defined
in Section 3.5.1, are constrained functions with minimal constraints). Thus, if F and G
are uninterpreted functions, then terms such as (F (G X)) and (CAR (F (G (CONS X
’5)))) are in SULFA.
Condition 4, however, rules out constrained functions that are not uninterpreted. If
F is introduced using ACL2’s constrained function feature, then not even grounded terms
involving it, such as (F ’4), are in SULFA.
Condition 5 ensures if a term involves applications of ACL2 core primitives other
than the SULFA core primitives, then those applications must be grounded. For example,
(EQUAL (BINARY-* ’2 ’4) (BINARY-+ ’4 ’4))
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is in SULFA, but not
(EQUAL (BINARY-* 2 X) (BINARY-+ X X)),
because BINARY-* and BINARY-+ are core primitives. Condition 5 similarly restricts re-
cursive functions whose measure cannot be justified by the normal definition principle.
Generally, this occurs when the measure has been removed. This also is the case for a
couple ACL2 primitives.
Condition 6 essentially restricts non-recursive function applications to those which




(NOT (< 0 X))
’T))
(DEFUN IMPLIES (P Q)
(IF P (IF Q ’T ’NIL) ’T))
(DEFUN REDUCE (N X)
(IF (< N 0) (CAR X) (CDR X)))
Given the above definitions, the following are SULFA terms:
(ZP ’4),
(IMPLIES A (EQUAL (CAR A) (CDR B))),
(REDUCE ’4 A), and
(REDUCE (+ ’1 ’2) (IF A (CONS X Y) (CONS Y Z))),
whereas the following are not SULFA terms:
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(ZP N),
(REDUCE A ’4), and
(REDUCE N (CONS ’4 ’5)).
Since (ZP N) expands into an expression of ACL2 core primitives other than the SULFA
core primitives, only grounded applications of ZP can be permitted. On the other hand,
since (IMPLIES A B) expands into a nested IF, any expression involving just IMPLIES is
in SULFA. In fact, since all propositional formulas in ACL2 expand into IF expressions all
propositional formulas are in SULFA.
The function (REDUCE N X) is perhaps more interesting because it expands into an
expression in which N is inside <, but X is only inside IF, CAR, and CDR. The result is that N
must be constant for (REDUCE N X) to be in SULFA, but X is unrestricted.
Applications of recursive functions are handled by conditions 7, 8, and 9 of the def-
inition of SULFAp (H, X, f , E). Intuitively, recursive applications are permitted in SULFA
terms, if those applications can be unrolled and that unrolling produces an expression that is
in SULFA. Consider the function (BV-NOT N X), which inverts a bit vector X, represented
as a list of Booleans of length N.
(DEFUN BV-NOT (N X)
(DECLARE (XARGS :MEASURE (IF (ZP N) 0 N)))
(IF (ZP N)
NIL
(CONS (EQUAL (CAR X) NIL)
(BV-NOT (BINARY-+ N -1) (CDR X))))).
Given the above definition, some examples of SULFA terms are
(BV-NOT 8 X),
(BV-NOT (+ ’1 ’1) (CONS X0 (CONS X1 ’NIL))), and
(EQUAL (BV-NOT 8 (BV-NOT 8 (BV-NOT 8 X))) (BV-NOT 8 X)).
59
Whereas, the following are not:
(BV-NOT N X),
(BV-NOT (+ ’1 N) (CONS X0 (CONS X1 ’NIL))), and
(EQUAL (BV-NOT N (BV-NOT N (BV-NOT N X))) (BV-NOT N X)).
The first part of condition 7, Evblp (H, X,Meas (H,Fn (E))), ensures that the measure is
constant. The second part SULFAp (H,G,Fn (E),Body (H,Fn (E))) ensures that the body
is also in SULFA.
Condition 8 and 9 represent the case where E is a recursive application. This case
must be handled carefully to ensure termination of the SULFA recognizer. If condition
8 holds, then the recursive call requires fewer or the same formals to be constant as the
original call. In this case, the previous, or ongoing, check is sufficient to ensure that the
expansion of E is in SULFA. If condition 8 does not hold, then a new check must be
undertaken with fewer formals assumed constant. For example, consider the following
definition of BV-AND, a function that computes the conjunction of two bit vectors:
(DEFUN BV-AND (N X Y)
(DECLARE (XARGS :MEASURE (IF (ZP N) 0 N)))
(IF (ZP N)
NIL
(CONS (AND (CAR X) (CAR Y))
(BV-AND (BINARY-+ N -1) (CDR Y) (CDR X)))))
The following are SULFA terms:
(BV-AND 8 X Y),
(BV-AND (+ ’4 ’4) (CONS X Y) (CONS A B)),
(EQUAL (BV-AND 4 (BV-NOT 4 X) Y) Z)
(BV-AND 2 (CONS ’T (CONS ’NIL ’NIL)) X).
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Whereas, the following are not:
(BV-AND N X Y), and
(BV-AND N (BV-NOT 4 X) Y).
Considering the last example term that was in SULFA
SULFAp (H,G, ∅, pNILq, p(BV-AND 2 (CONS ’T (CONS ’NIL ’NIL)) X)q),
by condition 7, reduces to
SULFAp (H, {pNq, pXq}, pBV-ANDq,Body (H, pBV-ANDq)).
We have defined BV-AND somewhat oddly in that the arguments on each recursive call are
swapped. Since
ConstForm (H, {pNq, pXq}, p(BV-AND (BINARY-+ N -1) (CDR Y) (CDR X))q)
=
{pNq}
condition 9 requires that
SULFAp (H, {pNq}, pBV-ANDq,Body (H, pBV-ANDq)),
which is true. Essentially, an attempt is made to show that the body of BV-AND is in SULFA
while assuming X is constant, but then it is found that in the recursive call X is not constant.
Therefore, the body is checked again without the assumption that X is constant. In this case,
the check succeeds because X did not need to be constant.
For an example where condition 9 leads to an ACL2 term not being in SULFA,
consider the definition of BV-ODD:
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(DEFUN BV-ODD (N X Y)
(DECLARE (XARGS :MEASURE (IF (ZP N) 0 N)))
(IF (ZP N)
NIL
(IF (< (LEN X) N)
X
(CONS (AND (CAR X) (CAR Y))
(BV-NOT (BINARY-+ N -1) (CDR Y) (CDR X))))))
The following term is not in SULFA:
(BV-ODD 2 (CONS ’T (CONS ’NIL ’NIL)) X).
The evaluation of the above term follows the same pattern as in BV-ODD, but the (LEN X)
test ensures that X really must be constant. Thus,
SULFAp (H, {pNq}, pBV-ANDq,Body (H, pBV-ANDq)),
is false.
5.4.1 Termination
We prove that SULFAp (H, X, f , E) terminates by defining an ordinal that decreases on each
recursive call in its definition.
All functions defined in an ACL2 history have an associated unique natural number,
such that functions are defined in terms of functions with smaller unique numbers. Define
FnNum (H, f ), given an ACL2 history H and f ∈ (S ∪ {♣}), as:
• the unique natural number associated with f , if f is a function symbol in history H;
• 0, otherwise.
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Thus, every non-recursive function application E′ ∈ E such that E′ is a subterm of
Body (H, f ) satisfies FnNum (H,Fn (E′)) < FnNum (H, f ).
Given an ACL2 history H, a set of symbols X ⊂ S, a symbol f ∈ S∪{♣}, and a term
E ∈ E, the ordinal that decreases is:
ord (H, X, f , E) , ω3 × badFn (H, f , E) +
ω2 × FnNum (H, f ) +
ω × |X| +
|E|.
where
• badFn (H, f , E) is defined to be 1, if f is not an ACL2 function; 1, if f does not have
a definition in H; 1, if there exists a function application E′ ∈ E that is a subterm of
E satisfying FnNum (H,Fn (E′)) > FnNum (H, f ); and 0, otherwise.
• |X| is the number of elements in the set X.
• |E| is the size of the term E, as defined previously.
We now prove that the ordinal decreases on each recursive call in
SULFAp (H, X, f , E):
• In condition 2, the ordinal decreases since the size of the term decreases,
|Arg (i, E)| < |E|, and everything else remains the same,
• In condition 6 and 7, first note that since functions are defined in terms of smaller
unique numbers badFn (H,Fn (E),Body (H,Fn (E))) = 0. Thus, if
badFn (H, f , E) = 1 then the ordinal decreases on the recursive call. Otherwise,
the unique number decreases, i.e., FnNum (H,Fn (E)) < FnNum (H, f ).
• In condition 9, the size of the set of formals decreases |X∩G| < |X|, while the function
and history remain the same.
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5.5 Efficient SULFA Recognizer
The SULFA recognizer defined by SULFAp (H, X, f , E) essentially has worst case cubic
complexity in the size of the bodies and measure terms in H. If no functions were recur-
sive, then it would have quadratic complexity in the size of the bodies and measures in H,
because determining whether a given function application E f is in SULFA requires, in the
worst case, considering all previous definitions. Recursive functions add another level of
complexity, because their bodies need to be considered, in the worst case, once for each of
their formal parameters.
While cubic complexity is better than the worst-case complexity required to solve a
SULFA formula, it is still too inefficient to be used on many ACL2 formulas. It is possible
though to define a more efficient recognizer. The intuition behind such a recognizer comes
from the following theorem, which is provable by induction on the ordinal used to prove
the termination of SULFAp :
X ⊂ Y ∧ SULFAp (H, X, f , E)→ SULFAp (H,Y, f , E).
As suggested by the above theorem, it is possible for any function f to find a minimal set
of formals, called the ground formal set, which must be constant in order for an application
of f to be in SULFA (assuming the arguments of the application are all in SULFA). For
example, given the definition of IFF:
(DEFUN IFF (P Q)
(IF P (IF Q ’T ’NIL) (IF Q ’NIL ’T))).
Then for the following application to be in SULFA
(IFF (+ ’4 ’5) (+ X ’5))
it is required that
SULFAp (H, {pQq}, pIFFq, p(IF P (IF Q ’T ’NIL) (IF Q ’NIL ’T))q),
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which is true since nested IF terms are in SULFA. Note that the assumption that Q is con-
stant is unnecessary. The following ACL2 term is also in SULFA:
(IFF (IFF A B) (IFF B C)).
In fact, any ACL2 term composed of only IFF applications is in SULFA. Thus, we say that
the ground formal set of IFF is empty.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, consider the constrained functions other than
uninterpreted functions. By case 4 in the definition of SULFAp illustrated in Figure 5.2,
no ACL2 term involving such functions can occur in a SULFA formula. We say that such
functions have no valid ground formal set.
Thus the most restricted functions, in terms of their occurrence in SULFA formu-
las, are those with no valid ground formal set, whereas the least restricted functions are
those with an empty ground formal set. For example, (F X Y) is in SULFA only if the
ground formal set of F is empty. On the other hand, if the ground formal set of F is equal
to its formals, then F can only occur in SULFA if its arguments are constant, such as in
(F (+ ’1 ’4) ’5). Finally, if F has no valid ground formal set, then it cannot occur in
any SULFA formula.
The ACL2 core primitives all have valid sets of ground formals. If an ACL2 core
primitive is a SULFA core primitive (i.e., the tree primitives, the if-then-else primitive, or
the equality primitive), then its ground formal set is the empty set; otherwise the ground
formal set of any ACL2 core primitive is equal to its full set of formals. For example,
the ground formal set of (CONS X Y) is the empty set, whereas the ground formal set of
(BINARY-+ X Y) is the full set of formals, {pXq, pYq}.
For a constrained function f to have a valid set of ground formals, it must be an
uninterpreted function (as defined in Section 3.5.1), i.e., it must have minimal constraints.
Uninterpreted functions have a ground formal set equal to the empty set.
For any function f with a definition in an ACL2 history H, its ground formal set
can be determined from its ground formal dependency graph, which is defined as follows:
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• Each node in the graph is either ♠ or a formal parameter of f . We use ♠ because it is
not equal to (and should not be confused with) any ACL2 symbol.
Intuitively, ♠ represents the empty set of ground formals and each edge from vs to vt
in the ground formal dependency graph denotes a dependence that vt be in the ground
formal set if vs is in the set.
• A subset of the nodes are marked as failure nodes. A failure node denotes a node that
cannot be part of the valid set of ground formals. If ♠ is a failure node, or if some
dependency leads to a failure node, then there is no valid set of ground formals.
A node v is marked as a failure node if any of the following conditions apply:
1. v = ♠ and there exists some term E ∈ E such that E is a subterm of the body of
f and Fn (E) has no valid set of ground formals.
Intuitively, f cannot be in any SULFA formula because it is defined from a
function that cannot be in any SULFA formula.
2. v = ♠ and there exists a term E ∈ E and a natural number i ∈ N such that E is
a subterm of the body of f , the ith formal of E is in the ground formal set of
Fn (E), and ¬Evblp (H,Formals (H, f ),Arg (i, E)).
Intuitively, f cannot be in any SULFA formula, because a function occurring in
the body of f requires an argument be constant that, in the body of f , cannot be
evaluated. For example, if (G (H X)) is in the body of f , H is not executable,
and the ground formal set of G includes its formal argument, then ♠ is a failure
node.
3. If v is the ith formal of f and there exists a recursive application E ∈ E in the
body of f (i.e. E is a subterm of the body and Fn (E) = f ), and
¬Evblp (H,Formals (H, f ),Arg (i, E)).
Intuitively, v cannot be part of the ground formal set because the body of f con-
tains a recursive call in which v cannot be evaluated. For example, if
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(F (G X)) is a recursive application in the body of F and G cannot be exe-
cuted, then X is a failure node.
• An edge occurs from vs (the source vertex) to vt in the ground formal dependency
graph of f if any of the following conditions hold:
1. vs = ♠, vt is the ith formal of f , and there exists an E ∈ E and i ∈ N such that
E is a subterm of the body of f , Fn (E) , f , the ith formal of Fn (E) is in the
ground formal set of Fn (E), and vt is a subterm of Arg (i, E).
Intuitively, vt must be in the ground formal set of f if vt is part of an expression
that must be mapped to a constant in order for some function application in the
body of f to be in SULFA. For example, if the body of the definition of F is
(IF (INTEGERP (+ N M))
(F (1- N) M (CDR X) B (CDR X) (CDR Y))
Y)
then an edge goes from ♠ to N and from ♠ to M, since INTEGERP and BINARY-+
are ACL2 core primitives, but not SULFA core primitives. N and M need to be
constant so that INTEGERP and BINARY-+ can be removed by evaluation.
2. vs = ♠ and f is a recursive function without an evaluatable measure.
Intuitively, such a function cannot be unrolled, but it may be evaluated, so its
ground formal set is its complete set of formals.
3. vs = ♠, f is a recursive function, and vt is a subterm of the measure of f .
Intuitively, the measure must be constant in order for the function to be unrolled.
For example, if the measure of f is (NFIX X), then an edge goes from ♠ to X,
denoting that X must be constant in order for f to be unrolled.
4. vs is the ith formal of f and there exists a recursive application E (a subterm of
the body of f such that Fn (E) = f ) such that vt is a subterm of Arg (i, E).
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For example, if (F (1- A) (CONS B C) 0) is a recursive call in the body of
F, and F has formal parameters A, B, and C respectively, then an edge goes from
A to A, from B to B, and C to B. Intuitively, this is because for B to be constant in
the recursive call, (CONS B C) must evaluate to a constant.
Figure 5.3 shows an example function definition and its associated ground formal
dependency graph. Since N occurs in the measure of f and as an argument of ZP, there is
a node from ♠ to N. There is also a node from ♠ to A, since A occurs as an argument of <.
The other edges follow the dependencies implied by the two recursive calls in the body of
EXAMPLE. Furthermore, the node D, corresponding to the fifth formal of EXAMPLE, is marked
as a failure node because F, which occurs in the fifth argument of a recursive call, is not
executable.
The ground formal set of a defined function f can be determined by computing
the set of nodes R f reachable from node ♠ in f ’s ground formal dependency graph. The
function f has no valid ground formal set if R f contains a failure node. Otherwise, the
ground formal set of f is the set of formals contained in R f .
The set of nodes reachable from ♠ in Figure 5.3 is {♠, pNq, pAq, pBq, pEq}. Since
none of these are failure nodes, the set of ground formals of EXAMPLE is {pNq, pAq, pBq, pEq}.
Thus, an application of EXAMPLE is in SULFA if its first, second, and sixth arguments are
constant.
Note that if we assume that the ground formal sets for all previously defined func-
tions have been determined, then the ground formal dependency graph can be constructed
for a newly defined function in linear time with respect to the size of its body and its mea-
sure function’s body. Also, computing the set of reachable nodes is linear in the number of
edges in the graph. Thus the ground formal sets for all functions in a history can be deter-
mined in linear time with respect to the size of the events in that history. Once the ground
formal sets have been computed for all functions occurring in a formula, it requires only a
single traversal through an ACL2 formula to determine whether that formula is in SULFA.
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(DEFUN EXAMPLE (N A B C D E)
(DECLARE (XARGS :MEASURE (NFIX N)))
(IF (ZP N)
(EQUAL (< 0 A) E)
(IF (CAR C)
(EXAMPLE (1- N) B B (EQUAL C D) (F B) E)
(EXAMPLE (1- N) E E E E E))))
A C EN B D
Ground Formal Dependence Graph
Figure 5.3: An example definition and its ground formal dependency graph. In the above
definition, the ACL2 primitive ZP, defined in Figure 3.3, checks whether a number is equal
to 0 and the function F is uninterpreted. The primitive NFIX, also defined in Figure 3.3,
is the identity function over natural numbers, and returns 0 for any other inputs. A double
circle in the dependency graph represents a failure node. In order for an application of
EXAMPLE to be unrollable all formals reachable from ♠ (i.e., N, A, B, and E) must be mapped
to constants.
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Figure 5.4: A plot comparing the time required to check whether formulas are in SULFA
compared to the time required to prove them using the ACL2 theorem prover. Each point
represents a file in the ACL2 regression suite. The x-axis is the total proof time to prove all
formulas in a given file and the y-axis is the total proof time in addition to the time required
to check whether all formulas in the same file are in SULFA. A point is on the line if no
measurable time is required to check whether the formulas in its file are in SULFA.
5.6 Results
Since the SULFA recognizer described in Section 5.5 has linear complexity (with respect
to the size of the SULFA formula plus the sizes of the bodies of its relevant functions and
their measures), it is not surprising that it is reasonably efficient. Figure 5.4 compares the
time needed to recognize whether a formula is in SULFA to the time needed by ACL2 to
prove the formula. 1,249 formulas were found to be in SULFA and 37,397 were found not
to be in SULFA (3.2% are in SULFA). The total proof time without the SULFA check was
5 hours, 12 minutes. An additional 32 minutes were required to determine whether each
formula was in SULFA (10.1% of the proof time). 1
1These results were obtained on a Pentium R© 4, 3.0 GHz, dual processor with 2 gigabytes of random access
memory. ACL2 version 3.1 was used, running under GNU Common Lisp version 2.6.7.
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5.7 Summary
This chapter identifies a subclass of ACL2 formulas, SULFA, for which a decision proce-
dure is presented in Chapter 6. Unlike most previously identified decidable subclasses of
first-order logic, SULFA is not a single decidable theory, but instead an infinite set of de-
cidable theories, since it has a principle for sound extension with new definitional axioms
while maintaining decidability.
Furthermore, SULFA is tightly integrated with ACL2, allowing procedures that de-
termine the validity of SULFA formulas (SULFA solvers) to be used as proof techniques
within the ACL2 theorem prover. Chapter 7 describes one such SULFA solver based, which
makes use of Boolean SAT solvers.
We believe developing decision procedures that operate on primitives and can solve
properties about user-defined functions is the key to developing a tight integration with
a general-purpose theorem prover. Furthermore, such work may promote a deeper under-
standing of the decidable space of formulas within the ACL2 logic, and, perhaps, first-order
logic itself.
5.8 Development and Bibliographic Notes
SULFA was first described at the 3rd International Joint Conference on Automated Reason-
ing (IJCAR 2006) [70]. This chapter differs, however, from the description in IJCAR 2006
in that it is more rigorous and that uninterpreted functions and equality have been added.
Sophisticated decision procedures have been previously integrated with general-
purpose theorem provers. The PVS general-purpose theorem prover contains decision pro-
cedures for the µ-calculus, linear arithmetic, and tree structures [61, 81, 12]. One way in
which SULFA differs from such decidable domains is that SULFA can be extended with
new function symbols and axioms. Similarly decision procedures in the HOL theorem
prover, such as the SAT-based decision procedure for propositional logic [34], are usually
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restricted to a finite set of functions. One exception is the HOL-Voss System, which sup-
ports model checking within the HOL theorem prover [36]. The HOL-Voss system also
makes use of the HOL type system to restrict formulas into a finite domain unique to the
HOL-Voss system. This differs from SULFA in that SULFA, like ACL2, is untyped, and
universally quantifies over the entire, infinite domain of ACL2 objects. Also, since HOL-
Voss uses its own type system, no formulas created by users unaware of the HOL-Voss
system can be verified by it.
The ACL2 theorem prover also has been integrated with a µ-Calculus model checker
[43], the SMV model checker [69], the SixthSense model checker [77], and UCLID [44].
The distinguishing feature of SULFA is that it is defined directly from ACL2’s ground-
zero primitives (in fact, SULFA is built on top of ACL2’s undefined, core primitives) and
can be extended with new function symbols. In that since, SULFA is more closely related
to ACL2’s built-in BDD proof technique, written by Matt Kaufmann and based on work
by J Moore [53]. SULFA differs from the BDD system in that the BDD system uses a less
automatic approach for function unrolling, which relies on user-generated rewrite rules, and
the BDD system requires hypotheses mapping variables directly into the Boolean domain.
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Chapter 6
A SULFA Decision Procedure
6.1 Introduction
Recall that we say that SULFA is a decidable subclass of ACL2 because it meets the fol-
lowing two conditions:
1. A terminating procedure exists that recognizes whether any ACL2 formula is in
SULFA.
2. A terminating procedure exists that decides whether any formula in SULFA is prov-
able in ACL2.
Chapter 5 presented a procedure that recognizes whether an ACL2 formula is in SULFA.
This chapter completes the description of SULFA as a decidable subclass by presenting a
decision procedure for all SULFA formulas. Note that for SULFA to be a decidable subclass
there is no need for the decision procedure to be efficient. The one presented in this chapter
is not efficient, but instead is intended to be as simple as possible. Chapter 7 shows how to
create a more efficient SULFA solver using SAT solvers.
This chapter reuses the terminology and simplified ACL2 logic from Chapter 5 to
present a decision procedure for SULFA. First, Section 6.2 shows how a SULFA formula
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may be reduced to a formula involving only SULFA core primitives, uninterpreted func-
tions, variables, and constants. Section 6.3 then shows how uninterpreted functions can be
removed. Finally, Section 6.4 presents a decision procedure for any ACL2 formula involv-
ing only SULFA core primitives, variables, and ACL2 constants. Section 6.5 then discusses
the problem of generating counterexamples to invalid SULFA formulas.
6.2 Unrolling SULFA Formulas
This section presents a method for reducing a SULFA formula into a formula involving
only uninterpreted functions and the SULFA core primitives. We begin by introducing the
following terminology:
• MakeFn ( f , E1, E2, ...En), given n ACL2 terms E1, E2, ...En and a f ∈ S, is the ACL2
term representing the application of the function f to arguments E1, E2, ...En. For
example,
MakeFn (pCARq, pXq) = p(CAR X)q, and
MakeFn (pFq, p(G X)q, pYq) = p(F (G X) Y)q.
• MakeEq (X,Y) , MakeFn (pEQUALq, X,Y).
• MakeIf (X,Y) , MakeFn (pIFq, X,Y).
• MakeCar (X,Y) , MakeFn (pCARq, X,Y).
• MakeCdr (X,Y) , MakeFn (pCDRq, X,Y).
• MakeCons (X,Y) , MakeFn (pCONSq, X,Y).
• MakeConsp (X,Y) , MakeFn (pCONSPq, X,Y).
• MakeImp (X,Y) , MakeFn (pIMPLIESq, X,Y).
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• MakeImpEq (X,Y,Z) , MakeImp (X,MakeEq (Y,Z)).
• EvPrf (H, E), given an ACL2 history H and an ACL2 term E, is the result of applying
ACL2’s evaluation proof strategy to E. As described in Section 3.6.5, the evaluation
proof strategy is a terminating technique that reduces evaluatable terms to constants
by evaluating executable ACL2 functions. For example,
EvPrf (H, p(+ 4 5)q) = p9q,
whereas
EvPrf (H, p(+ X 4)q) = p(+ X 4)q.
• EvPrfp (H, E), given an ACL2 history H and an ACL2 term E, is the predicate that
returns true if the evaluation proof strategy successfully proves that E is not NIL.
Thus,
EvPrfp (H, E) , |EvPrf (H, E)| = 0 ∧ EvPrf (H, E) , pNILq.
where |EvPrf (H, E)| = 0 is whether EvPrf (H, E) returns a constant.
• Expd (H, E), given a history H and a function application E ∈ E, is the expansion of
the top-level function application in E. To be more precise,
Expd (H, E) , Body (H,Fn (E))/σ,
where σ is the substitution mapping the formals of Fn (E) to the corresponding argu-
ments of E. For example, given the definition of IFF
(DEFUN IFF (P Q)
(IF P (IF Q ’T ’NIL) (IF Q ’NIL ’T))).
Then Expd (H, p(IFF (IFF X Y) Z)q) is
(IF (IFF X Y) (IF Z ’T ’NIL) (IF Z ’NIL ’T)).
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• ExpdM (H, E), given a history H and a function application E ∈ E, is the expansion
of the measure of E. To be more precise,
ExpdM (H, E) , Meas (H,Fn (E))/σ,
where σ is the substitution mapping the formals of Fn (E) to the corresponding argu-
ments of E. For example, given the definition of BV-NOT
(DEFUN BV-NOT (N X)
(DECLARE (XARGS :MEASURE (IF (ZP N) 0 N)))
(IF (ZP N)
NIL
(CONS (EQUAL (CAR X) NIL)
(BV-NOT (BINARY-+ N -1) (CDR X))))).
Then ExpdM (H, p(BV-NOT 8 (F X))q) is (IF (ZP 8) 0 8).
The function UnRoll (H, f , o, E) is defined in Figure 6.1. By Theorem 1, UnRoll
terminates for all valid inputs. Furthermore, given a SULFA formula F in an ACL2 history
H, by Theorem 3, F is valid if and only if UnRoll (H,♣, p0q, F) is valid and, by Theorem 2,
UnRoll (H,♣, p0q, F) contains only SULFA core primitives and uninterpreted functions.
Therefore, any SULFA formula can be automatically reduced to a formula involving only
SULFA core primitives and uninterpreted functions. For example, consider the following
SULFA formula, which we name cadrBvNot
(IMP (CAR (CDR (BV-NOT 2 X))) (EQUAL (CAR (CDR X)) NIL))
where the BV-NOT function is the same function defined previously and IMP is a simpler
version of IMPLIES, defined as
(DEFUN IMP (X Y) (IF X Y ’T))
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Given an ACL2 history H, f ∈ (S ∪ {♣}), o ∈ E, and E ∈ E, define UnRoll (H, f , o, E) as
1. E, if |E| < 2.
2. p’ERRORq, if ¬Evblp (H, ∅, o)∨(( f , ♣)∧(FnNum (H, f ) ≤ FnNum (H,Fn (E)))).
3. EvPrf (H, E), if Evblp (H, ∅, E).
4. Erec, if Fn (E) has no definition in H, i.e., it is a constrained function or a core
primitive.
5. UnRoll (H,Fn (E),♣,Expd (H, Erec)), if Fn (E) is not recursive.
6. UnRoll (H,Fn (E), orec,Expd (H, Erec)), if Fn (E) , f .
7. UnRoll (H, f , orec,Expd (H, Erec)), if EvPrfp (H,MakeFn (pO<q, orec, o)).
8. p’IRRELEVANTq, otherwise.
where
• orec , ExpdM (H, Erec)
• Erec is the application of Fn (E) such that the ith argument of Erec is
UnRoll (H, f , o,Arg (i, E)).
Figure 6.1: Definition of UnRoll (H, f , o, E), which is used to unroll the user-defined func-
tions in a SULFA formula. Note that MakeFn (pO<q, x, y) is an ACL2 term representing
whether the term x represents a smaller ordinal than the term y.
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(cons (equal (car x) nil)
(if nil nil
(cons (equal (car (cdr x)) nil)
(if t nil
(cons (equal (car (cdr (cdr x))) nil)
’irrelevant))))))))
(equal (car (cdr x)) nil)
t)
Note that (BV-NOT 0 (CDR (CDR X))) is unrolled into
(IF T NIL (CONS (IF (CAR (CDR (CDR X))) NIL T) ’IRRELEVANT)).
The other applications of BV-NOT, and IMPLIES are expanded directly.
The term (BV-NOT -1 (CDR (CDR (CDR X)))) is replaced with ’IRRELEVANT
to prevent the recursion in BV-NOT from continuing without end. In this case, as is common
in practice, the replacement can be justified directly by simplifying IF terms with constant
conditions.
In general, however, more sophisticated reasoning may be required. For example,
consider the following ACL2 definition:
(DEFUN F (X)
(DECLARE (XARGS :MEASURE 1))




Since the IF condition is a valid theorem in ACL2, the theorem prover can reduce (F X)
to T and thus allow the introduction of F with the above definition.
The SULFA formula (F X) unrolls into (IF (EQUAL X X) T ’IRRELEVANT).
Thus, an axiom regarding EQUAL is needed to prove that the unrolled term is equivalent
to the original formula. For any E, the task of proving UnRoll (H,♣, p0q, E) equivalent to
E, on a case by case basis, can be as difficult as determining the validity of an arbitrary
SULFA formula. However, instead of proving the equivalence on a case by case basis, we
rely on the proof of termination, which implies that any recursive call in which a measure
fails to decrease is in an impossible IF branch.
6.2.1 Correctness
Given an ACL2 history H, f ∈ (S ∪ {♣}), o ∈ E, and E ∈ E, define the ordinal
UnRollOrd (H, f , o, E) as
UnRollOrd (H, f , o, E) ,
 ε
3
0 , if f = ♣
ε20 × FnNum (H, f ) + ε0 × ord (H, o) + |E|, otherwise.
where
• ord (H, o), is the ordinal represented by EvPrf (H, o), if EvPrf (H, o) returns an ACL2
ordinal constant; otherwise, ord (H, o) , 0. Recall that an ACL2 ordinal constant
represents an ordinal less than ε0.
• FnNum (H, f ) has the same definition as in Section 5.4.1.
Theorem 1. UnRoll (H, f , o, E) terminates for all valid inputs.
Proof Sketch: The ordinal UnRollOrd (H, f , o, E) decreases on each recursive call in Fig-
ure 6.1. 
Lemma 1. SULFAp (H, X, f , E) → SULFAp (H, X, f ,Arg (i, E)), where H is an ACL2 his-
tory, X a set of symbols, f ∈ S ∪ {♣}, E ∈ E is a function application, and i is a natural
number less than NA (E).
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Proof Sketch: Trivial from the definition of SULFAp . 
Lemma 2. SULFAp (H, X, f , E) → SULFAp (H, X, f ,Expd (H, E)), where H is an ACL2
history, X a set of symbols, f ∈ S ∪ {♣}, and E ∈ E is a function application.
Proof Sketch: First note, by induction on |E|
Evblp (H, X, E)→ Evblp (H, X,Expd (H, E)).
It follows that
ConstForm (H, X, E) = ConstForm (H, X,Expd (H, E)).
The theorem thus follows from the definition of SULFAp (H, X, f , E) and induction on the
ordinal used to prove termination of SULFAp (H, X, f , E). 
Lemma 3. SULFAp (H, ∅,♣, E)→ SULFAp (H, ∅,♣,UnRoll (H, f , o, E)).
Proof Sketch: The theorem follows from induction on UnRollOrd (H, f , o, E), the definition
of UnRoll , Lemma 1, and Lemma 2. 
Theorem 2. If SULFAp (H, ∅,♣, E) and f is a function applied in UnRoll (H, g, o, E), then
either f is an uninterpreted function or a SULFA core primitive.
Proof Sketch: By, induction on UnRollOrd (H, f , o, E), the theorem reduces to the case
when Fn (E) is a constrained function or a core primitive. Thus, the theorem follows from
the definition of SULFAp given in Figure 5.2. 
Given three ACL2 terms E, A, and C, define
SubConj (E, A,C) ,

{C} if E = A
∅, if |E| < 2⋃
i∈N,1≤i≤3
SubConj (Arg (i, E), A, ifConj (i,C)), if Fn (E) = pIFq⋃
i∈N,1≤i≤NA (E)





C, if i = 1
MakeIf (Arg (1, E),C, pNILq), if i = 2
MakeIf (Arg (1, E), pNILq,C), otherwise.
Intuitively, A is a subterm of E and SubConj (E, A, H) is the set of assumptions
(encoded as ACL2 terms) under which A is relevant to E.
Lemma 4. If C ∈ SubConj (Body (H, f ), E, pTq), then
MakeImp (C,MakeFn (pO<q,ExpdM (H, E),Meas (H, f ))) is a valid ACL2 formula; where
H is an ACL2 history, E is an ACL2 term, and f is a recursively defined function in H.
Proof Sketch: The theorem follows directly from the (user-guided) proof of termination of
f in H. 
Lemma 5. Evblp (H, ∅, E)→ |EvPrf (H, E)| = 0.
Proof Sketch: Follows directly from our knowledge of the ACL2 evaluation proof tech-
nique. The ACL2 evaluation proof technique reduces any grounded ACL2 term containing
only executable functions to a constant. 
Theorem 3. If SULFAp (H, ∅,♣, E) then UnRoll (H,♣, p0q, E) is a valid ACL2 formula if
and only if E is a valid ACL2 formula.
Proof Sketch: First, we generalize the theorem, proving that if SULFAp (H, ∅, p0q, E), then
MakeImpEq (C, E,UnRoll (H, f , o, E)) is a valid ACL2 formula, where
1. C is pTq if f = ♣; otherwise, C is some ACL2 term such that
C ∈ SubConj (Body (H, f ))/σ, E, pTq).
2. o is p0q, if f = ♣; otherwise, o is Meas (H, f )/σ.
3. f is either ♣ or the name of a function defined in H such that E is a subterm of
Body (H, f )/σ.
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4. σ is any substitution mapping ACL2 variable symbols to ACL2 terms.
We now prove the generalization by induction on UnRollOrd (H, f , o, E). Consider
each case in the definition of UnRoll illustrated in Figure 6.1:
1. Trivial, since MakeEq (E, E) is valid.
2. This case cannot occur under the theorem’s assumptions.
3. Trivial, since MakeEq (E,EvPrf (H, E)) is valid.
4. MakeImpEq (C, E, Erec), where Erec has the definition given in Figure 6.1, follows
from induction. Note that unless Fn (E) = pIFq the assumptions under which E
occurs are the same as the assumptions under any argument of E, i.e., Fn (E) , pIFq
implies that for every ith argument of E
SubConj (Body (H, f )/σ, E, pTq)
is equal to
SubConj (Body (H, f )/σ,Arg (i, E), pTq).
When, Fn (E) = pIFq, this case reduces to the following ACL2 formula, which is a
theorem:
(IMPLIES (AND (IMPLIES A (EQUAL X B))
(IMPLIES (NOT A) (EQUAL X C)))
(EQUAL X (IF A B C)))
5. By induction, and Lemma 3, the theorem reduces to
MakeImpEq (C, E,Expd (H, Erec)).
This is valid by the definition of Fn (E), Lemma 2, and the induction hypothesis.
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6. Same reasoning as previous case, with the addition that, SULFAp (H, ∅,♣, E), by
the definition of SULFAp , implies Evblp (H,ConstForm (H, ∅, E), E), which implies
Evblp (H, ∅, orec).
7. Same reasoning as previous case.
8. By Lemma 4, MakeImp (C,MakeFn (pO<q,ExpdM (H, E), o)) is valid, and by the
same reasoning as in case 4, MakeImp (C, E, Erec). Thus,
MakeImp (C,MakeFn (pO<q, orec, o))
is a valid ACL2 formula. This simplifies, by the case assumptions and Lemma 5, to
MakeImp (C, pNILq). Therefore, MakeImpEq (C, E,UnRoll (H, f , o, E)) is vacuously
true.

6.3 Removing Uninterpreted Functions
Section 6.2 shows that defined functions in a SULFA formula can be removed by unrolling,
leaving a formula involving only uninterpreted functions and SULFA core primitives. Next,
we show that the uninterpreted functions can also be removed, leaving a formula involving
only SULFA core primitives. Before explaining how to remove uninterpreted functions
though, the following terminology is introduced:
• S/σ, given a set S ⊂ E, is the set satisfying for all E ∈ E:
(E ∈ S )→ (E/σ ∈ S/σ).
• FreshV (F), given F ∈ E, produces a symbol not used as a variable in F. Such a
function is possible since ACL2 contains an infinite namespace of variable names.
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• It is possible to define a lexicographic ordering on ACL2 terms, and such an ordering
is provided with the ACL2 theorem prover. The details of this ordering are not signif-
icant to this dissertation, except that if A is a subterm of B, then A is lexicographically
smaller than (or equal to) B.
• Let F be a formula containing applications of uninterpreted functions. Then, let
PickUF (F) be the lexicographically smallest uninterpreted function application in F.
• MakeEqArgs (X,Y), given two applications X ∈ E and Y ∈ E of functions of the
same arity, is the ACL2 term that representing∧
i∈N,1≤i≤NA (X)
Arg(i, X) = Arg(i,Y).
For example, MakeEqArgs (p(F X Y Z)q, p(G A B C)q) =
p(AND (EQUAL X A) (EQUAL Y B) (EQUAL Z C))q
• Given A ∈ E, X ∈ E, and E ∈ E:
SubUF (A, X, E) ,

X, if E = A
E, if (|E| < 2) ∨ (|A| < 2)
Erec, if Fn (E) , Fn (A)
MakeIf (MakeEqArgs (A, Erec), X, Erec), otherwise.
where Erec is an application of Fn (E) such that the ith argument of Erec is
SubUF (A, X,Arg (i, E)).
Intuitively, A is an application of an uninterpreted function, X is a variable, and E
is a term in which X does not occur. In that case, SubUF (A, X, E) produces a term
equivalent to E, with A replaced by X.
Given a formula F containing only applications of uninterpreted functions and core
SULFA primitives, from Theorem 4 and Theorem 5, SubUF (PickUF (F),FreshV (F), F) is
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an equivalent formula with fewer uninterpreted function applications. Thus, by repeatedly
applying SUBUF , all the uninterpreted functions from F can be removed, leaving a formula
with only SULFA core primitives. For example, let E be the following ACL2 term, where
F and G are uninterpreted functions:
(IF (EQUAL (F Y) (F X))
(EQUAL (G (F X)) (G (F Y)))
(EQUAL (EQUAL X Y) NIL)).
Note that E is a valid ACL2 formula. Then SubUF (p(F Y)q, pV0q, E) is
(IF (EQUAL V0 (IF (EQUAL X Y) V0 (F X)))
(EQUAL (G (IF (EQUAL X Y) V0 (F X))) (G V0))
(EQUAL (EQUAL X Y) NIL)).
Label the above formula E′. Note that E has four distinct applications of uninterpreted func-
tions, (F Y), (F X), (G (F X)), and (G (F Y)). On the other hand, E′ has only three
distinct applications of uninterpreted functions, (F X),
(G (IF (EQUAL X Y) V0 (F X))), and (G V0). Furthermore, we can prove E from
E′ by instantiation and we can prove E′ from E by functional instantiation (substitute
((LAMBDA (A) (IF (EQUAL A Y) V0 (F A)))) for F).
SubUF (p(F X)q, pV1q, E′) is:
(IF (EQUAL V0 (IF (EQUAL X Y) V0 V1))
(EQUAL (G (IF (EQUAL X Y) V0 V1)) (G V0))
(EQUAL (EQUAL X Y) NIL)).
Label the above formula E′′. E′′ has only two uninterpreted function applications, and E′′
is equivalent to E′ by a similar justification as that used to prove E′ equivalent to E.
Now, let E′′′ be SubUF (p(F X)q, pV2q, E′′), which is equal to:
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(IF (EQUAL V0 (IF (EQUAL X Y) V0 V1))
(EQUAL (IF (EQUAL (IF (EQUAL X Y) V0 V1) V0)
V2
(G (IF (EQUAL X Y) V0 V1)))
V2)
(EQUAL (EQUAL X Y) NIL)).
E′′′ has only one distinct uninterpreted function application, and E′′′ is equivalent to E′′ by
a similar justification as that used to prove E′ equivalent to E.
Now, let EIV be SubUF (p(G (IF (EQUAL X Y) V0 V2))q, pV3q, E′′′), which is
equal to:
(IF (EQUAL V0 (IF (EQUAL X Y) V0 V1))




(EQUAL (EQUAL X Y) NIL)).
EIV has no uninterpreted function applications, and EIV is equivalent to E′′′ by a similar
justification as that used to prove E′ equivalent to E. Thus, E has been reduced to a term
with no uninterpreted functions.
6.3.1 Correctness
Lemma 6. For any ACL2 formula F and ACL2 term x, F is a valid ACL2 formula if and
only if SubUF (x, x, F) is a valid ACL2 formula.
Proof Sketch: The theorem follows from the definition of SubUF , by induction on |F|. 
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Theorem 4. Let F be a formula in history H containing only applications of SULFA core
primitives and uninterpreted functions. Further assume that F contains at least one uninter-
preted function application. Then, F is a valid ACL2 formula if and only if
SubUF (PickUF (F),FreshV (F), F) is valid.
Proof Sketch: First, we assume that SubUF (PickUF (F),FreshV (F), F) is valid and show
that F is valid. Let
G , SubUF (PickUF (F),FreshV (F), F)/[FreshV (F) 7→ PickUF (F)].
By instantiation, G is valid. Furthermore,
G = SubUF (PickUF (F),PickUF (F), F).
F then follows from SubUF (PickUF (F),PickUF (F), F) by Lemma 6.
Next, we assume F and show that SubUF (PickUF (F),FreshV (F), F) is valid. Let
g be an ACL2 lambda function with the same arity as Fn (PickUF (F)) such that its body is
MakeIf (MakeEqArgs (PickUF (F), A),FreshV (F), A),
where A is the application of Fn (PickUF (F)) such that the ith argument of A is equal to the
ith formal parameter of g. Let G be F except that all applications of Fn (PickUF (F)) are
replaced with applications of a function g. G follows from F by functional instantiation,
justified in ACL2 by Kaufmann and Moore [39]. SubUF (PickUF (F),FreshV (F), F) then
follows from G by expanding applications of g and reducing
MakeIf (MakeEqArgs (PickUF (F),PickUF (F)),FreshV (F), A)
to FreshV (F). 
Theorem 5. Let E ∈ E, x ∈ S, and A ∈ E such that A contains exactly one uninterpreted
function application, which occurs at the top level of A. Then, SubUF (A, x, E) contains at
most the same number of distinct uninterpreted function applications as E. Furthermore,
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if A is a subterm of E, then SubUF (A, x, E) contains fewer distinct uninterpreted function
applications than E.
Proof Sketch: The theorem follows from induction on |E| and the definition of SubUF ,
since MakeEqArgs (A, Erec) only contains terms that occur as arguments to A or Erec. The
arguments of A have no uninterpreted function applications, and any applications added
from Erec are repetitious. 
6.4 A Decision Procedure for SULFA Core Primitives
This section presents a decision procedure for any ACL2 formula that contains only ACL2
constants, variables, and applications of SULFA core primitives. Before presenting the
procedure, we introduce the following terminology:
• SymTermp (X,Y), given X ∈ E and Y ∈ E, is a predicate returning true if and only if
X ∈ S and X occurs as a variable in Y . For example,
SymTermp (pXq, p(CAR (CDR (CONS A X)))q) = true,
SymTermp (pAq, p(CAR (CDR (CONS A X)))q) = true,
SymTermp (pYq, p(CAR (CDR (CONS A X)))q) = false, and
SymTermp (p(CONS A X)q, p(CAR (CDR (CONS A X)))q) = false.
• MakeNotConsp (X) , MakeEq (MakeConsp (X), pNILq). For example,
MakeNotConsp (p(F 4)q) = p(EQUAL (CONSP (F 4)) NIL)q.
• MakeNotEq (X,Y) = MakeEq (MakeEq (X,Y), pNILq). For example,
MakeNotEq (p(F A)q, p(G A)q) = p(EQUAL (EQUAL (F A) (G A)) NIL)q.
• Given a set C ⊂ E, and a term E ∈ E, define
MakeSetImp (C, E)
,  E, if C = ∅MakeIf (C0,MakeSetImp (C \ {C0}, E), pTq), otherwise.
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where C0 is the lexicographically smallest element of C (actually any element will
do, we only choose the lexicographically smallest element so that MakeSetImp has
a precise definition). Also, note that \ is set subtraction, e.g.,
{a, b, c, d} \ {a, c} = {a, b}.
Intuitively, MakeSetImp (C, E) is the ACL2 representation of the predicate which
returns true when the conjunction of the elements of C imply E. For example,
MakeSetImp ({pAq}, p(CAR B)q}, p(EQUAL X Y)q) is
p(IF A (IF (CAR B) (EQUAL X Y) ’T) ’T)q.
• ESC is the subset of ACL2 terms containing only applications of SULFA core primi-
tives.
• ET is the set of ACL2 terms containing only variables, constants (which may be any
ground terms involving ACL2 primitives), and applications of CONS. For example,
(CONS X Y), (CAR (CONS ’4 ’5)) and X are in ET, whereas (CAR X) is not.
• ENT is the set of ACL2 terms recognized by the grammar
negTree ::= (EQUAL (EQUAL tree tree) ’NIL) |
(EQUAL (CONSP tree) ’NIL)
tree ::= var | constant | (CONS tree tree)
where var is a variable symbol and constant is an ACL2 constant (which may be a
ground term involving ACL2 primitives). For example,
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p(EQUAL (EQUAL X Y) ’NIL)q ∈ ENT,
p(EQUAL (CONSP X) ’NIL)q ∈ ENT,
p(EQUAL (EQUAL X (CONS X Y)) ’NIL)q ∈ ENT,
p(EQUAL X Y)q < ENT,
p(EQUAL (EQUAL X Y) ’T)q < ENT, and
p(EQUAL (CONSP (CAR X)) ’NIL)q < ENT.
• HGZ is the empty history, representing ACL2’s ground zero theory.
• NonConsFA (E), given an E ∈ E such that E < ET, returns the lexicographically
smallest subterm E′ of E, such that Fn (E′) , pCONSq and for each ith argument of
E′, Arg (i, E′) ∈ ET.
Intuitively, NonConsFA (E) picks one of the inner-most subterms of E that is not an
application of CONS. For example,
NonConsFA (p(EQUAL (CONS (CAR (CONS A B)) (EQUAL A C)) X)q)
is ’(CAR (CONS A B)).
• Given an E ∈ E define
GetCar (E) ,

EvPrf (HGZ,MakeCar (E)), if |E| = 0
MakeCar (E), if (|E| = 1) ∨ (Fn (E) , pCONSq)
Arg (1, E), otherwise.
Intuitively, GetCar (E) is equal to the CAR of E, with some simplifications. For ex-
ample,
GetCar (p(CONS A B)q) = pAq,
GetCar (p(+ ’4 ’5)q) = pNILq,
GetCar (pAq) = p(CAR A)q, and
GetCar (p(CAR A)q) = p(CAR (CAR A))q.
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• Given an E ∈ E define
GetCdr (E) ,

EvPrf (HGZ,MakeCdr (E)), if |E| = 0
MakeCdr (E), if (|E| = 1) ∨ (Fn (E) , pCONSq)
Arg (2, E), otherwise.
Intuitively, GetCdr (E) is equal to the CDR of E, in the same way that GetCar (E) is
equal to the CAR of E.
• Given an E ∈ E define
GetConsp (E) ,

EvPrf (HGZ,MakeConsp (E)), if |E| = 0
MakeConsp (E), if (|E| = 1) ∨ (Fn (E) , pCONSq)
pTq, otherwise.
Intuitively, GetConsp (E) is equal to the CONSP of E, in the same way that GetCar (E)
is equal to the CAR of E.
The decision procedure is broken into two components: first, the formula is sim-
plified into a set of formulas such that all the formulas in the set are valid if and only if
the original formula is valid; next, the validity of each simplified formula is determined.
During simplification, each element in the set of formulas to be conjoined is maintained as
a pair (C, E), representing the formula MakeSetImp (C, E), where C ⊂ ET and E ∈ E. The
pair (∅, F) is the initial formula. Simplification proceeds as a series of steps of the func-
tion Round (C, E) simplifies a formula into a set of “simpler” formula until each formula is
represented by a pair (C, E) such that E ∈ ET.
Given a set C ⊂ ENT and a term E ∈ ESC, such that E < ET, let A , NonConsFA (E),
A f , Fn (A), A1 , Arg (1, A), A2 , Arg (2, A), A3 , Arg (3, A), and subA (X) be the term
formed from E by replacing all occurrences of A with X. Also, let v0 and v1 be unique
symbols not used as variables in E or any member of C. Then, Round (C, E) ,
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1. {(C, subA (X))}, if (A f ∈ {pCARq, pCDRq, pCONSPq})∧Fnp (A1), where X is Arg (1, A1),
Arg (2, A1), or pTq, if A f is pCARq, pCDRq, or pCONSPq respectively.
Intuitively, this case simplifies (CAR (CONS X Y)), (CDR (CONS X Y)), and
(CONSP (CONS X Y)) into X, Y, and T respectively. For example,
Round (∅, p(IF (EQUAL (CAR (CONS X Y)) (CAR X)) A B)q)
=
{(∅, p(IF (EQUAL X (CAR X)) A B)q)},
which simplifies the ACL2 formula
(IF (EQUAL (CAR (CONS X Y)) (CAR X)) A B)
to
(IF (EQUAL X (CAR X)) A B).
2. {(C, subA (X))}, if (A f = pIFq) ∧ ¬(A1 ∈ S), where X is A3 or A2, if A1 = pNILq or
A1 , pNILq respectively.
Intuitively, this case simplifies (IF NIL X Y) to Y and (IF α Y Z) to Y, if α is a
non-NIL constant or an application of CONS. For example,
Round (∅, p(EQUAL NIL (IF NIL Y Z))q)
=
{({X}, p(EQUAL NIL Z)q)},
which simplifies the ACL2 formula




As a second example,
Round ({p(EQUAL (EQUAL X NIL) NIL)q}, p(IF (CONS A B) T NIL)q)
=
{({p(EQUAL (EQUAL X NIL) NIL)q}, pTq)},
which simplifies the ACL2 formula
(EQUAL (EQUAL X NIL) NIL)→ (IF (CONS A B) T NIL).
to
(EQUAL (EQUAL X NIL) NIL)→ T.
3. {(C, subA (X))}, if (A f = pEQUALq) ∧ (SymTermp (A1, A2) ∨ SymTermp (A2, A1)),
where X is pTq or pNILq, if A1 = A2 or A1 , A2 respectively.
Intuitively, this case simplifies (EQUAL X X) to T and (EQUAL X α) to NIL, if α is
a CONS tree with X as one of its leaves. For example,
Round (∅, p(EQUAL (CONS (EQUAL X X) Y) Z)q)
=
{(∅, p(EQUAL (CONS T Y) Z)q)},
which simplifies the ACL2 formula
(EQUAL (CONS (EQUAL X X) Y) Z)
to
(EQUAL (CONS T Y) Z).
As a second example,
93
Round (∅, p(IF (EQUAL X (CONS (CONS X Y) Z)) T NIL))q)
=
{(∅, p(IF NIL T NIL)q)},
which simplifies the ACL2 formula
(IF (EQUAL X (CONS (CONS X Y) Z) T NIL))
to
(IF NIL T NIL).
4. {(C, subA (X))}, if A f = pEQUALq ∧ A1 < S ∧ A2 < S, where X is pNILq or
MakeIf (Ecar, Ecdr, pNILq), if GetConsp (A1) = pNILq ∨ GetConsp (A2) = pNILq or
GetConsp (A1) , pNILq ∧ GetConsp (A2) , pNILq respectively; Ecar ,
MakeEq (GetCar (A1),GetCar (A2)); Ecdr , MakeEq (GetCdr (A1),GetCdr (A2)).
Intuitively, when the arguments to EQUAL are not symbols, they must be applications
of CONS. This case then simplifies (EQUAL (CONS X0 Y0) (CONS X1 Y1)) to
(IF (EQUAL X0 X1) (EQUAL Y0 Y1) NIL)
and (EQUAL α (CONS Y Z)) to NIL if α is a non-tree constant. For example,
Round (∅, p(IF (EQUAL (CONS X Y) (CONS A B)) T NIL)q)
=
{(∅, p(IF (IF (EQUAL X A) (EQUAL Y B) NIL) T NIL)q)},
which simplifies the ACL2 formula
(IF (EQUAL (CONS X Y) (CONS A B)) T NIL)
to
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(IF (IF (EQUAL X A) (EQUAL Y B) NIL) T NIL).
As a second example,
Round (∅, p(CONS (EQUAL (CONS X Y) ’4) A)q)
=
{(∅, p(CONS NIL A)q)},
which simplifies the ACL2 formula
(CONS (EQUAL (CONS X Y) ’4) A)
to
(CONS NIL A).
5. {(C ∪CNC, subA (pNILq)), (C/σ, subA (X)/σ)}, if
(A f ∈ {pCARq, pCDRq, pCONSPq}); where σ , [A1 7→ MakeCons (v0, v1)]; CNC ,
{MakeNotConsp (A1)}; and X is v0, v1, or T, if A f is pCARq, pCDRq, or pCONSPq
respectively.
Intuitively, this case breaks up a formula involving (CAR X), (CDR X), and
(CONSP X) into two cases: one when X is a variable satisfying
(EQUAL (CONSP X) NIL) and another X is a variable satisfying (CONSP X). In the
second case, (CONS V0 V1) is substituted for X, where V0 and V1 are variables not
occurring in the original term. A simpler formula is produced in the sense that the
conclusion has fewer applications of CAR, CDR, and CONSP. For example,
Round (∅, p(IF (CAR X) A (CDR X))q)
=
{ ({p(EQUAL (CONSP X) NIL)q}, p(IF NIL A (CDR X))q),
(∅, p(IF V0 A V1)q)},
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which simplifies the ACL2 formula
(IF (CAR X) A (CDR X))
to the conjunction of the validity of
((EQUAL (CONSP X) NIL)→ (IF NIL A (CDR X)))
and
(IF V0 A V1).
As a second example,
Round ({p(EQUAL (EQUAL (CONS A X) Y) NIL)q}, p(CAR X)q)
=
{ ( {p(EQUAL (EQUAL (CONS A X) Y) NIL)q,
p(EQUAL (CONSP X) NIL)q},
pNILq),
({p(EQUAL (EQUAL (CONS A (CONS V0 V1)) Y) NIL)q}, pV0q)},
which simplifies the ACL2 formula
(EQUAL (EQUAL (CONS A X) Y) NIL)→ (CAR X)
to the conjunction of the validity of





(EQUAL (EQUAL (CONS A (CONS V0 V1)) Y) NIL)→ V0.
6. {(C ∪CNEQ, subA (A2)), (C/σ, subA (A3)/σ)}, if A f = pIFq, where
σ , [A1 7→ pNILq] and CNEQ , {MakeNotEq (pNILq, A1)}.
Intuitively, this case breaks (IF X Y Z) (where X is a variable) into two cases, one
where X is true and the other where X is false. For example,
Round (∅, p(IF X Y Z)q)
=
{ ({p(EQUAL (EQUAL X NIL) NIL)q}, pYq),
(∅, pZq)},
which simplifies the ACL2 formula
(IF X Y Z)
to the conjunction of the validity of
(EQUAL (EQUAL X NIL) NIL)→ Y
and
Z.
As a second example,
Round ( {p(EQUAL (EQUAL (CONS A X) Y) NIL)q},
p(CAR (IF X Y (CONS X Y)))q)
=
{ ( {p(EQUAL (EQUAL (CONS A X) Y) NIL)q,
p(EQUAL (EQUAL X NIL) NIL)q},
p(CAR Y)q),
( {p(EQUAL (EQUAL (CONS A NIL) Y) NIL)q},
p(CAR (CONS NIL Y))q)},
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which simplifies the ACL2 formula
(EQUAL (EQUAL (CONS A X) Y) NIL)
→
(CAR (IF X Y (CONS X Y)))
to the conjunction of the validity of




(EQUAL (EQUAL (CONS A NIL) Y) NIL)→ (CAR (CONS NIL Y)).
7. {(C∪CNEQ, subA (pNILq)), (C/σ, subA (T)/σ)}, otherwise, where AS is the argument
of A that is a symbol (AS ∈ S), AO is the other argument of A, σ , [AS 7→ AO], and
CNEQ , {MakeNotEq (AS , AO)}.
Note that at this point A f must be EQUAL and either A1 or A2 is a symbol. Intuitively,
this case breaks (EQUAL X Y) into two cases, one in which (EQUAL X Y) is false
and the other in which it is true. In the false case, (EQUAL (EQUAL X Y) NIL) is
added to the set of hypotheses. In the true case, X is replaced everywhere with Y. For
example,
Round (∅, p(EQUAL X (CONS A B))q)
=
{ ({p(EQUAL (EQUAL X (CONS A B)) NIL)q}, pNILq),
(∅, pTq)},
which simplifies the ACL2 formula
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(EQUAL X (CONS A B))
to the conjunction of the validity of
(EQUAL (EQUAL X (CONS A B)) NIL)→ NIL
and
T.
As a second example,
Round ( {p(EQUAL (EQUAL (CONS A X) Y) NIL)q},
p(CONS (EQUAL X Y) X)q)
=
{ ( {p(EQUAL (EQUAL (CONS A X) Y) NIL)q,
p(EQUAL NIL NIL)q},
p(CONS NIL X)q),
( {p(EQUAL (EQUAL (CONS A Y) Y) NIL)q},
p(CONS T Y)q)},
which simplifies the ACL2 formula
(EQUAL (EQUAL (CONS A X) Y) NIL)→ (CONS (EQUAL X Y) X)
to the conjunction of the validity of





(EQUAL (EQUAL (CONS A Y) Y) NIL)→ (CONS T Y).
Thus through a sequence of calls Round can reduce a set of formulas represented
as pairs (C, E), where C ⊂ ENT and E ∈ ESC, into simplified pairs (C′, E′), where C ⊂ ENT
and E ∈ ET. This sequence is formalized in with following function.
Given S ∈ (P(ENT) × ESC), define
SimplifyCore (S ) ,
 S , if ∀(C, E) ∈ S : E ∈ ETSimplifyCore ((S \ {(XC , XE)}) ∪ Round (XC , XE)), otherwise.
where (XC , XE) is some element of S such that XE < ET (to be precise we can choose the
element such that MakeSetImp (C, E) is lexicographically smallest).
The SimplifyCore function terminates by Theorem 6 and by Theorem 7 it produces
a set of formula that are valid if and only if its input formula is valid.
The decision procedure can then be completed with a procedure that checks the
validity of each formula returned by SimplifyCore .
Given a set C ⊂ ENT and a term E ∈ ET, define
ValidFFp (C, E) ,

EvPrfp (HGZ,MakeSetImp (C, E)/σ) = pNILq, if E = pNILq
ValidFFp (C/[E 7→ pNILq], pNILq), if E ∈ S
true, otherwise.
where σ is the substitution that maps each vi to the natural number i + M, v1 ∈ S through
vn ∈ S are the n variables that occur in MakeSetImp (CG, E), and M is a natural number at
least as large as any constant that occurs in MakeSetImp (C, E).
From Theorem 8 it follows that ValidFFp (C, E) is true if and only if
MakeSetImp (C, E) is a valid ACL2 formula. Thus, F ∈ ESC is valid if and only if
ValidFFp (C, E) is true for all (C, E) ∈ SimplifyCore (∅, F). We therefore have a decision
procedure for any formula that contains only SULFA core primitives.
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Intuitively, ValidFFp (C, E) determines whether MakeSetImp (C, E) is valid by
breaking up the problem into three cases: 1) E is NIL, 2) E is a symbol, 3) E is an ap-
plication of CONS (the only other possibility since E ∈ ET ). Case 3 is trivially valid, since
(CONS X Y) , NIL.
Case 2 can be reduced to case 1, since if the formula has a counterexample, that counterex-
ample occurs when E is NIL. For example,
(EQUAL (EQUAL (CONS A Y) Y) NIL)→ Y.
is reduced to:
(EQUAL (EQUAL (CONS A NIL) NIL) NIL)→ NIL.
Case 1 then determines whether there is a substitution σ mapping variables to values such
that every hypothesis is true. Since each hypothesis is the negation of a CONSP application
or the negation of an EQUAL, this can be determined easily.
• Every CONSP negation that can be true will be true when all variables are mapped to
non-tree values. For example, (EQUAL (CONSP X) NIL) is true when X is a non-tree
value, (EQUAL (CONSP (CONS X Y)) NIL) must be false, and (EQUAL (CONSP
’8) NIL) must be true.
• Every EQUAL negation that can be true will be true when all variables are given values
distinct from other variables and from values occurring in the original term. For
example, (EQUAL (EQUAL X Y) NIL) is true when X and Y are different and
(EQUAL (EQUAL (CONS X Y) (CONS A B)) NIL)
is true when X, Y, A, and B are all different from each other. Similarly,
(EQUAL (EQUAL (CONS X ’4) (CONS A ’4)) NIL)
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is true when X and A are different. On the other hand,
(EQUAL (EQUAL (CONS X Y) (CONS X Y)) NIL)
will be false regardless of which values are given to X and Y.
Thus, given a C ⊂ ENT, a simple way of determining whether a formula
MakeSetImp (C, pNILq) is valid is to see if MakeSetImp (C/σ, pNILq) evaluates to NIL
when σ is a substitution mapping the variables in C to non-tree constants (such as natural
numbers) different from one another and from the constants in C. For example, the validity
of
(EQUAL (EQUAL (CONS X Y) (CONS X Y)) NIL)
∧
(EQUAL (CONSP X) NIL)
∧
(EQUAL (CONSP Y) NIL)
→
NIL
is determined by evaluating
(EQUAL (EQUAL (CONS 1 2) (CONS 1 2)) NIL)
∧
(EQUAL (CONSP 1) NIL)
∧
(EQUAL (CONSP 2) NIL)
→
NIL.
On the other hand, a counterexample to
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(EQUAL (EQUAL (CONS X 4) (CONS X Y)) NIL)
∧
(EQUAL (CONSP X) NIL)
∧
(EQUAL (CONSP Y) NIL)
→
NIL
is determined by evaluating
(EQUAL (EQUAL (CONS 5 4) (CONS 5 6)) NIL)
∧
(EQUAL (CONSP 5) NIL)
∧




Given a set of symbols S and term E, define Count (S , E) to be the number of times that
symbols in S appear as functions in E. Furthermore, define VarCount (E) to be the number
of distinct variable symbols that occur in E. For example,
Count ({pCARq, pCDRq}, p(CONSP (CAR (CDR (CDR X))))q) = 3,
Count ({pCDRq}, p(CONSP (CAR (CDR (CDR X))))q) = 2,
Count ({pCONSPq}, p(CONSP (CAR (CDR (CDR X))))q) = 1,
VarCount (p(CONS X (CONS X Z))q) = 3, and
VarCount (p(CONS X (CONS X Y))q) = 2.
Also, given E ∈ E, define
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RoundOrd (E) , ω3 × Count ({pCARq, pCDRq, pCONSPq}, E) +
ω2 × VarCount (E) +
ω × Count ({pCONSq}, E) + Count ({pEQUALq, pIFq}, E).
Lemma 7. Given C ⊂ ENT and E ∈ ESC such that E < ET, let S , Round (C, E). Then,
for each element (S C , S E) ∈ S it follows that S C ∈ ENT, S E ∈ ESC, and RoundOrd (S E) <
RoundOrd (E).
Proof Sketch: Note that from the definition of NonConsFA it follows that A is a subterm
of E such that Fn (A) ∈ {CAR, CDR, CONSP, IF, EQUAL}.
For all (S C , S E) ∈ S , it follows trivially from the definition of Round that S C ∈ ENT
and S E ∈ mathbbESC. To prove that RoundOrd (S E) < RoundOrd (E), we consider each
case within the definition of Round .
• In cases 1 through 3, each conclusion S E returned by Round (C, E) is trivially smaller
than RoundOrd (E), since S E is formed by replacing A with an argument of A.
• In case 4, either A1 or A2 is an application of pCONSq. Thus, by the definition of
GetCar and GetCdr , A contains at least one fewer application of pCONSq. Further-
more, since A1 < S and A2 < S no new applications of pCARq or pCDRq are added.
• In case 5, the substitution σ may add applications of pCONSq, but not applications
of any other functions. Therefore, each conclusion S E returned by Round (C, E) has
one fewer application of pCARq, pCDRq, or pCONSPq than E.
• In case 6, both subA (A2) and subA (A3)/σ have one fewer application of pIFq, since
σ just maps variables to pNILq.
• In case 7, subA (pNILq) has at least one fewer application of EQUAL then E and
subA (T)/σ, while it may have more CONS applications than E, has fewer variables.

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Theorem 6. For all S ∈ (P(ENT) × E) SimplifyCore (S ) terminates.
Proof Sketch: From Lemma 7 it follows that the ordinal
∑
(C,E)∈S
ωRoundOrd (E) decreases on
each recursive call in the definition of SimplifyCore (S ). 
Lemma 8. Let X ∈ ET and Y ∈ ET satisfy SymTermp (X,Y) and X , Y. Then,
MakeEq (MakeEq (X,Y), pNILq) is a valid ACL2 formula in HGZ.
Proof Sketch: Trivial by induction on |Y | and ACL2’s axioms defining the primitive
ACL2-COUNT, from which it follows that:
(AND (INTEGERP (ACL2-COUNT X))
(<= 0 (ACL2-COUNT X))
(IMPLIES (CONSP X)
(< (ACL2-COUNT (CAR X)) (ACL2-COUNT X)))
(IMPLIES (CONSP X)
(< (ACL2-COUNT (CDR X)) (ACL2-COUNT X)))).

Lemma 9. Given E ∈ E, X ∈ S, an ACL2 history H, let v0 ∈ S and v0 ∈ S be symbols not
occurring in E such that v0 , v1. Then, MakeImp (MakeConsp (X), E) is valid in H if and
only if E/[X 7→ MakeCons (v0, v1)] is valid in H.
Proof Sketch: If MakeImp (MakeConsp (X), E) is valid, then E/[X 7→ MakeCons (v0, v1)]
follows by instantiation.
If F = E/[X 7→ MakeCons (v0, v1)] is valid, then
F/[v0 7→ MakeCar (X), v1 7→ MakeCdr (X)]
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is valid. Therefore, MakeImp (MakeConsp (X), E) follows from the validity of
(IMPLIES (CONSP X) (EQUAL (CONS (CAR X) (CDR X)) X)).

Lemma 10. Given E ∈ E, X ∈ S, Y ∈ E, and an ACL2 history H, the formula
MakeImp (MakeEq (X,Y), E) is valid in H if and only if E/[X 7→ Y] is valid in H.
Proof Sketch: Trivial from the inference rules of the ACL2 logic. 
Theorem 7. Given a finite set C ⊂ ENT and an ACL2 term E ∈ ESC such that E < ET,
let S , Round (C, E). Then, for any ACL2 history H, MakeSetImp (C, E) is a valid ACL2
formula in H if and only if for all (S C , S E) ∈ S , MakeSetImp (S C , S E) is a valid ACL2
formula.
Proof Sketch: We prove the theorem for each of the cases in the definition of Round , and
using the same definitions of A1, A2, and A f as in the definition Round . Note that, since
A1 ∈ ET , Fnp (A1)→ Fn (A1) = pCONSq and the same is true for A2.
1. Follows directly from the validity of
(EQUAL (CAR (CONS X Y)) X),
(EQUAL (CDR (CONS X Y)) X), and
(EQUAL (CONSP (CONS X Y)) T).
2. Either A1 is a constant or an application of CONS. Therefore, the equivalence of
MakeSetImp (C, subA (X)) and MakeSetImp (C, E) follows from the validity of
(IMPLIES (NOT (EQUAL X NIL)) (EQUAL (IF X Y Z) Y)),
(EQUAL (IF NIL Y Z) Z)), and
(EQUAL (IF (CONS A B) Y Z) Y).
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3. If A1 = A2, then (EQUAL (EQUAL X X) T). Otherwise, the theorem follows from
Lemma 8.
4. One of A1 and A2 is an application of CONS and the other is either a constant or an ap-
plication of CONS. Therefore, if either GetConsp (A1) = pNILq or
GetConsp (A2) = pNILq then the theorem follows from the validity of
(IMPLIES (NOT (CONSP X)) (EQUAL (CAR X) NIL)),
(IMPLIES (NOT (CONSP X)) (EQUAL (CDR X) NIL)), and
(IMPLIES (NOT (CONSP X)) (EQUAL (CONSP X) NIL)).
Otherwise, the theorem follows from
(IMPLIES (AND (CONSP A1) (CONSP A2))
(EQUAL (EQUAL A1 A2)
(IF (EQUAL (CAR A1) (CAR A2))
(EQUAL (CDR A1) (CDR A2))
NIL))).
5. Note that A1 ∈ S, by the negation of the conditions of case 1. Furthermore,
MakeSetImp (C ∪CNC, subA (NIL))
is equal to
MakeSetImp (C ∪CNC, E),
by the same reasoning as in case 1. Thus, we need only prove that
MakeImp (MakeConsp (A1,MakeSetImp (C, E))
is valid if and only if
MakeSetImp (C/σ, subA(X)/σ)
is valid. This follows from Lemma 9 and the reasoning in case 1.
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6. Note again that A1 ∈ S. From the validity of
(IMPLIES (NOT (EQUAL A1 NIL)) (EQUAL (IF A1 A2 A3) A2)),
it follows that
MakeSetImp (C ∪CNEQ, subA (A2))
is equal to
MakeSetImp (C ∪CNEQ, E).
Therefore, we need only prove that
MakeImp (MakeEq (pNILq, A1),MakeSetImp (C, E))
is valid if and only if
MakeSetImp (C/σ, subA(A3)/σ).
This follows from Lemma 10 and the validity of
(IMPLIES (EQUAL A1 NIL) (EQUAL (IF A1 A2 A3) A3)).
7. Note that Fn (A) = pEQUALq, and either A1 ∈ S or A2 ∈ S. Therefore,
MakeSetImp (C ∪CNEQ, subA (pNILq))
equals
MakeSetImp (C ∪CNEQ, E).
Thus, we need only prove that
MakeImp (MakeEq (AS , AO),MakeSetImp (C, E))
is valid if and only if
MakeSetImp (C/σ, subA(pTq)/σ),
which follows from Lemma 10.
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
Lemma 11. Given a term X ∈ ET and Y ∈ ET, let A , MakeNotEq (X,Y); letσ ⊂ (S×E) be
a substitution mapping all the variables in A to unique natural numbers that do not appear
in A; Then, if EvPrfp (HGZ, A/σ), then A is a valid ACL2 formula.
Proof Sketch: First note that since σ maps all variables to constants and all functions in A
are ACL2 primitives, EvPrfp (HGZ, A/σ) is equivalent to EvPrf (HGZ, A/σ) , pNILq.
Induct on the number of CONS applications in A.
• If there are no CONS applications, then X and Y are each either a constant or a variable.
Since σ never maps a variable to a constant that occurs in A and never maps two
variables to the same constant, X and Y must be constant. In that case, the formula is
clearly valid, since A = A/σ.
• If either X or Y is a CONS application, but not both, then the theorem follows from
contradiction. EvPrf (H, Aσ) = pTq, since no natural number can equal the result of
a CONS application.
• Otherwise, both X and Y are CONS applications. Thus, the theorem follows from
induction, and the validity of
(IMPLIES (OR (NOT (EQUAL X0 Y0)) (NOT (EQUAL X1 Y1)))
(NOT (EQUAL (CONS X0 X1) (CONS Y0 Y1)))).

Lemma 12. Given an ACL2 history H, C ⊂ ENT, let E , MakeSetImp (C, pNILq). Fur-
thermore, let v1 ∈ S through vn ∈ S denote the n variables that occur in E, let M be a
natural number at least as large as the largest natural number constant that appears in E,
and let σ be the substitution that maps each vi to the natural number i + M. Then, E is a
valid formula in H if and only if EvPrfp (HGZ, E/σ).
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Proof Sketch: First note that since σ maps all variables to constants and all functions in A
are ACL2 primitives, EvPrfp (HGZ, A/σ) is equivalent to EvPrf (HGZ, A/σ) , pNILq.
The validity of E implies the validity of E/σ, by instantiation. Furthermore, since
σ maps all variables in E to constants and E ∈ ECS, the validity of E/σ implies that
EvPrf (HGZ, E/σ) is a constant and not equal to pNILq.
We prove that the validity of E follows from the validity of E/σ by contradiction.
Assume that E/σ is valid, since EvPrf (HGZ,MakeSetImp (C, pNILq/σ)) , pNILq, there
must be some A ∈ C such that EvPrf (HGZ, A/σ) = pNILq.
• First, assume A = MakeNotConsp (Ax) for some Ax ∈ ET. If Ax is constant, then
Ax = pNILq, and therefore E is valid. Otherwise, Ax must be an application of CONS,
since Ax ∈ S implies EvPrf (HGZ, A/σ) =T. Thus, the validity of E follows from
(EQUAL (NOT (CONSP (CONS X0 X1))) NIL).
• Otherwise, the validity of E follows from Lemma 11.

Theorem 8. Let H be an ACL2 history, C ⊂ ENT, and E ⊂ EH . Then, MakeSetImp (C), E)
is a valid formula in H if and only if ValidFFp (C, E).
Proof Sketch: If E = pNILq, then the theorem follows directly from Lemma 12. If E ∈ S,
then the theorem follows from Lemma 10 and Lemma 12. Otherwise, the theorem follows
from the validity of p(NOT (EQUAL (CONS X Y) NIL))q. 
6.5 Counterexample Generation
It is possible to construct a counterexample to any invalid SULFA formula. In this context a
counterexample replaces uninterpreted functions with concrete functions and variables with
values such that a formula evaluates to NIL.
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From the previous section, recall that if F ∈ ESC is an invalid formula, then there ex-
ists a (C, E) ∈ SimplifyCore ({(∅, F)}) such that ¬ValidFFp (C, E). Note that when
ValidFFp (C, E) is false ValidFFp creates a counterexample to MakeSetImp (C, E). By
following the substitutions leading to (C, E), it is possible to construct a counterexample to
the original formula F.
Furthermore, by inverting the substitutions used to remove uninterpreted functions
in Section 6.3, it is possible to determine concrete functions for each uninterpreted function
such that the formula evaluates to NIL. Furthermore, the unrolling algorithm in Section 6.2
produces an equivalent formula to the original SULFA formula with no new variables and
only provably irrelevant variables removed. Therefore, a counterexample to the unrolled
formula is also a counterexample to the original SULFA formula.
6.6 Summary
Chapter 5 defines SULFA, a decidable subclass of ACL2 formulas, involving unbounded
tree structures, if-then-else, equality, uninterpreted functions, and a definition principle for
extending it with user-defined functions. SULFA intuitively resembles the theory of list
structures with uninterpreted functions, which is known to be decidable. The axioms of
ACL2 are somewhat different from the axioms of the theory of list structures (more can
be proven from the axioms of ACL2). Also, ACL2 contains a more sophisticated array of
constants than the traditional theory of list structures, such as strings, symbols, and complex
numbers. Thus the decidability of SULFA does not directly follow from previous proofs of
decidability of similar theories.
This chapter shows that SULFA is, in fact, a decidable subclass, by presenting a
procedure that determines whether any SULFA formula is valid. The procedure first unrolls
user-defined functions, then removes uninterpreted functions, and finally solves ACL2 for-
mulas involving SULFA core primitives. A proof sketch of the correctness of each step of
the procedure is provided.
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The decision procedure presented here is intended to be as simple as possible, rather
than efficient. Chapter 7 describes a more efficient SULFA solver, though with a less rig-




Developing a SAT-Based SULFA
Solver
7.1 Introduction
Chapter 5 defines SULFA, a decidable subclass of ACL2 formulas made up of the tree
data structure, equality, if-then-else, uninterpreted functions, and (unrollable) user-defined
functions. Chapter 6 shows that SULFA is a decidable subclass by presenting a procedure
that determines whether any SULFA formula is valid. In order to apply a SULFA solver to
problems of practical interest, however, a more efficient procedure than this is required.
This chapter outlines an algorithm for solving SULFA formulas, based on SAT
solvers, which Chapters 8 and 9 apply to non-trivial problems from hardware verifica-
tion. The intuition behind the SAT-Based SULFA Solver is to find a finite set of equality
and CONSP predicates that are relevant to a given formula. Then, the relationship between
the predicates is codified as a satisfiability problem in Boolean Conjunctive Normal Form
(CNF), and passed to a SAT solver. The algorithm is described in more detail in our work-
shop paper [32] and an implementation of it, along with its source code, is available with
the ACL2 distribution [37].
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Section 7.2 begins by showing how nested if-then-else terms can be translated into
CNF. Section 7.3 then defines Boolean SULFA predicates, which form the basis for our
SAT-based algorithm. Section 7.4 next presents an overview of the algorithm used to trans-
late SULFA formulas into CNF and the intuition used to optimize it. Section 7.5 illustrates
how our algorithm translates a few SULFA formulas into CNF.
Note that this chapter reuses some of the terminology from Chapter 5, as well as the
simplifications to the ACL2 logic described in Section 5.3. While the actual implementation
supports mutual recursion and lambda functions, these features are not addressed in this
chapter.
7.2 Translating Nested If Terms to CNF
We begin by showing how nested IF terms are translated into CNF, which forms the basis
for our full SULFA to CNF translation algorithm.
Define a normalized IF term as an IF term where every condition (the first argument
of IF) is a symbol. The validity of normalized IF terms can be easily translated into the
satisfiability of a Boolean CNF formula. For example, the universally-quantified ACL2
formula
α: (IF A (IF B C D) (IF E F G))
translates to the following (negated) existentially-quantified CNF formula:
β : (¬a ∨ ¬b ∨ ¬c) ∧ (¬a ∨ b ∨ ¬d) ∧ (a ∨ ¬e ∨ ¬ f ) ∧ (a ∨ e ∨ ¬g)
Note that α is valid if and only if β is unsatisfiable. Thus a SAT solver that checks whether
β is satisfiable also solves whether α is valid.
A simple algorithm for translating a normalized IF term to CNF creates one clause
for each possible result of the IF condition. This has O(N2) worst case complexity, where
N is the size of the normalized IF term, since the generated CNF formula has N clauses
and each clause has at most N literals.
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The straightforward method for normalizing a nested IF term, however, requires
exponential time, because the branches of the IF must be duplicated during normalization.
As Tseitin showed, however, this problem can be alleviated by introducing new variables
into the CNF term[89]. To formalize this concept, we introduce the notion of an ACL2 term
in CNF-ready form, defined by the following grammar:
CNF-ready ::= norm-if | (IMPLIES (AND norm-iff) norm-if) |
(IMPLIES (AND norm-iff-list) norm-if)
norm-iff-list ::= norm-iff | norm-iff norm-iff-list
norm-iff ::= (IFF symbol norm-if) | norm-if
norm-if ::= symbol | T | NIL | (IF symbol norm-if norm-if)
where symbol is an arbitrary symbol. For example, the nested IF term
(IF (IF A B C) D E) is valid if and only if the CNF-ready formula
(IMPLIES (IFF V (IF A B C)) (IF V D E))
is valid.
The simple algorithm for translating normalized IF terms into CNF can be extended
into an algorithm to translate CNF-ready formulas. For example, the formula
(IMPLIES (IFF V (IF A B C)) (IF V D E)) is translated into:
(¬v ∨ ¬a ∨ b) ∧ (¬v ∨ a ∨ c) ∧ (v ∨ ¬a ∨ ¬b)∧
(v ∨ a ∨ ¬c) ∧ (¬v ∨ ¬d) ∧ (v ∨ ¬e)
where v , (pVq , pNILq), a , (pAq , pNILq), b , (pBq , pNILq), c , (pCq , pNILq),
d , (pDq , pNILq), and e , (pEq , pNILq). The above formula is unsatisfiable if and only
if
(IMPLIES (IFF V (IF A B C)) (IF V D E))
is valid.
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The algorithm used above has O(N2) complexity. Each hypothesis in the CNF-
ready formula is translated into CNF independently of the conclusion and other hypotheses,
since the disjunction in the ACL2 formula becomes a conjunction in the CNF formula.
Furthermore, each IFF hypothesis translates into CNF by translating its normalized IF
term twice, once for the true case and once for the false case. Therefore, the time required




n), where mi is the size of the ith IF term. Given a CNF-ready formula






The translation of a CNF-ready formula into CNF is linear if the size of each IFF
is bounded. Therefore, any nested IF term can be translated into CNF in linear time, if
variables are created for every IF term. For example,
(IF A (IF B C D) (IF (IF E F G) H J))
can be translated to
(IMPLIES (AND (IFF V0 (IF B C D))
(IFF V1 (IF E F G))
(IFF V2 (IF V1 H J)))
(IF A V0 V2)).
The above CNF-ready formula is translated to CNF in linear time, since each hypothesis
and conclusion contains only a single IF term.
7.3 Boolean SULFA Predicates
Note that in the previous section each Boolean variable in the CNF formula represents a
predicate on ACL2 terms of the form α , NIL for some ACL2 variable α. The problem
is then decidable since only a finite number of such Boolean predicates are relevant to the
nested IF term. Similarly every SULFA formula can be reduced to a finite number of
Boolean predicates.
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Define a SULFA Boolean predicate as an ACL2 term in the following grammar:
SBP ::= T | NIL | (CONSP ccExpr) | (EQUAL ccExpr ccExpr) |
ccExpr ::= symbol | (CAR ccExpr) | (CDR ccExpr)
where symbol is an arbitrary symbol. For example, (CONSP (CDR (CAR X))) and
(EQUAL (CAR A) (CAR (CDR B))) are SULFA Boolean predicates.
Furthermore, a SULFA nested IF predicate is defined by the grammar:
ifpred ::= SBP | (IF ifpred ifpred ifpred)
where SBP is an arbitrary SULFA Boolean predicate. For example,
(IF (EQUAL (CAR X) 4) (CONSP Y) (EQUAL (CDR X) NIL))
is a SULFA nested IF predicate.
Given a SULFA Boolean predicate X and a substitution σ mapping variables to
terms in ESC (terms containing only SULFA core primitives), X/σ can be reduced to a
SULFA nested IF predicate by successive applications of the rules in Figure 7.1. Further-
more, any ACL2 formula F is equivalent to p(EQUAL X NIL)q/[X 7→ F]. Therefore, since
any SULFA formula can be reduced to a formula involving only SULFA core primitives,
any SULFA formula can be reduced to a SULFA nested IF predicate. For example,
(IMPLIES (EQUAL (CAR X) A)
(EQUAL (CAR (IF (CONSP X) X (CONS A B)))
A))
is a SULFA formula that is equivalent to:
(IF (EQUAL (CAR X) A)




1. (CAR (IF A B C))⇒ (IF A (CAR B) (CAR C))
2. (CDR (IF A B C))⇒ (IF A (CDR B) (CDR C))
3. (CAR (EQUAL A B))⇒ (CDR (EQUAL A B))⇒ NIL
4. (CAR (CONS A B))⇒ A
5. (CDR (CONS A B))⇒ B
6. (CAR (CONSP A))⇒ (CDR (CONSP A))⇒ NIL
7. (EQUAL (IF A B C) D)⇒
(IF (EQUAL A NIL) (EQUAL C D) (EQUAL B D))
8. (EQUAL (CONS A B) C)⇒
(IF (CONSP C)
(IF (EQUAL (CAR C) A) (EQUAL (CDR C) B) NIL)
NIL)
9. (EQUAL (CONSP A) B)⇒ (IF (CONSP A) (EQUAL B T) (EQUAL B NIL))
10. (EQUAL (EQUAL A B) C)⇒
(IF (EQUAL A B) (EQUAL C T) (EQUAL C NIL))
11. (CONSP (IF A B C))⇒ (IF (EQUAL A NIL) (CONSP C) (CONSP B))
12. (CONSP (CONS A B))⇒ T
13. (CONSP (CONSP A))⇒ (CONSP (EQUAL A B))⇒ NIL
Figure 7.1: Let X be a nested IF predicate, and σ a substitution mapping symbols to terms
in ESC (terms that include only SULFA core primitives). Then, the rewrite rules above can
be used to reduce X/σ into a nested IF predicate.
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The above formula is equivalent to the following instantiation of p(EQUAL X NIL)q:
(NOT (EQUAL
(IF (EQUAL (CAR X) A)




where (NOT E) is an abbreviation of (IF E NIL T). By repeatedly applying the simplifi-
cation rules in Figure 7.1 and evaluating ground terms, the above formula simplifies to the
following SULFA nested IF predicate:
(NOT (IF (NOT (EQUAL (CAR X) A))
NIL
(NOT (IF (NOT (NOT (CONSP X)))
(EQUAL (CAR X) A)
(EQUAL A A))))).
If the negation in the above formula is removed, it becomes:
(IF (EQUAL (CAR X) A)
(IF (CONSP X)
(EQUAL (CAR X) A)
(EQUAL A A))
T).
Let F be a SULFA nested IF predicate containing the set Z ⊂ E of SULFA Boolean
predicates. Then, if each member of Z is generalized to a variable, the result is a nested
IF that can be translated into CNF. If a SAT solver returns unsatisfiable, then the origi-
nal SULFA formula is valid. Otherwise, the original formula is valid only if the formula
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MakeSetImp (C, pNILq) is valid, where each element of C either is E ∈ Z, if E corre-
sponds to a true variable in the satisfying instance; or MakeNot (E), if E corresponds
to a false variable in the satisfying instance. In our example, a satisfying instance re-
turned by the SAT solver could lead to (NOT (CONSP X)), (EQUAL (CAR X) A), and
(NOT (EQUAL A A)), which is a spurious counter-example
Any SULFA Boolean predicate, such as (EQUAL X X), that is reducible to a con-
stant can be easily simplified. If E is an instance of (EQUAL X X), then it is simplified to ’T;
otherwise, if E is an application of EQUAL such that one of its arguments, X, is a subterm of
the other, then it is simplified to (EQUAL X ’NIL). For example,
(EQUAL A (CAR A)) is simplified to (EQUAL A ’NIL). MakeEq (X, NIL). Our example
formula therefore simplifies to:
(IF (EQUAL (CAR X) A)
(IF (CONSP X)
(EQUAL (CAR X) A)
T)
T).
The above formula generalizes to a valid nested IF term, which can be proven using a SAT
solver.
Further spurious counterexamples can occur due to relations between SULFA
Boolean predicates. For example, if (CONSP X) is true, then (EQUAL X NIL) must be
false. Many spurious counterexamples can be avoided, however, by instantiating the the-
orems in Figure 7.2. For example, by adding instances of the theorems in Figure 7.2, our
example becomes:
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1. (IMPLIES (AND (EQUAL X Y) (EQUAL Y Z)) (EQUAL X Z))
2. (IMPLIES (NOT (CONSP X)) (EQUAL (CAR X) NIL))
3. (IMPLIES (NOT (CONSP X)) (EQUAL (CDR X) NIL))
4. (IMPLIES (AND (CONSP X) (NOT (CONSP Y))) (NOT (EQUAL X Y)))
5. (IMPLIES (CONSP X) (EQUAL (CONSP X) T))
6. (IMPLIES (EQUAL X Y) (EQUAL (EQUAL X Y) T))
7.
(IMPLIES (AND (EQUAL (CAR X) (CAR Y))




Figure 7.2: ACL2 theorems instantiated after generalization to prevent spurious counter
examples.
(IMPLIES
(IMPLIES (NOT (CONSP X)) (EQUAL (CAR X) NIL))
(IF (EQUAL (CAR X) A)
(IF (CONSP X)
(EQUAL (CAR X) A)
T)
T)).
Note that IMPLIES and NOT are easily translated to IF terms.
Since each of the theorems in Figure 7.2 is an ACL2 theorem, adding instantiations
of them as hypotheses does not affect the validity of an ACL2 formula. Our algorithm
instantiates every instance of the theorems in Figure 7.2 that we believe may be relevant to
the SAT solver, to avoid as many spurious counterexamples as possible.
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7.4 Developing an Efficient SAT-Based Proof Procedure
The previous section shows that it is possible to use SAT solvers to aid in the proof and
disproof of SULFA formulas. This section describes the optimizations needed to make an
efficient SAT-based SULFA verification technique, and provides an overview of the result-
ing tool. Note that the subject of uninterpreted functions is omitted from this section and
instead discussed in Section 7.7.
To develop an efficient algorithm for translating a SULFA formula to CNF, a trade
off is managed between the following three goals:
1. Avoid duplication of terms: In simpler versions of our algorithm, complex terms
are often duplicated. For example, unrolling (F (IF A B C)) might lead to the
duplication of (IF A B C) since the formal parameter of Fmay occur multiple times
in its body. Such duplication leads to an exponential explosion that can be avoided
by creating new variables. For example, (F (IF A B C)) is equal to
(IMPLIES (EQUAL V (IF A B C)) (F V)),
so that F can be unrolled without duplicating (IF A B C). Therefore, the efficient
translation algorithm creates variables for complex terms before those terms are likely
to be duplicated.
2. Avoid the creation of unnecessary variables: On the other hand, the performance
of a SAT solver on a given problem is often closely related to the number of Boolean
variables present in the problem. Furthermore, the size of the term can increase from
the unnecessary creation of variables. For example,
(IF (F0 A0) (F1 A1) (F2 A2))
might unroll to A1, if (F0 A0) expands to T and (F1 A1) expands to A1. If a variable
is created for (F0 A0), however,
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(IF (F0 A0) (F1 A1) (F2 A2))
becomes
(IMPLIES (EQUAL V (F0 A0)) (IF V (F1 A1) (F2 A2))).
Now, (F2 A2) is likely to be unrolled, despite the fact that it is irrelevant to the
original formula.
The efficient translation algorithm avoids unrolling irrelevant terms such as (F2 A2)
above, by restricting variable creation to IF terms, and performing minimal simplifi-
cation on IF terms before unrolling or variable creation.
3. Avoid simplifying irrelevant subterms: Note that the rewrite rules in Figure 7.1,
implement a form of cone of influence reduction. For example, the formula
(EQUAL (CAR (IF A
(CONS (CONS (F X) (F Y)) (F Z))
(CONS X (G Y))))
NIL).
simplifies to
(EQUAL (IF A (CONS (F X) (F Y)) X)
NIL)
by rules 1 and 4 in Figure 7.1. This further simplifies to
(IF (EQUAL A NIL)
(EQUAL X NIL)
(EQUAL (CONS (F X) (F Y)) NIL))
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by rules 7 in Figure 7.1. Finally, this is simplified to
(IF (EQUAL A NIL) (EQUAL X NIL) NIL)
by rule 8 in Figure 7.1, which produces an IF with a trivial condition that is then
simplified to NIL—essentially, the CONS of two elements is never equal to NIL. Note
that the subterms (F X), (F Y), (F Z), and (G Y) in the original example formula
have no bearing its validity.
The efficient translation algorithm, for the most part, avoids manipulating or creating
variables for subterms that can be removed by the rewrite rules in Figure 7.1. In
practice, this is an important technique for hardware verification, since it enables the
verification of shallow properties of large hardware designs.
An overview of the optimized SAT-based proof procedure, which manages a trade-
off between the three above goals, is illustrated in Figure 7.4. The procedure is divided into
the following phases:
• SULFA Recognizer. The recognizer described in Section 5.5 is used to efficiently
determine if the given formula is in SULFA. If it is not, then an error message is
presented to the user. Otherwise, the procedure continues.
• Basic Simplification. This phase performs some minimal simplification of the cur-
rent term, which is initially the formula and later the definition of a symbol occurring
in the formula (the current term is updated at the end of the normalization phase).
The simplification in this phase generally involves only the evaluation proof tech-
nique, simplification based on the axioms of CONS, and simplification based on the
axioms of IF. For example, (CAR (IF T (CONS X Y) Z)) is simplified to X.
• Definition Creation. First, define an inner-if term as an IF term that occurs either
within the argument of a user-defined function, the condition of an IF, or an argu-























Figure 7.3: An overview of our tool that verifies SULFA formulas using SAT Solvers
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in its condition. For example, (F (IF (CAR X) (F Y) Z)) contains an inner-if,
whereas (F (IF (F X) (F Y) Z)), (IF (CAR X) (F Y) Z),
and (IF A (IF (CAR X) (F Y) Z)) do not.
During this phase, new symbols are defined to represent inner-if terms occurring
in the current term. For example, (F (IF (CAR X) (F Y) Z)) is replaced with
(F V), where V is defined to be (IF (CAR X) (F Y) Z).
• Unroll. This phase expands functions in the current term.
• Definition Removal and Normalization. If the current term is the formula, then it
is equivalent to p(NOT (EQUAL X NIL))q/[X 7→ F], which is reduced to a SULFA
nested IF by outside-in rewriting based on the theorems in Figure 7.1.
Otherwise, the formula is a SULFA nested IF predicate and the current term defines
a symbol that occurs in the formula. The definition is now removed by mapping its
symbol to the current term. Next, the formula is again reduced to a SULFA nested
IF predicate by outside-in rewriting, based on the theorems in Figure 7.1.
New variables are also created for the resulting SULFA Boolean predicates in the
same manner. For example, if V0 is a symbol with a definition that has not yet been
traversed, then (IF A (EQUAL NIL V0) (EQUAL NIL V0)) is translated to
(IMPLIES (IFF V0-P0 (EQUAL NIL V0)) (IF A V0-P0 V0-P0)).
When the symbol removal phase later substitutes a term for V0, this term will not be
duplicated.
Once the formula is normalized, the most recent definition not already removed, is
chosen as the new current term. If no definitions exist that have not been removed
then the algorithm proceeds to the final translation phase.
• Final Translation. The final translation phase generalizes any remaining SULFA
Boolean predicates, instantiates the theorems in Figure 7.2, as described in Sec-
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tion 7.3, and then translates the resulting nested IF into CNF by the method described
in Section 7.2.
• Counterexample. If the SAT solver returns satisfiable, then the satisfying instance is
a mapping from SULFA Boolean predicates to Booleans. In a manner similar to that
described in Section 6.5, this mapping is translated, if possible, into a concrete ACL2
object that is a counterexample to the original formula.
The algorithm in Figure 7.4 is further optimized to avoid simplifying irrelevant
subterms. Note that in the definition removal and normalization phase, there is some finite
set of SULFA Boolean predicates in which the current term will eventually be instantiated.
The basic simplification, symbol creation, and unrolling phases are, therefore, optimized to
ignore subterms that are irrelevant to the set of predicates in which the current term will
eventually be instantiated. Any unsimplified terms are eventually removed by the definition
removal and normalization phase.
7.5 Example
This section translates an example SULFA formula into CNF using the algorithm shown in
Figure 7.4. First define UNARY-AND as:
(DEFUN UNARY-AND (N X)
(IF (ZP N) T
(IF (CAR X)
(UNARY-AND (1- N) (CDR X))
NIL))),
which computes the conjunction of the first n-bits in a bit vector. In the body of UNARY-AND,
the function ZP returns true if its argument is the natural number 0, and the function “1-”
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subtracts 1 from its argument. The following is a valid SULFA formula, which we we name
uAndForm:
(EQUAL (UNARY-AND 2 (IF A (CONS B (CONS C (CONS (F A) NIL)))
(CONS C (CONS B NIL))))
(IF B (IF C T NIL) NIL)).
where F is any arbitrary function with a valid ground formal set.
The formula uAndForm is valid since both the conjunction of B and C and the con-
junction of C and B, are equal to T if B and C are non-NIL; otherwise, both are NIL.
We will now translate the theorem uAndForm to CNF. The first step is to simplify
the formula, using the axioms of IF, CONS, and evaluation, which yields no change to the
formula. Next, the definition creation phase produces the following:
(LET* ((V0 (IF A (CONS B (CONS C (CONS (F A) NIL)))
(CONS C (CONS B NIL))))
(V1 (IF B (IF C T NIL) NIL)))
(EQUAL (UNARY-AND 2 V0)
V1)).
Two symbols, V0 and V1, are created to represent inner-if terms. These symbols are defined
in a LET* (LET* is described in Chapter 3).
The next phase that alters the formula is the unroll phase, which produces:
(LET* ((V0 (IF A (CONS B (CONS C (CONS (F A) NIL)))
(CONS C (CONS B NIL))))
(V1 (IF B (IF C T NIL) NIL)))
(EQUAL (IF (ZP 2) T




The above formula is equivalent to uAndForm by the definition of UNARY-AND.
The translation algorithm next uses the basic simplification phase to simplify the
body of the LET* into:
(LET* ((V0 (IF A (CONS B (CONS C (CONS (F A) NIL)))
(CONS C (CONS B NIL))))
(V1 (IF B (IF C T NIL) NIL)))
(EQUAL (IF (CAR V0) (UNARY-AND 1 (CDR V0)) NIL)
V1)).
which is equivalent to the previous formula by evaluation and the axioms of IF.
Next, the definition creation phase translates the formula into the following:
(LET* ((V0 (IF A (CONS B (CONS C (CONS (F A) NIL)))
(CONS C (CONS B NIL))))
(V1 (IF B (IF C T NIL) NIL))
(V2 (IF (CAR V0) (UNARY-AND 1 (CDR V0)) NIL)))
(EQUAL V2 V1)).
Next, the translation process proceeds to the definition removal and normalization
phase. Normally, this phase must reduce the current term into a SULFA nested IF predicate,
but in the above example the current term (in this case, the body of the LET*) is already a
SULFA nested IF predicate, so no normalization is needed. Instead, a variable is simply
created to represent each SULFA Boolean predicate in the current term, as shown below:
(LET* ((V0 (IF A (CONS B (CONS C (CONS (F A) NIL)))
(CONS C (CONS B NIL))))
(V1 (IF B (IF C T NIL) NIL))
(V2 (IF (CAR V0) (UNARY-AND 1 (CDR V0)) NIL)))
(IMPLIES (IFF V2-P0 (EQUAL V1 V2))
V2-P0)).
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The new symbol, V2-P0, is associated with V2 since V2 is the more recently defined symbol
in the SULFA Boolean predicate it represents. At first glance the above formula appears
weaker than the previous formula, since V2-P0 is not restricted to be Boolean. However,
the two formulas are equivalent since V2-P0 is never used in a context that distinguishes
between non-NIL constants.
Also note that the arguments of the equality have been reordered. Although not pre-
viously mentioned, arguments of SULFA Boolean predicates are ordered to avoid creating
equivalent predicates.
At this point, the simplification continues with the current term becoming the
bottom-most definition, which is the definition of V2. The unroll phase is the next phase to
modify the formula, as shown below:
(LET* ((V0 (IF A (CONS B (CONS C (CONS (F A) NIL)))
(CONS C (CONS B NIL))))
(V1 (IF B (IF C T NIL) NIL))
(V2 (IF (CAR V0)
(IF (ZP 1) T
(IF (CAR (CDR V0))
(UNARY-AND (1- 1) (CDR (CDR V0)))
NIL))
NIL)))
(IMPLIES (IFF V2-P0 (EQUAL V1 V2))
V2-P0)).
The above formula is equivalent to the previous formula, by the definition of UNARY-AND.
Next, the basic simplification phase produces:
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(LET* ((V0 (IF A (CONS B (CONS C (CONS (F A) NIL)))
(CONS C (CONS B NIL))))
(V1 (IF B (IF C T NIL) NIL))
(V2 (IF (CAR V0)
(IF (CAR (CDR V0))
(UNARY-AND 0 (CDR (CDR V0)))
NIL)
NIL)))
(IMPLIES (IFF V2-P0 (EQUAL V1 V2))
V2-P0)),
which is equivalent to the previous formula by evaluation and the axioms of IF.
After another round of unrolling and basic simplification, the following formula is
produced:
(LET* ((V0 (IF A (CONS B (CONS C (CONS (F A) NIL)))
(CONS C (CONS B NIL))))
(V1 (IF B (IF C T NIL) NIL))
(V2 (IF (CAR V0) (IF (CAR (CDR V0)) T NIL) NIL)))
(IMPLIES (IFF V2-P0 (EQUAL V1 V2))
V2-P0)),
which is equivalent to the previous formula by the definition of UNARY-AND, evaluation, and
the axioms of IF.
Next, V2 is removed by substituting its body into the body of the LET*, leading to:
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(LET* ((V0 (IF A (CONS B (CONS C (CONS (F A) NIL)))
(CONS C (CONS B NIL))))
(V1 (IF B (IF C T NIL) NIL)))
(IMPLIES (IFF V2-P0 (EQUAL V1
(IF (CAR V0)
(IF (CAR (CDR V0)) T NIL)
NIL)))
V2-P0)).
Note that the definition of V2 in the LET* has been removed, and that the body of the LET*
is a SULFA nested IF term.
Normalization of the LET* body now occurs, using outside rewriting based on the
theorems in Figure 7.1:
(LET* ((V0 (IF A (CONS B (CONS C (CONS (F A) NIL)))
(CONS C (CONS B NIL))))
(V1 (IF B (IF C T NIL) NIL)))
(IMPLIES (IFF V2-P0 (IF (EQUAL NIL (CAR V0)) (EQUAL NIL V1)




which is equivalent to the previous formula, by the axioms of IF and EQUAL.
Next, variables are created for each SULFA Boolean predicate, which produces:
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(LET* ((V0 (IF A (CONS B (CONS C (CONS (F A) NIL)))
(CONS C (CONS B NIL))))
(V1 (IF B (IF C T NIL) NIL)))
(IMPLIES
(AND (IFF V0-P0 (EQUAL NIL (CAR V0)))
(IFF V0-P1 (EQUAL NIL (CAR (CDR V0))))
(IFF V1-P0 (EQUAL NIL V1))
(IFF V1-P1 (EQUAL T V1))
(IFF V2-P0 (IF V0-P0 V1-P0 (IF V0-P1 V1-P0 V1-P1))))
V2-P0)).
Next, the translation algorithm continues, with the current term equal to V1. Since
V1 contains no defined functions or inner-if terms, the translation proceeds directly to the
definition removal and normalization phase, which produces:
(LET* ((V0 (IF A (CONS B (CONS C (CONS (F A) NIL)))
(CONS C (CONS B NIL)))))
(IMPLIES
(AND (IFF B-P0 (EQUAL NIL B))
(IFF C-P0 (EQUAL NIL C))
(IFF V0-P0 (EQUAL NIL (CAR V0)))
(IFF V0-P1 (EQUAL NIL (CAR (CDR V0))))
(IFF V1-P0 (IF B-P0 T (IF C-P0 T NIL)))
(IFF V1-P1 (IF B-P0 NIL (IF C-P0 NIL T)))
(IFF V2-P0 (IF V0-P0 V1-P0 (IF V0-P1 V1-P0 V1-P1))))
V2-P0)).
The above formula is produces by substituting V1 into the terms for V1-P0 and V1-P1 and
then performing outside-in rewriting based on the theorems in Figure 7.1.
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Next, simplification continues on V0. The term (F A) is not expanded, since it is
irrelevant to the SULFA Boolean predicates involving V0. Instead, the translation proceeds
directly to the definition removal and normalization phase, which produces:
(IMPLIES
(AND
(IFF A-P0 (EQUAL NIL A))
(IFF B-P0 (EQUAL NIL B))
(IFF C-P0 (EQUAL NIL C))
(IFF V0-P0 (IF A-P0 C-P0 B-P0))
(IFF V0-P1 (IF A-P0 B-P0 C-P0))
(IFF V1-P0 (IF B-P0 T (IF C-P0 T NIL)))
(IFF V1-P1 (IF B-P0 NIL (IF C-P0 NIL T)))
(IFF V2-P0 (IF V0-P0 V1-P0 (IF V0-P1 V1-P0 V1-P1))))
V2-P0).
Note that the theorems in Figure 7.1 act here as a form of cone of influence reduction,
removing the unwanted application of F.
At this point, the remaining SULFA Boolean predicates are generalized by remov-
ing the hypotheses involving them. The theorems in Figure 7.2 are instantiated over the
generalized predicates, as needed. In this case, since the predicates are (EQUAL NIL A),
(EQUAL NIL B), and (EQUAL NIL C), no instantiation is necessary. Finally, the formula
is translated into CNF, using the algorithm described in Section 7.2. A SAT solver then
returns unsatisfiable, so uAndForm is valid.
Next, consider what happens if we attempt to prove the following formula:
(EQUAL (UNARY-AND 2 (IF A (CONS B (CONS C (CONS (F A) NIL)))
(CONS C (CONS B NIL))))
(IF B C NIL)).
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The above formula is similar to uAndForm, but is not a theorem, because UNARY-AND al-
ways returns T or NIL, whereas (IF B C NIL) returns the value of C when B is non-NIL.
The translation process follows in a similar manner as previously, except that V1 is




(IFF A-P0 (EQUAL NIL A))
(IFF B-P0 (EQUAL NIL B))
(IFF C-P0 (EQUAL NIL C))
(IFF C-P1 (EQUAL T C))
(IFF V0-P0 (IF A-P0 C-P0 B-P0))
(IFF V0-P1 (IF A-P0 B-P0 C-P0))
(IFF V1-P0 (IF B-P0 T C-P0))
(IFF V1-P1 (IF B-P0 NIL C-P1))
(IFF V2-P0 (IF V0-P0 V1-P0 (IF V0-P1 V1-P0 V1-P1))))
V2-P0).
Note that applying the rules in Figure 7.1 creates a test on (EQUAL T C), since V1-P1
is (EQUAL T V1). The SAT solver therefore returns the following satisfying instance:
(EQUAL NIL A) is false, (EQUAL NIL B) is false, (EQUAL NIL C) is false, and
(EQUAL T C) is false. This corresponds to the case where A is T, B is T, and C is 0, which
is a counterexample to the original formula.
7.6 Notes on Complexity and Efficiency
Our SAT-based SULFA procedure suffers from multiple exponential complexity issues.
SAT solving is itself an NP-Complete problem, thus the CNF formula may require ex-
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(DEFUN BAR (N X ANS)





(OR (BAR (1- N) (CDR X) (OR (EQUAL (CAR X) 0) ANS))
(BAR (1- N) (CDR X) (OR (EQUAL (CAR X) 1) ANS))))))
(DEFUN BAR-BETTER (N X ANS)







(OR (EQUAL (CAR X) 0)
(EQUAL (CAR X) 1)
ANS)))))
Figure 7.4: Two equivalent ACL2 definitions, which produce drastically different perfor-
mance when used in SULFA formulas. To unroll an application of BAR, with a first argu-
ment equal to the natural number N, BAR must be expanded 2N times. On the other hand,
BAR-BETTER, only needs to be expanded N times.
ponential time to solve. Furthermore, the complexity of unrolling can, in the worst case, be
as large as the highest complexity ACL2 function possible, since any ACL2 function could
be used to compute the ordinal that decreases during unrolling. Furthermore, our algorithm
that instantiates the theorems in Figure 7.2 produces an exponential number of hypotheses
in some cases.
In practice though, these exponential issues often can be avoided:
• SAT solvers, while exponential in the number of variables in the worst case, can
often solve problems arising from hardware verification containing tens of thousands
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of variables [90].
• Also, many interesting properties can be solved without exponential unrolling. Some-
times the definition of a function can be rewritten to keep the amount of unrolling
small. For example, properties involving the BAR-BETTER function in Figure 7.4
require significantly less unrolling than properties involving the equivalent function
BAR.
• Finally, large numbers of instantiations of the theorems in Figure 7.2 only result
when the transitivity theorem (theorem number 1) is instantiated. This theorem
is only instantiated though when multiple SULFA Boolean Predicates of the form
(EQUAL X Y) exist, where neither X nor Y are constant. Usually in our work, how-
ever, we use bit-vector equality rather than EQUAL, which does not result in such
SULFA Boolean Predicates.
7.7 Uninterpreted Functions
The SAT based proof procedure has been extended to include uninterpreted functions using
a mechanism similar to that described in Section 6.3. However, the current extension is a
prototype and not very efficient.
Note that the algorithm in Section 6.3 requires uninterpreted functions to be re-
moved inside-out. However, in order to support a cone of influence reduction, our proof
procedure presented in this chapter is primarily outside-in. The result is that as uninter-
preted functions are removed, previously removed definitions must be revisited.
Another problem is that, as mentioned in Section 7.6, our algorithm is inefficient
when the transitivity theorem in Figure 7.2 needs to be instantiated a lot. However, remov-
ing uninterpreted functions produces exactly the type of SULFA Boolean predicates that
lead to multiple instantiations of the transitivity theorem.




This chapter presents a SAT-based proof procedure for SULFA formulas, with a number
of important optimizations. New variables are created to reduce the duplication of terms
during unrolling and normalization. Furthermore, an outside-in cone of influence reduction
is used to avoid reasoning about irrelevant parts of tree structures.
An implementation of the SAT-based procedure is distributed with the ACL2 the-
orem prover [37] and evidence of its efficiency can be found in later chapters. Chapter 8
uses the procedure, along with the ACL2 theorem prover, to verify a significant hardware
design. Furthermore, chapter 9 uses the procedure, along with the ACL2 theorem prover,
to implement a solver for a standard bit-vector theory and to verify a set of benchmark
problems in that theory.
The SAT-based proof procedure is the first publicly-available integration of an ex-
ternal proof engine, such as SAT solvers, with the ACL2 theorem prover. It also helped
guide the creation of the SixthSense integration with ACL2, described in Chapter 10, and
motivate ACL2’s new general-purpose extension mechanism for external tools, described in
Chapter 11. We believe the integration of general-purpose theorem provers, such as ACL2,
with other proof engines, such as external tools, BDD packages, model checkers, and reso-
lution provers, will greatly decrease the amount of human-effort required during large-scale
verification efforts.
7.9 Development and Bibliographic Notes
Proof techniques based on SAT solvers have been developed for various useful theories,
including the theories of linear arithmetic, arrays, and bit vectors. The ICS tool, which was
integrated with the PVS general-purpose theorem prover, contains a decision procedure for
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tree structures [12]. ICS uses a lazy approach, based on incremental SAT solvers, whereas
SULFA uses an eager approach, making only a single call to a SAT solver. When full
translation to CNF can be performed efficiently, we believe an eager approach is more
effective. In particular, we believe a general-purpose bit-vector SMT solver, such as the
one described in Chapter 9, benefits from the eager approach, since bit-vector SMT solvers
traditionally use an eager approach.
ICS has recently been replaced with Yices [92]. Yices contains support for induc-
tive datatypes, a general-purpose mechanism capable of supporting tree structures. More
recently, CVC3 [85] has also added support for inductive datatypes. It is not clear, how-
ever, if the use of a more general datatype leads to a loss in performance or more spurious
counterexamples than result from a domain-specific approach.
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Chapter 8




One application of the SULFA subclass described in Chapter 5 and its SAT-based SULFA
solver described in Chapter 7 is to aid in the verification of ACL2 models of hardware de-
signs. This chapter applies the SAT-based SULFA solver to the verification of a component
of the TRIPS processor. The TRIPS processor is a prototype next-generation processor that
was designed and fabricated by the University of Texas and IBM [9, 73]. We applied our
technique to a unique component of the processor that implements a data tile protocol. The
data tile protocol is part of the TRIPS processor’s unique decentralized design, which is
intended to provide a complexity-effective way for increasing the capacity and bandwidth
of a processor’s memory system [79, 80].
Our approach involves the automatic extraction of an ACL2 model from the Verilog
design. The ACL2 model is then specified and verified using the ACL2 theorem prover. In-
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stead of verifying the design using the standard rewriting and induction approach, however,
we use rewriting and induction to reduce the proof that the ACL2 model satisfies its speci-
fication into a set of formulas that can be verified automatically by the SAT-based SULFA
solver. Through our approach, the full power of the ACL2 theorem prover is available, but
the SULFA solver provides an alternative that, when applicable, substantially decreases the
human effort required to complete ACL2 proofs.
This chapter first overviews the TRIPS processor in Section 8.2. Section 8.3 then
describes the data-tile communication protocol, which is necessary for speculative execu-
tion. Section 8.4 then describes our verification methodology, before applying it in Sec-
tions 8.5 and 8.6 to the verification of the data-tile protocol.
8.2 Overview of the TRIPS Processor
The TRIPS processor is a dual-core processor, with each core further divided into tiles as
shown in Figure 8.1 1. Different tiles, for the most part, only communicate with neighbor-
ing tiles, and only once per-cycle. The TRIPS processor contains sixteen execution tiles
(each marked as E), accessing four banks of registers (each marked as R), which allows
16 instructions to be potentially executed in parallel. Furthermore, memory is divided into
four partitions, each with its own instruction cache (marked as I) and data cache (marked as
D). A single global tile (marked as G) is used to coordinate actions that are universal to the
entire processor core.
The tile-based design methodology helps to address the latency (wire delays),
power, and complexity issues facing next-generation microprocessors. Latency issues are
addressed by localizing most computation within each tile. The power density can be re-
duced by spreading out the tiles on the chip. Complexity is reduced by reusing a single tile
design many times on a chip.































Figure 8.1: An overview of the design of a TRIPS processor core, which contains 16 exe-
cution tiles (each marked as E), four register tiles (each marked as R), four data tiles (each
marked as D), five instruction cache tiles (each marked as I), and a single global tile (G).
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8.3 Overview of the Data-Tile Protocol
The TRIPS processor executes up to 256 memory instructions speculatively. These 256 in-
structions are divided into eight instructions blocks, each containing 32 instructions. All 32
instructions in a given block are dispatched, committed, and flushed together, as managed
by the global tile.
As shown in Figure 8.1, the TRIPS processor core design contains four memory
partitions, which are part of its decentralized design for executing load and store instruc-
tions [79, 80]. While most data-tile functions can be performed locally, the data tiles must
communicate to accumulate two types of information needed for speculative execution:
1) which instruction blocks have caused exceptions and 2) which store instructions have
been (or have begun to be) executed.
Before going into more detail, we first introduce the following terminology:
• A data tile is said to be above another data tile if it is closer to the global tile, as
shown in Figure 8.1. The closest tile to the global tile is referred to as the top tile and
the furthest from the global tile is referred to as the bottom tile.
• We refer to the protocols used to accumulate exception and store information as the
exception protocol and the store protocol respectively. Together these two protocols
make up the data-tile protocol.
• The component of the data tile that implements the exception and store protocols is
called the Data Status Network (DSN).
An overview of the communication between the four data tiles is shown in Fig-
ure 8.2. Information about committed and flushed instruction blocks initiated from the
global tile are communicated to the top data tile as 8 bit flush and commit masks and are
then communicated downward each cycle (four cycles are required for the flush or commit
of an instruction block to affect the bottom tile). Two types of exceptions can occur; each
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Data Tile Communication Protocol
Right (from E Tile)
* Local exception (8 bits)
* Local store (9 bits)
Left (to E Tile)
* Arrived stores (256 bits)
Up (toward G Tile)
* Exception masks (16 bits)
* Arrived stores (27 bits)
Down (away from G Tile)
* Arrived stores (27 bits)
* Flushed blocks (32 bits)
* Committed blocks(32 bits)
* Arrived stores (1024 bits)
State (total)
* Flush mask (8 bits)





* Exception masks (64 bits)
Figure 8.2: An overview of the communication between the four data tiles of the TRIPS
processor.
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of which are input to each data tile through a one bit enable and three bit instruction block
address (actually one of these exceptions is computed by the data tile, but for simplicity
we will consider it an input). Also, one store can occur within each memory partition each
cycle, and its arrival is announced to each data tile through a one bit enable and eight bit in-
struction address. The arrived stores are then output as a 256 bit mask to each execution tile
(to the left) and the exceptions are output as two 8 bit masks to the global tile (up above).
To create the exception output mask, the data tiles communicate all known excep-
tions in a mask sent upward each cycle. Thus, an exception occurring in the bottom tile
requires four cycles to be reported to the global tile, whereas an exception occurring in the
top tile requires only a single cycle to be reported. To create the mask of arrived stores,
the arrival of up to three stores are communicated upward and downward each cycle (this
is sent as a 27 bit signal including an enable bit and an eight bit address per store). A total
of 1152 bits of state are required to implement the protocol, including bits for each each
potentially arrived store (256 bits per tile), each possible exception (16 bits per tile), each
possible flushed block (8 bits per tile) and each committed instruction block (8 bits per tile).
8.4 Formal Verification Methodology
Figure 8.3 presents an overview of the hardware verification methodology we use to ver-
ify the data-tile protocol. We start with a Verilog design and an informal specification,
composed of documentation, models, and test suites. The Verilog design is translated au-
tomatically into a circuit description in the DE2 language, as described in Chapter 12. The
DE2 description is then automatically translated into an ACL2 finite state machine model.
A proof of equivalence between the ACL2 model and its DE2 description (relative to the
semantics of the DE2 language as encoded in ACL2) is also automatically generated and
checked with the ACL2 theorem prover. A formal specification is then written relative to
the ACL2 model and proven correct through a mixture of user-guided theorem proving and























Figure 8.3: An overview of our verification methodology
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Safety-Theorem:
(τ ∈ N)→ P (Tth-state (τ, ι), nth (τ, ι))
follows from the following three finite-step theorems:
1. inv (S0)
2. inv (S )→ inv (step (S , I))
3. inv (S )→ P (S , I)
Figure 8.4: An outline of our basic strategy for verifying safety properties expressed as
ACL2 theorems. Note that all unbound variables, such as S and I in the second finite-step
theorem, are implicitly universally quantified over all ACL2 objects.
8.4.1 Verification of Safety Properties
The ACL2 machine model consists of an initial state, S0; a step function step (S , I), which
maps the machine state S at the beginning of a cycle and its inputs I during the cycle to the
machine state at the beginning of the following cycle; and functions that return each output
of the machine, given its current state and inputs. Thus, the state at clock cycle τ, given a
sequence of machine inputs ι, is defined as:
Tth-state (τ, ι)
,  S0, if zp (τ)step (Tth-state (τ − 1, ι), nth (τ, ι)), otherwise.
A safety property is a predicate on the state of the machine Tth-state (τ, ι) that is
true for all time τ and any machine input sequence ι. The basic strategy for verifying safety
properties is shown in Figure 8.4. Note that the function nth (n, x) returns the nth element of
the list x. A machine input sequence ι is represented as a list, so that nth (τ, ι) is the machine
inputs at time τ.
The proof of safety properties shown in Figure 8.4 essentially strengthens the target
safety property into an inductive invariant, which then follows from three single-step prop-
erties. First, the inductive invariant is shown to be true of the initial state. Then, it is shown
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Augmented-Safety-Theorem:
(τ ∈ N) ∧ var (v) ∧ Tth-inp (τ, ι)→ P (v,Tth-state (τ, ι), nth (τ, ι))
follows from the following three finite-step theorems:
1. var (v)→ inv (v,S0)
2. var (v) ∧ inp (S , I) ∧ inv (v, S )→ inv (v, step (S , I))
3. var (v) ∧ inp (S , I) ∧ inv (v, S )→ P (v, S , I)
Figure 8.5: An augmentation of the basic strategy shown in Figure 8.4 for proving safety
properties. The augmented strategy includes an additional variable v and predicates var (v),
inp (S , I), and Tth-inp (τ, ι).
to be inductive, i.e., its truth at a state S implies its truth at the next state step (S , I). Finally,
it is shown to be a generalization of the intended safety property.
The composition of the finite step theorems in Figure 8.4 into the safety theorem is
verified by a straightforward ACL2 proof by induction on τ. Furthermore, given a specific
finite state machine model, each of the finite-step properties can be automatically trans-
formed into SULFA formulas. In theory, any SULFA formula can be proven or disproven
through the decision procedure in Chapter 5, and in practice many significant formulas can
be proven or disproven entirely automatically using the SAT-based SULFA solver described
in Chapter 7.
An augmentation of the basic safety property strategy is shown in Figure 8.5. The
augmented strategy reduces a safety property into three finite step properties reducible to
SULFA formulas, but includes additional variables and predicates. The property P may
include an extra variable v, which is restricted into a finite domain by the predicate var (v).
Furthermore, the predicate Tth-inp (τ, ι) is used to encode assumptions necessary on the




false, if ¬inp (S τ, Iτ)
true, if zp (τ)
Tth-inp (τ − 1, ι), otherwise.
where the predicate inp (S , I) returns whether the machine inputs I satisfy all the input
assumptions required by inputs occurring in a cycle that begins with the machine state S ,
S τ = Tth-state (τ, ι) is the state at the beginning of cycle number τ, and Iτ = nth (τ, ι) is the
input during cycle number τ.
The augmented strategy is not strictly necessary for verifying safety properties.
Since v is restricted to a finite domain, any property verified by the augmented strategy
in Figure 8.5 can be reduced to a finite number of safety properties without v. Furthermore,
by adding an extra bit to the machine state, the input assumptions Tth-inp can be encoded
into the basic strategy.
The advantage of the augmented strategy is that it often leads to a more compact
specification and proof. For example, in Section 8.5.2 the exception type is encoded in the
variable v, allowing a single specification and proof to be used for two types of exceptions.
Furthermore, by encoding the input assumptions in Tth-inp , no input assumptions need to
be encoded into the invariant.
8.4.2 Verification of Liveness Properties
To verify the data-tile protocol, only a restricted form of liveness property is required. Using
the same ACL2 model as used for safety properties, each liveness property can be expressed
in the form of Liveness-Theorem in Figure 8.6. The restricted liveness theorem states that
if some property P holds of the machine at time τ then eventually there will be a time τ′ at
which Q holds.
Our basic strategy for verifying liveness properties is shown in Figure 8.6. The
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Liveness-Theorem :
(τ ∈ N) ∧ P (v,Tth-state (τ, ι), nth (τ, ι))
→
(∃τ′ : (τ′ ∈ N) ∧ (τ < τ′)→ Q (v,Tth-state (τ′, ι), nth (τ′, ι)))
follows from the following five finite-step theorems:
1. inv (S 0)
2. inv (S )→ inv (step (S , I))
3. inv (step (S , I)) ∧ P (S , I) ∧ ¬Q (S , I)→ bnd (b0, step (S , I))
4. (b ∈ N) ∧ (0 ≤ b < b0) ∧ bnd (b + 1, S ) ∧ ¬Q (S , I)→ bnd (b, step (S , I))
5. bnd (0, step (S , I))→ Q (S , I)
Figure 8.6: An outline of our basic strategy for verifying a type of liveness properties
expressed as ACL2 theorems.
Augmented-Liveness-Theorem :
(τ ∈ N) ∧ var (v) ∧ P (v,Tth-state (τ, ι), nth (τ, ι))
→
(∃τ′ : (τ′ ∈ N) ∧ (τ < τ′) ∧ (Tth-inp (τ′, ι)→ Q (v,Tth-state (τ′, ι), nth (τ′, ι)))
follows from the following five finite-step theorems:
1. var (v)→ inv (v, S 0)
2. var (v) ∧ inp (S , I) ∧ inv (v, S )→ inv (v, step (S , I))
3. var (v) ∧ inp (S , I) ∧ inv (v, step (S , I)) ∧ P (v, S , I) ∧ ¬Q (v, S , I)
→
bnd (v, b0, step (S , I))
4. (b ∈ N) ∧ (0 ≤ b < b0) ∧ var (v) ∧ inp (S , I) ∧ bnd (v, b + 1, S ) ∧ ¬Q (v, S , I)
→
bnd (v, b, step (S , I))
5. var (v) ∧ inp (S , I) ∧ bnd (v, 0, step (S , I))→ Q (v, S , I)
Figure 8.7: An augmentation of the basic strategy shown in Figure 8.6 for proving live-
ness properties. As in the augmented safety strategy, the augmented strategy includes an
additional variable v and predicates var (v), inp (S , I) and Tth-inp (τ, ι).
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liveness theorem is proven by defining an inductive invariant inv (S ) and a bound predicate
bnd (b, S ) satisfying the five finite-step theorems. The first two of the finite-step theorems
show that inv (S ) is an inductive invariant of the machine. The next three use the invariant
to prove that P implies a bound b0 on the number of cycles until Q holds.
Our basic strategy for verifying liveness properties is augmented in the same way
as our safety property strategy is. The augmented strategy, with an additional variable v
predicates var (v), inp (S , I) and Tth-valid-ins (τ, ι), is shown in Figure 8.7.
Using the ACL2 theorem prover, we have proven, by induction on τ and τ′, that
Augmented-Liveness-Theorem follows from the five finite-step theorems in Figure 8.7. Fur-
thermore, if b0 is a constant, as it is in the data-tile protocol, then for any specific finite
state machine each of the five finite-step theorems in Figure 8.7 can be written as SULFA
formulas.
8.5 Verification of the Exception Protocol
As described in Section 8.3, the exception protocol accumulates exceptions detected the
the execution and data tiles. The formal specification of the protocol is a correspondence
between the four DSN components and a single specification machine, shown in Figure 8.8.
The specification machine outputs an exception mask that reports all exceptions that have
occurred in all tiles (that have not yet been flushed), whereas the top DSN requires up to
four cycles to report (to the global tile) an exception.
The specification is that if the top tile reports an exception, then that exception
is also reported by the specification machine; and if the specification machine outputs an
exception, then eventually either a flush will occur or the top tile will also report that ex-
ception. This is written in temporal logic as the following two properties:
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Up (to G Tile)
* Exception masks (16 bits)
Down (from G Tile)
* Flush mask (8 bits)
Right (from E Tiles)
State
* Exceptions (16 bits)
* Recent Flushes (24 bits)




Exception Protocol Specification Machine
Figure 8.8: A high-level overview of the specification machine for the exception protocol.
Exception-Safety:
(dsn-ebit (type, x, 0)→ spec-ebit (type, x)).
Exception-Liveness:
(spec-ebit (type, x)→ ^(flush (x) ∨ dsn-ebit (type, x, 0))).
where
• x is implicitly universally quantified over natural numbers from 0 to 7 inclusive.
• type is implicitly universally quantified over the set of exception types, {miss, exec}.
• dsn-ebit (type, x, n) is a predicate returning whether tile n of the DSN is reporting an
exception of type type in instruction block x.
• spec-ebit (type, x) is a predicate returning whether the specification machine is re-
porting an exception of type type in instruction block x.
• flush (x) is a predicate returning whether the instruction block x is currently being
flushed (in tile 0).
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The following assumptions are also made about the inputs the exception protocol:
• No Resets. The DSN contains a reset input, which resets most of its registers. In our
verification effort, however, we assume that the reset signal is off.
• Properly Connected Wiring. The predicate dsn-ebit (type, x, n) implements the four
DSNs as completely independent and unconnected, without the wiring shown in Fig-
ure 8.2. Instead, part of the input assumption is that the four DSN tiles are related in
the same way as if they were connected as shown in Figure 8.2.
• No Exception After Flush. We also assume that no exception occurs in the cycle
after a flush. This assumption is reasonable since exceptions are caused by executing
instructions and multiple cycles must occur before a new block of instructions can be
executed.
8.5.1 ACL2 Model of the Exception Protocol
The implementation of the exception protocol, its single-tile specification machine, and its
input assumptions are modeled in ACL2 as an initial state constant, a step function, an
input assumption predicate, and a function for each output. As in Section 8.4, given a cycle
number τ and an input sequence ι, we refer to Tth-state (τ, ι) as the state at time τ and
Tth-inp (τ, ι) as whether the input assumptions are met for all inputs in the sequence ι up to
and including those during the cycle numbered τ. The following are the output functions
and state accessor functions used in the following sections:
• dsn-ebit (type, x, n, S , I) is the predicate returning whether an exception in instruction
block x of type type is being reported by the DSN at tile n, given state S and machine
inputs I.
• st-dsn-ebit (type, x, n, S ) is the predicate returning whether an exception of type type
in instruction block x is currently being stored in tile n of the DSN, i.e., it was reported
by tile n of the DSN in the previous cycle.
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• spec-ebit (type, x, S , I) is the predicate returning whether an exception in instruction
block x of type type is being reported by the single tile specification machine, given
state S and machine inputs I.
• st-spec-ebit (type, x, S ) is the predicate returning whether an exception of type type
in instruction block x is currently being stored in the single-tile specification machine,
i.e., it was reported by the specification machine in the previous cycle.
• flush (x, I) is the predicate returning whether the machine inputs I contains a flush of
instruction block x (at tile 0).
• st-flush (x, n, S ) is the predicate returning whether a flush of instruction block x oc-
curred at tile n of the DSN in the previous cycle.
• st-will-flush (x, n, S ) is the predicate returning whether a flush of instruction block x
has occurred in one of the blocks above n in the previous cycle. Thus, a flush of x is
“on its way” to tile n.
8.5.2 Proof of Exception-Safety
The Exception-Safety property can be translated into the following ACL2 property (note
that Iτ and S τ are abbreviations for terms, not universally quantified free variables like τ, ι,
x, and type):
DSN-Exception-Safety:
(x ∈ N) ∧ (x < 8) ∧ (τ ∈ N) ∧ (type ∈ {miss, exec})
∧ Tth-inp (τ, ι) ∧ dsn-ebit (type, x, 0, S τ, Iτ)
→
spec-ebit (type, x, S τ, Iτ)
where S τ = Tth-state (τ, ι) is the state of the machine after τ clock cycles and Iτ = nth (τ, ι)
is the input to the machine during clock cycle τ.
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var (v) , (vx ∈ N) ∧ (vx < 8) ∧ (vtype ∈ {miss, exec})
P (v, S , I) , dsn-ebit (vtype, vx, 0, S , I)→ spec-ebit (vtype, vx, S , I)
inv (v, S )
,
(∀n ∈ N, n < 4 :
¬st-will-flush (vx, n, S ) ∧ st-dsn-ebit (vtype, vx, n, S )
→
st-spec-ebit (vtype, vx, S ))
Figure 8.9: The definitions of the var (v), P (v, S , I), and inv (v, S ) functions needed to verify
the safety property of the exception protocol using the strategy illustrated in Figure 8.5.
Note that v represents the pair [vx, vtype]. Thus, vx and vtype are abbreviations for the first
and second element of v respectively.
The DSN-Exception-Safety property is verified using the strategy shown in Fig-
ure 8.5 with the definitions shown in Figure 8.9. Intuitively, the inductive invariant is that
either a previous input was invalid or every exception of type type in instruction block x
in the DSN is also in the specification machine. Each of the three properties in Figure 8.5
is verified entirely automatically through the SAT-based SULFA solver described in Chap-
ter 7. They are then composed using the ACL2 theorem prover.
8.5.3 Proof of Exception-Liveness
The Exception-Liveness property can be translated into the ACL2 logic as the following
first-order property (note that S τ and Iτ are abbreviations for terms):
DSN-Exception-Liveness:
(x ∈ N) ∧ (x < 8) ∧ (τ ∈ N) ∧ (type ∈ {miss, exec}) ∧ spec-ebit (type, x, S τ, Iτ)
→
(∃τ′ : (τ′ ∈ N) ∧ (τ < τ′)∧
(Tth-inp (τ, ι)→ flush (x, Iτ) ∨ dsn-ebit (type, x, 0, S τ, Iτ)))
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var (v) , (vx ∈ N) ∧ (vx < 8) ∧ (vtype ∈ {miss, exec})
P (v, S , I) , spec-ebit (vtype, vx, S , I)
Q (v, S , I) , flush (vx, I) ∨ dsn-ebit (vtype, vx, 0, S , I)
inv (v, S ) , st-spec-ebit (vtype, vx, S )→ bnd (v, 3, S )
bnd (v, b, S )
, {
bnd1 (v, 0, S ), if zp (b)
bnd1 (v, b, S ) ∨ bnd (v, b − 1, S ), otherwise.
where
bnd1 (v, b, S )
,
¬st-will-flush (vx, b, S ) ∧ ¬st-flush (vx, 0, S ) ∧ st-dsn-ebit (vtype, vx, b, S )
Figure 8.10: The definitions of the var (v), P (v, S , I), Q (v, S , I) and inv (v, S ) functions
needed to verify the liveness property of the exception protocol using the strategy illustrated
in Figure 8.7. Note that v represents the pair [vx, vtype]. Thus, vx and vtype are abbreviations
for the first and second element of v respectively.
where S τ = Tth-state (τ, ι) is the state of the machine at the beginning of clock cycle τ and
Iτ = nth (τ, ι) is the input during clock cycle τ.
The DSN-Exception-Liveness theorem is proven using the strategy for liveness
properties shown in Figure 8.7, given the definitions shown in Figure 8.10. The bound
function, bnd (v, b, S ), returns whether an exception of the type and instruction block de-
noted by v is being stored in one of the top b tiles. Therefore, unless a flush occurs, the
exception will be reported by the top tile within b cycles. The inductive invariant, inv (v, S ),
is equivalent to the statement that if an exception is being stored in the specification ma-
chine, then it is also stored somewhere in the actual machine.
Given the definitions in Figure 8.10, each of the five properties in Figure 8.7 is





Store Protocol Specification Machine
* Local stores (36 bits)
Right (from E Tiles)
* Arrived stores (256 bits)
Down (from G Tile)
* Flush mask (8 bits)
* Commit mask (8 bits)
State
* Arrived stores (256 bits)
* Recent Flushes (24 bits)
Left (to E Tiles)
Figure 8.11: A high-level overview of the specification machine for the store protocol.
8.6 Verification of the Store Protocol
As described in Section 8.3, the store protocol accumulates information regarding which
store instructions have arrived. The formal specification of the protocol is a correspon-
dence between the four DSN components and a single specification machine, shown in
Figure 8.11. The specification machine outputs a store mask that reports all stores that have
occurred in all tiles (that have not yet been flushed), whereas a DSN component may require
up to four cycles to report that a give store has arrived.
The specification of the store protocol is a correspondence between the four tile
DSN and the single tile specification machine, expressed as the following temporal logic
properties:
Store-Safety:
(dsn-sbit (x, n) ∧ ¬will-flush (b x32c, n) ∧ ¬will-commit (b
x
32c, n)→ spec-sbit (x))
Store-Liveness:
(spec-sbit (x)→ ^(flush (b x32c) ∨ commit (b
x
32c) ∨ dsn-sbit (x, n)))
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where
• x, which represents the instruction address of a store, is implicitly universally quan-
tified over natural numbers from 0 to 255 inclusive.
• n, which represents a tile number, is implicitly universally quantified over natural
numbers from 0 to 3 inclusive.
• dsn-sbit (type, x, n) is the predicate returning whether tile n of the DSN is reporting
that instruction x is an executed store instruction.
• spec-sbit (x) is the predicate returning whether the specification machine is reporting
that the store x has been executed.
• flush (x) is the predicate returning whether the instruction block x is currently being
flushed (in tile 0).
• will-flush (y, n) is the predicate returning whether a flush of instruction block y is
occurring in a tile above tile n (i.e., it’s on its way to tile n).
• commit (x) is the predicate returning whether the instruction block x is currently be-
ing committed (in tile 0).
• will-commit (y, n) is the predicate returning whether a commit of instruction block y
is occurring in a tile above tile n
Intuitively, the safety property is that if any tile of the DSN illustrated in Figure 8.2
reports that a store has arrived (and its not about to be removed), then the specification
machine illustrated in Figure 8.11 must also report that the store has arrived. The liveness
property is that if the specification machine reports a store as having arrived, then each tile
of the DSN eventually reports that the store has arrived (or the store is removed from the
specification machine).
The following assumptions are also made about the inputs to the store protocol:
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• No Store Arrives Twice. If a store is being reported by the specification machine,
then no DSN input can state that it has again been executed. This is justified since
if a store has been executed once, it cannot be executed again without a commit or a
flush.
• No Early Commits. A commit of an instruction block cannot occur unless all stores
reported by the specification machine have also been reported by the top tile of the
DSN. This assumption is justified because the global tile will not send a commit until
the top tile has reported that all stores in the instruction block have arrived.
Similarly, no local store can arrive in an instruction block that has begun to be com-
mitted. For example, if tile 0 has committed instruction block 0, then no store can
arrive in block 0 of tile 3 until after tile 3 has also committed it.
• No Store After Flush. We also assume that no store occurs in the cycle after a flush.
This assumption is reasonable since multiple cycles must occur between the flush of
an instruction block and when the first instruction is executed.
• No Resets. The DSN contains a reset input, which resets most of its registers. In our
verification effort, however, we assume that the reset signal is off.
• Properly Connected Wiring. Our DSN machine is actually implemented as four
DSN tiles, without the wiring shown in Figure 8.2. Instead, part of the input assump-
tion is that the four DSN tiles are related in the same way as if they were connected
as shown in Figure 8.2.
8.6.1 ACL2 Model of the Store Protocol
The implementation of the store protocol, its single-tile specification machine, and its input
assumptions are modeled in ACL2 as an initial state constant, a step function, an input
assumption predicate, and a function for each output. To coincide with the strategy outlined
in Section 8.4, given a cycle number τ and an input sequence ι, we refer to Tth-state (τ, ι) as
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the state at time τ and Tth-inp (τ, ι) as whether the input assumptions are met for all inputs
in the sequence ι up to and including those during the cycle numbered τ. The following are
the output functions and state accessor functions used in the following sections:
• dsn-sbit (x, n, S , I) is the predicate returning whether tile n of the DSN is reporting
that a store at instruction address x has been executed, given state S and machine
inputs I.
• st-dsn-sbit (x, n, S ) is the predicate returning whether the state of tile n of the DSN
includes the knowledge that a store at instruction address x has been executed, i.e., it
was reported by tile n of the DSN in the previous cycle.
• spec-sbit (x, S , I) is the predicate returning whether a store at instruction address x
is being reported by the single tile specification machine, given state S and machine
inputs I.
• st-spec-sbit (x, S ) is the predicate returning whether the state of the single tile speci-
fication machine includes the knowledge that a store at instruction address x has been
executed, i.e., it was reported by the specification machine in the previous cycle.
• flush (y, I) is the predicate returning whether the machine inputs I contains a flush of
instruction block y (at tile 0).
• st-flush (y, n, S ) is the predicate returning whether a flush of instruction block y oc-
curred at tile n of the DSN in the previous cycle.
• st-will-flush (y, n, S ) is the predicate returning whether a flush of instruction block y
is occurring in one of the blocks above n in the previous cycle. Thus, a flush of y is
on its way to tile n.
• commit (y, I) is the predicate returning whether the machine inputs I contains a com-
mit of instruction block y (at tile 0).
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• st-will-commit (y, n, S ) is the predicate returning whether a commit of instruction
block y is occurring in one of the blocks above n in the previous cycle. Thus, a
commit of y is on its way to tile n.
8.6.2 Proof of Store-Safety
The Store-Safety property can be translated into the ACL2 logic as the following first order
property (note that Iτ and S τ are abbreviations for terms, not universally quantified free
variables):
DSN-Store-Safety:
(x ∈ N) ∧ (x < 256) ∧ (τ ∈ N) ∧ (n ∈ N) ∧ (n < 4)
∧ Tth-inp (τ, ι) ∧ dsn-sbit (x, n, S τ, Iτ)
∧ ¬st-will-flush (b x32c, n, S τ) ∧ ¬st-will-commit (b
x
32c, n, S τ)
→
spec-sbit (x, n, S τ, Iτ)
where S τ = Tth-state (τ, ι) is the state of the machine after τ clock cycles and Iτ = nth (τ, ι)
is the input to the machine during clock cycle τ.
The DSN-Store-Safety property is verified using the strategy shown in Figure 8.5
with the definitions outlined in Figure 8.12. Without going into too much detail, the invari-
ant is a conjunction of the following:
1. The safety property. The first clause in the conjunction is just a rewriting of the
store protocol safety property into a predicate on state.
2. Each store in the channels is in the specification. All stores in communication
channels must also be reported as arrived by the specification machine. This is nec-
essary since such stores are about to be reported by the tile receiving the communi-
cation.
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var (v) , (vx ∈ N) ∧ (vx < 256) ∧ (n ∈ N) ∧ (n < 4)
P (v, S , I) , dsn-sbit (vx, n, S , I)→ spec-sbit (vx, S , I)
inv (v, S )
,
(∀n′ ∈ N, n′ < 4 :
¬st-will-commit (b vx32c, n
′, S ) ∧ ¬st-will-flush (b vx32c, n
′, S )
∧ (st-dsn-sbit (vx, n′, S ) ∨ in-channel (vx, n′, S ))
→
st-spec-sbit (vx, S ))
∧
in-channel-implies-in-spec (vx, S )
∧
no-committed-stores-in-up-channel (vx, S )
∧
in-up-channel-implies-not-above (vx, S )
Figure 8.12: An outline of the definitions needed to verify the store protocol safety property
using the strategy illustrated in Figure 8.5. Note that v represents the pair [vx, vtype]. Thus,
vx and vtype are abbreviations for the first and second element of v respectively.
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3. No committed stores are communicated upward. If stores in an instruction block
are in the process of being communicated to the top tile, then the instruction block
cannot be committed because the top tile could not have detected that all stores in
the block have been executed. This invariant is needed because, unlike with a flushed
store, the protocol design contains no extra logic to ensure that a committed store
being communicated upwards is properly removed.
4. If a store is being communicated upward, then it is not already known in the tiles
above. If a store is in one of the upward communication channels, then, since no store
can arrive twice, it cannot be in any of the upward communication channels in the
tiles above or in the arrived mask of the top tile. This clause is required, since our
input assumptions regarding committing and duplicate stores do not directly involve
the communication channels and therefore cannot alone imply that no committed
stores are in the upward communication channels.
Given the above invariant, each of the three properties in Figure 8.5 can be veri-
fied through a mixture of user-guided theorem proving and the SAT-based SULFA solver
described in Chapter 7. Only a small amount of user guidance and theorem proving is nec-
essary, because each of the three properties in Figure 8.5 can be proven automatically by
the SAT-based SULFA solver for any given store x. Thus, the proofs of the three proper-
ties involve a case split on the 256 possible stores, followed by 256 calls to the SAT-based
SULFA solver.
8.6.3 Proof of Store-Liveness
The store protocol liveness property can be translated into the ACL2 logic as the following
first-order property (note that S τ, Iτ, and Iτ+1, are abbreviations for terms):
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var (v) , (vx ∈ N) ∧ (vx < 256) ∧ (n ∈ N) ∧ (n < 4)
P (v, S , I) , spec-sbit (vx, step (S , I), I′)
Q (v, S , I) , flush (vx, I) ∨ dsn-sbit (vx, n, step (S , I), I′)
inv (v, S ) , bnd-live-inv (vx, S ) ∧ (st-spec-sbit (vx, S )→ within (vx, n, b, S ))
bnd (v, b, S ) , bnd-live-inv (vx, S ) ∧ within (v, b, S )
Figure 8.13: An outline of the definitions needed to verify the store protocol safety property
using the strategy illustrated in Figure 8.7. Note that v represents the pair [vx, vtype]. Thus,
vx and vtype are abbreviations for the first and second element of v and respectively.
DSN-Store-Liveness:
(x ∈ N)∧ (x < 256)∧ (τ ∈ N)∧ (n ∈ N)∧ (n < 4)∧spec-sbit (x, step (S τ, Iτ), Iτ+1)
→
(∃τ′ : (τ′ ∈ N) ∧ (τ < τ′)∧
(Tth-inp (τ + 1, ι)→ flush (b x32c, Iτ) ∨ dsn-sbit (x, n, step (S τ, Iτ), Iτ+1)))
where S τ = Tth-state (τ, ι) is the state of the machine at the beginning of clock cycle τ and
Iτ = nth (τ, ι) is the input during clock cycle τ. The reason for using both Iτ and Iτ+1 is that
the store mask is the output of a register, which is affected only by inputs in the previous
cycle, as shown in Figure 8.11. Thus, a flush of instruction block y in inputs Iτ does not
affect dsn-sbit (x, n, S τ, Iτ), but may affect dsn-sbit (x, n, step (S τ, Iτ), Iτ+1).
Figure 8.13 outlines the functions that map our liveness proof strategy, from Fig-
ure 8.7, to a proof of the DSN-Store-Liveness theorem. The function within (x, n, b, S ) is
defined, roughly, as the predicate returning whether x has either arrived at tile n or is in
one of the communication channels headed towards n and within b tiles of n. The predicate
bnd-live-inv (x, S ) is an inductive invariant stating that if x is being flushed in some tile n,
then x is not in the communication channel going from tile n − 1 to n. This is necessary
since within (x, n, 1, S ) is true if a store is in the channel from n − 1 to n; however, such a
store would be removed if it came the cycle after a flush.
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The liveness proof strategy in Figure 8.7 thus reduces DSN-Store-Liveness into five
finite-step properties. As with DSN-Store-Safety, the ACL2 theorem prover is used to split
each of the five finite-step properties into 256 possible values of x. Then, each property
is proven for that specific value of x automatically, by using the SAT-based SULFA solver
described in Chapter 7.
8.7 Analysis
The formal verification of the exception and store protocols found no bugs in the protocol
designs or their implementation. The verification effort, however, provides a higher degree
of assurance than would be possible with simulation. We believe that all bugs found by
simulation would have also been found by formal verification and that formal verification
also rules out any hidden corner cases. For example, the initial software model of the DSN
removed only exceptions and stores flushed in the current cycle, not those flushed in the
previous cycle. This leads to a bug when a flush occurs while an exception or store is being
communicated upward. This case was only found after considerable testing of the software
model. However, given a circuit containing this bug, the SAT-based SULFA solver produces
a counterexample when attempting to prove the safety invariant.
Furthermore, formal verification of the DSN clarifies its input assumptions, which
is helpful for designing other blocks. For example, it was believed before this verification
effort began that the DSN required that no stores arrive for three cycles after an instruction
block is committed (in tile 0). However, no such input assumption is required. Now that all
input assumptions are clearly specified, units that interact with the DSN can be developed
for maximum efficiency without any fear of violating subtle correctness assumptions.
We believe that the SAT-based SULFA solver from Chapter 7 greatly reduced the
amount of human effort required to verify the exception and store protocols using ACL2.
Without the SAT-based SULFA solver, a significant amount of user guidance would be
required to prove each of the finite step properties that were proven automatically by the
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SAT-based SULFA solver. Some evidence of this is provided by our initial proof of the
liveness of the store protocol, which was proven using an earlier and less efficient SAT-
based SULFA solver and before we learned to case-split on the store address to reduce the
state space. While still making some use of the SAT-based SULFA solver, our early effort
required 152 definitions and lemmas, along with weeks of human effort to create. The
current proof is far simpler, requiring only 21 definitions and lemmas to prove the same
property.
The greatest decrease in human effort comes from the generation of counterexam-
ples to failed proofs. Almost all of the inductive invariants and bound functions described
in this chapter were initially incorrect and had to be debugged by counterexamples and
failed proofs. Furthermore, over ten bugs in the initial specification—the input assump-
tions, top-level DSN output functions, and single tile model—were discovered. Using the
ACL2 theorem prover alone, each of these bugs in the specification and proof would have
been discovered only after careful inspection of failed proofs. The SULFA solver from
Chapter 7, however, produces a mapping from variables to values under which an invalid
formula evaluates to false. We believe this is usually far easier to understand than the output
of a failed proof. A counterexample tells the user immediately that the formula is invalid,
not just that it could not be proven. Plus, the Lisp interpreter and its debugging mechanisms
(such as trace) provide a reasonable environment for determining the underlying causes
behind each counterexample.
The fully-automatic verification of SULFA formulas promotes reusability. The user
guidance within theorem proving is often specific to the internals of a specific design. Sim-
ilarly, simulation often requires illustrative test suites designed with knowledge of the de-
sign’s internals. Formal verification, when making use of fully-automated techniques, how-
ever, requires no knowledge of the design’s internals. Thus, hard to follow low-level opti-
mizations can be attempted late in the design process. If the formal verification succeeds
when rerun, then the optimizations can be trusted.
166
8.8 Summary
The SAT-based procedure for SULFA formulas described in Chapter 7 has been applied
to the formal verification of components of the TRIPS processor. Both safety and live-
ness properties were proven about models extracted automatically from the actual Verilog
implementations.
The component verified is a novel component of the TRIPS processor, a protocol
required to implement its decentralized memory system. The decentralized memory system
is part of the TRIPS processor’s unique EDGE architecture, which provides the opportunity
to increase thread-level and data-level parallelism within a single processor design.
Our approach uses the theorem prover to reduce safety and liveness properties of
hardware designs into finite step problems in the SULFA decidable subclass. The full power
of the ACL2 theorem prover then remains available at all times, but automatic approaches
are also applicable. During the verification of the exception and store protocols we feel
that we were able to prove many formulas fully automatically that would otherwise have
required significant further guidance. Our approach speeds up debugging of failed proofs by
providing counterexamples to invalid theorems, and promotes reusability by avoiding the
need to consider many internal design details. We feel that the SAT-based procedure from
Chapter 7 can substantially reduce the human guidance required by hardware verification
efforts with the ACL2 theorem prover.
8.9 Development and Bibliographic Notes
The EDGE architecture and the TRIPS processor were developed through a joint effort
between many researchers at the University of Texas [9, 73]. The data tile of the TRIPS
processor, including its communications protocols was primarily designed by Simha Sethu-
madhavan. I wrote the initial Verilog implementation of the DSN component of the data
tile.
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ACL2 and its predecessor Boyer-Moore theorem provers have been used exten-
sively for hardware verification. A simple pipelined processor, the FM8501, was proven to
satisfy its ISA specification by Hunt in 1985 [27]. A more complex model of an out-of-order
pipelined processor, the FM9801, was verified in 1998 [75]. At AMD, the floating-point
unit on the AMDK586 and the floating-point unit on the AthlonTMK7 were verified with
ACL2 [54, 72]. Also, the implementation of Rockwell Collin’s AAMP7 separation kernel,
the unit that keeps critical and non-critical processes from interfering with each other, was
verified with ACL2 [21]. The AAMP7 processor is an industrial processor used for safety-
critical applications. To our knowledge, however, none of the above efforts make extensive
use of fully-automated techniques.
Outside the ACL2 community, there has been considerable interest in applying a
combination of theorem proving and model checking to verify significant hardware systems.
At Intel, the FORTE verification tool has been used to verify the floating-point unit of
the Pentium R© 4 as well as other components, such as the branch-target buffer and the
instruction-length decoder [1, 78]. FORTE uses a fully-automated technique, STE, to verify
finite-step properties, along with a lightweight HOL theorem prover to compose them.
The SMV model checker includes some compositional theorem proving capabilities
[49], which has been used successfully to verify significant hardware designs, such as the
cache coherence protocol on the FLASH processor [50] and to verify an implementation of
Tomasulo’s out-of-order scheduling algorithm [48].
The entire implementation of the VAMP processor, an out-of-order pipelined pro-
cessor, has also recently been verified using the PVS theorem prover [6]. To our knowledge,
however, no inter-tile communication protocol, like the one described in this chapter, has
ever been formally verified previously.
One ACL2 verification effort that did make extensive use of fully-automated tech-
niques, was the verification of an out-of-order, pipelined processor model by Manolios and
Srinivasan using ACL2 and UCLID [44]. This effort differs from our own in a number
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of substantial ways. While Manolios and Srinivasan verified a much larger portion of the
processor design, the processor they verified is not nearly as novel or complex as that of
the TRIPS processor. Also, the type of properties verifiable by their technique differs from
SULFA in interesting ways. SULFA includes ACL2 formulas unrollable into a restricted
set of ACL2 primitives, where variables are unified over the full domain of ACL2 objects.
The UCLID integration proves ACL2 formulas unrollable into a set of defined ACL2 func-
tions that are equivalent UCLID primitives, where variables must be restricted into either
the boolean or integer domains recognized by UCLID.
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Chapter 9
The SULFA SMT Solver
9.1 Introduction
A Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) is a standard theory for which fully-automated pro-
cedures exist to determine whether formulas are satisfiable. Developing and standardizing
SMT theories is an active area of interest in the verification research community. Stan-
dard SMT theories have been developed for theories including linear arithmetic, arrays,
uninterpreted functions, and bit vectors. Databases of problems in SMT theories are be-
ing developed and annual competitions are being held to determine the most efficient and
effective procedure for each standard theory [67, 84].
We have applied the SULFA procedure, along with the ACL2 theorem prover, to
develop an SMT solver for the Quantifier-Free Theory of Uninterpreted Functions and Bit
Vectors of up to 32 bit width (QF UFBV32). The SULFA SMT solver can solve all 8,246
of the problems in the 2006 QF UFBV32 benchmark suite. Furthermore, it has a uniquely
high degree of flexibility due to its embedding within the ACL2 theorem prover.
This chapter begins with an introductory example in Section 9.2, which shows how
an SMT bit-vector problem can be solved through a mixture of theorem proving and the
SAT-based SULFA solver described in Chapter 7. Section 9.3 then describes the SMT
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2006 bit-vector theory in more detail. Next, Section 9.4 outlines the implementation of the
SULFA SMT solver and Section 9.5 describes the unique feature of the SULFA SMT solver,
that it can be extended in a sound and verifiable way with new simplification strategies and
bit-vector primitives. Finally, Section 9.6 describes the verification of the benchmark suite
in more detail before concluding with a summary and bibliographic notes.
9.2 Introductory Example
We begin with an example to introduce the SMT bit-vector theory and show how it can
be modeled and solved using the ACL2 theorem prover and our SAT based procedure for
SULFA formulas. An SMT solver determines whether a given formula, such as the one
below, is satisfiable:
SMT1:
bvnot (bvnot (bvnot (uf0 ()))) = uf1 ()
where bvnot (x) is bitwise negation and uf0 () and uf1 () are uninterpreted functions de-
clared to return 4-bit, bit vectors. In the SMT language, all functions other than bit vector
primitives are uninterpreted, functions, which are constrained only to input and output bit
vectors of some finite declared width.
The goal is to determine whether there exist interpretations of the functions uf0 ()
and uf1 () returning 4-bit, bit vectors such that SMT1 is always satisfied. A typical SMT
solver begins by performing simplification based on the definitions of the bit-vector primi-
tives. In this case, reducing bvnot (bvnot (x)) to x leads to:
bvnot (uf0 ()) = uf1 ()
The above formula may then be shown to be satisfiable (e.g., in binary, uf0 () , 0000
and uf1 () , 1111) by using SAT solvers, BDDs, or some other fully-automated technique.
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In order to model the ACL2 logic in the SMT language, we must first choose a
bit-vector representation that maps ACL2 objects to bit vectors. Different mappings can
be used to create such a model. For now, let the ith bit of an ACL2 bit vector x be high
if nth (n − i − 1, x) = true. Thus a bit vector represented in Boolean as “1110” can be
represented in ACL2 as the list [true, true, true, false]. The bit vector “1110” can also be
represented as the less intuitive [true, true, true], since nth (n, x) = false if x is a list of
less than n elements. In this representation, the number of bits in a bit vector cannot be
determined from its value. Thus, the size of the input bit vectors are added as an input to
each bit-vector primitive. This leads to the following ACL2 representation of the formula
SMT1, which is valid if and only if SMT1 is unsatisfiable:
ACL2-SMT1:
¬nbveq (4, nbvNot (4, nbvNot (4, nbvNot (4, uf0 ())), uf1 ()))
where nbveq (n, x, y) ,
∧
i∈N,0≤i<n
nth (i, x)↔ nth (i, y), and nbvNot (n, x) is the n element list
whose ith element is ¬nth (i, x). The functions uf0 () and uf1 () are uninterpreted functions.
ACL2-SMT1 is in SULFA because, given a constant bit width, each call to a bit-
vector primitive can be unrolled into an expression involving only propositional logic and
list primitives. Rather than solving the problem directly using the SAT-based procedure,
however, it is preferable to let the ACL2 rewriter perform some simplification first. For ex-
ample, the following theorem, which can be proven with the ACL2 theorem prover instructs
the rewriter to remove double negation:
NBVNOT-NOT :
nbvNot (n, nbvNot (n, x)) = nbvfix (n, x)
where nbvfix (n, x) maps x into a list of Booleans of length n representing the same bit




nbvNot (n, nbvfix (n, x)) = nbvNot (n, x)
Thus, using the ACL2 rewriter ACL2-SMT1, can be simplified in the same manner
as SMT1, which leads to the formula:
¬nbveq (4, nbvNot (4, uf0 (), uf1 ())).
The above formula can be then passed to the SAT-based procedure described in Chapter 7.
The SAT-based procedure finds the following counter example to the above formula
uf0 () , [true, false, false, true]
uf1 () , [false, true, true, false]
Thus ACL2-SMT1 is invalid.
Note that the process for proving ACL2-SMT1 invalid follows the same flow as
would likely be used by an SMT solver to find that SMT1 is satisfiable. The advantage of our
approach, however, is that the bit-vector primitives are ACL2 functions and the rewrite rules
can be verified. This makes it easier to create new bit-vector primitives and simplification
strategies.
9.3 The Standard Bit-Vector Theory
This section provides a more detailed description of the SMT 2006 Quantifier-Free Theory
with Uninterpreted Functions and Bit Vectors up to 32 bits (QF UFBV32). QF UFBV32
provides a standard interface for comparing automated verification strategies on bit vectors
and writing higher-level tools that reduce software and hardware verification to bit-vector
verification problems. Formulas in the SMT bit-vector theory consist of constants, appli-
cations of primitive functions and predicates, and applications of uninterpreted functions
and predicates. A constant is a natural number, a bit vector of width up to 32 bits, or a
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Table 9.1: SMT Bit-Vector Functions
SMT Function ACL2 Function Description
extract ( j, k)(x) ebvEx (nx, j, k, x) Extract bits j through k of x
fill ( j)(x) ebvRepeat (1, x, j) Create j copies of x
concat (x, y) ebvConcat (nx, ny, x, y) Concatenation
bvnot (x) ebvNot (nx, x) Bitwise negation
bvand (x, y) ebvAnd (nx, x, y) Bitwise conjunction
bvor (x, y) ebvOr (nx, x, y) Bitwise disjunction
bvxor (x, y) ebvXor (nx, x, y) Bitwise exclusive or
bvadd (x, y) ebvAdd (nx, x, y) x + y mod 2nx
bvneg (x) ebvNeg (nx, x) −x
bvsub (x, y) ebvSub (nx, x, y) x − y mod 2nx
bvmul (x, y) ebvMul (nx, x, y) x ∗ y mod 2nx
bvnand (x, y) ebvNand (nx, x, y) Negated bitwise conjunction
bvnor (x, y) ebvNor (nx, x, y) Negated bitwise disjunction
bvshift left0 (x, j) ebvShiftLeft0 (nx, x, j) Shift left j bits, filling with zeros
bvshift left1 (x, j) ebvShiftLeft1 (nx, x, j) Shift left j bits, filling with ones
bvshift right0 (x, j) ebvShiftRight0 (nx, x, j) Shift right j bits, filling with zeros
bvshift right1 (x, j) ebvShiftRight1 (nx, x, j) Shift right j bits, filling with ones
bvrepeat (x, j) ebvRepeat (nx, x, j) Create j copies of x
sign extend (x, j) ebvSignExtend (nx, x, j) Extend with j copies of the sign bit
rotate left (x, j) ebvRotateLeft (nx, x, j) Rotate left j bits
rotate right (x, j) ebvRotateRight (nx, x, j) Rotate right j bits
ite (a, x, y) ebvIte (nx, a, x, y) If a then x else y
Boolean. Uninterpreted functions are strongly typed to input and output bit vectors of a
specific, known width.
Tables 9.1 and 9.2 show the primitive functions and predicates in QF UFBV32. The
bit-vector functions and predicates implement standard bit-vector operations, such as con-
junction, disjunction, summation, subtraction, multiplication, equality and less-than. Note
that some common bit-vector operations like division and exponentiation are not included
in the SMT 2006 language.
Each primitive in Tables 9.1 and 9.2 input and output Booleans and bit vectors. The
tables informally include type descriptions by using the convention that bit-vector variables
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Table 9.2: SMT Bit-Vector Predicates and Logical Operators
SMT ACL2 Description
x = y x =ebv y bit-vector equivalence
bvlt (x, y) ebvLt (nx, x, y) Unsigned less than
bvleq (x, y) ebvLeq (nx, y, x) Unsigned less than or equal to
bvgeq (x, y) ebvGeq (nx, x, y) Unsigned greater than or equal to
bvgt (x, y) ebvGt (nx, y, x) Unsigned greater than
bvslt (x, y) ebvSlt (nx, x, y) Signed less than
bvsleq (x, y) ebvSleq (nx, y, x) Signed less than or equal to
bvsgt (x, y) ebvSgt (nx, y, x) Signed greater than
bvsgeq (x, y) ebvSgeq (nx, x, y) Signed greater than or equal to
if then else (a, b, c) eif (a, b, c) If a then b else c
not (a) enot (a) Logical negation
implies (a, b) eimplies (a, b) Implication
and (a1, a2, ..., ak) eand (a1, a2, ..., ak) Conjunction
or (a1, a2, ..., ak) eor (a1, a2, ..., ak) Disjunction
xor (a1, a2, ..., ak) exor (a1, a2, ..., ak) Exclusive or
iff (a, b) eiff (a, b) Boolean equivalence
are named x, y, or z; Boolean variables are named a, b, or c; and natural number variables
are named j or k. The variables nx and ny also represent natural numbers, but they only are
used in the ACL2 functions, and are therefore not part of the SMT language description.
For a precise description of the types of each of these primitives, see the SMT-Lib web page
[67]. Also, on the SMT-Lib web page is a precise description of the SMT syntax, which is
similar to Common Lisp.
The representation of bit vectors in the SMT language is left to each implementa-
tion to define. In our ACL2 representation, a bit vector x is represented as a pair [nx, vx]
where the size of x is nx and vx is a list representing the Boolean values of the bits. The
top-level ACL2 functions used to model the SMT bit-vector primitives are also shown in




The design of the SULFA SMT solver is outlined in Figure 9.1. The SMT solver is divided
into six phases, each of which manipulates the SMT problem before passing it to the next
phase. Each phase is entirely automatic and most, since they manipulate ACL2 formulas,
have the potential to be verified using the ACL2 theorem prover. The following subsections
describe each phase and follow how that phase manipulates an example.
9.4.1 Syntactic Translation and Negation
The functions and predicates in Tables 9.1 and 9.2 have been formalized as ACL2 func-
tions. Thus, we have developed a shallow embedding of the SMT language within the
ACL2 logic. We refer to the top-level ACL2 functions as the Embedded Type ACL2 (ET-
ACL2) model, since bit vectors are represented as a pair that includes their width. Thus,
unlike the representation in Figure 9.2, the type information is embedded into the bit-vector
representation.
The reason for embedding type information into the data, despite the fact that it is
also input into most functions directly, is that we do not want to input the bit-vector size to
the bit-vector equivalence function =ebv. This allows bit-vector equivalence to be a binary
equivalence relation, which is important during the ACL2 simplification phase.
Thus, the first step in solving a given SMT problem is to translate it into the ET-
ACL2 model. The translation is performed by a mixture of program-mode ACL2 functions
and a program written in C. The formula is negated to translate it from a satisfiability prob-




bvand ( bvor (4bv4, bvand (bvand (uf (0bv4), uf (1bv4)), bvnot (uf (0bv4)))),





























Figure 9.1: An overview of the data flow within the general-purpose SMT solver is shown
on the left. On the right is an example formula, similar to the one in Section 9.2, as it is
represented in each data flow stage. In the example SMT formula, uf0 (), uf1 (), and uf2 ()
are each declared to be uninterpreted functions returning 4-bit, bit vectors.
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where Jbv4 is the 4-bit, bit vector representing the natural number J, i.e., the ith bit of Jbv4
is high if b J2i c mod 2 = 1. For example, 1bv4 is 0001 (where the right most bit is the 0th
bit) Also, the function uf (x) is an uninterpreted functions inputing and outputting a 4-bit,
bit vector.
Intuitively, SMT2 is the formula x = (4 | x & y & x) & 5 & x, where | represents
bitwise disjunction, & represents bitwise conjunction, y represents bitwise negation of y,
4 and 5 represent bit-vector representations of 4 and 5, and all bit vectors are four bits.
The uninterpreted function is used simply to represent the variables x and y (uf (0bv4) and
uf (1bv4) respectively).
The goal is to determine whether SMT2 is satisfiable, which it is. The first step is to




ebvAnd ( 4, ebvOr (4, 4ebv4, ebvAnd (4, euf (0ebv4), ebvAnd ( euf (1ebv4),
ebvNot (4, euf (0ebv4)))),
ebvAnd (4, 5ebv4, euf (0ebv4)))
Descriptions of all the ET-ACL2 primitives used in ACL2-SMT2 are given in Fig-
ure 9.2. The bit-vector representation is defined by function ebv (n, x), which is defined to
create the n-bit, bit vector represented by the Boolean list x; ebvSize , which returns the
size of a bit vector x, and ebvRaw (x), which returns the Boolean list representing the bits
of the bit vector x. The function ebvNbv (n, x) is also defined, which is used to map x to a
Boolean list representation when x is expected to be n bits. If x is not n bits, then the empty
list is returned, which is equivalent to all low bits.
SMT uninterpreted functions are translated into ACL2 uninterpreted functions by
mapping their inputs and outputs into the appropriate embedded type data structure, as
shown in Figure 9.3. Thus, the euf (x) function in ACL2-SMT2 is defined to return the same
4-bit, bit vector result for any 4-bit, bit vector input.
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ebv (n, x) , [n, x]
ebvSize (x) , nth (0, x)
ebvRaw (x) , nth (1, x)
nbvEq (n, x, y) ,

true, if zp (n)
false, if ¬(car (x)↔ car (y))
nbvEq (n − 1, cdr (x), cdr (y)), otherwise.
x =ebv y
, {
false, if ebvSize (x) , ebvSize (y)
nbvEq (ebvSize (x), ebvRaw (x), ebvRaw (y)), otherwise.
ebvNbv (n, x) ,
{
ebvRaw (x), if ebvSize (x) = n
[], otherwise.
nbvNot (n, x) ,
{
[], if zp (n)
cons (¬car (x), nbvNot (n − 1, cdr (x))), otherwise.
ebvNot (n, x) , ebv (n, nbvNot (n, ebvNbv (n, x)))
nbvAnd (n, x, y) ,
{
[], if zp (n)
cons (car (x) ∧ car (y), nbvAnd (n − 1, cdr (x), cdr (y))), otherwise.
ebvAnd (n, x, y) , ebv (n, nbvAnd (n, ebvNbv (n, x), ebvNbv (n, y)))
nbvOr (n, x, y) ,
{
[], if zp (n)
cons (car (x) ∨ car (y), nbvOr (n − 1, cdr (x), cdr (y))), otherwise.
ebvOr (n, x, y) , ebv (n, nbvOr (n, ebvNbv (n, x), ebvNbv (n, y)))
Figure 9.2: The definitions of the bit-vector primitives used in our example.
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nbvMap (n, x) ,

[], if zp (n)
cons (false, nbvMap (n − 1, cdr (x))), if car (x) = false
cons (true, nbvMap (n − 1, cdr (x))), otherwise.
bvMap (x) , nbvMap (ebvSize (x), ebvRaw (x))
euf (x0, x1, ..., xk) , ebv (neuf , uf (bvMap (x0), bvMap (x1), ..., bvMap (xk)))
Figure 9.3: A generic SMT uninterpreted function euf (...), returning a bit vector of size
neuf , is defined in the ET-ACL2 model by mapping an ACL2 uninterpreted function uf (...).
into the appropriate domain.
9.4.2 ACL2 Simplification
After translating the problem into an ET-ACL2 formula, the next step is to simplify it using
the ACL2 rewriter. First, =ebv is proven to be an equivalence relation, as shown in ebvEq-
is-equivalence in Figure 9.4. Next, congruence rules are provided for every function in
the ET-ACL2 model, showing that equivalence of its inputs implies the equivalence of its
output. Congruence rules for each of the functions in our example are shown in Figure 9.4.
Proving ebvEq-is-equivalence (or forcing the theorem prover to accept the rule
without proof) enables ACL2 proof strategies specific to equivalence relations, and, most
importantly, enables the rewriter to treat the theorem
P(x)→ E =ebv E′
as an instruction to rewrite a proof goal F to F′ when a subterm G of F and substitution σ
can be found satisfying E/σ = G. F′ then is the term formed from F by replacing G with
G/σ. For the rewriting to succeed it is also required that P/σ can be proven and, using the
congruence rules, it can be shown that
E =ebv E′ → F ↔ F′.
We have therefore created a library of theorems of the form P→ E =ebv E′ that can
be used to simplify ET-ACL2 problems. Some of these theorems are shown in Figure 9.5.
Note that syntaxp (x) is a function that logically returns true, but is used to implement
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ebvEq-is-an-equivalence:
Booleanp (x =ebv y) ∧ (x =ebv x) ∧ ((x =ebv y)→ (y =ebv x)) ∧
((x =ebv y) ∧ (y =ebv z)→ (x =ebv z))
ebvAnd-congruence-1:
(x0 =ebv x1)→ (ebvAnd (n, x0, y) =ebv ebvAnd (n, x1, y))
ebvAnd-congruence-2:
(y0 =ebv y1)→ (ebvAnd (n, x, y0) =ebv ebvAnd (n, x, y1))
ebvOr-congruence-1:
(x0 =ebv x1)→ (ebvOr (n, x0, y) =ebv ebvOr (n, x1, y))
ebvOr-congruence-2:
(y0 =ebv y1)→ (ebvOr (n, x, y0) =ebv ebvOr (n, x, y1))
ebvNot-congruence:
(x0 =ebv x1)→ (ebvNot (n, x0) =ebv ebvOr (n, x1))
Figure 9.4: The theorems needed to recognize =ebv as an equivalence relation and to enable
E =ebv E′ to be used as a rewrite rule rewriting E to E′ where E is an expression occurring
in our example.
ebvAnd-sort1:
syntaxp (¬ebvAndOrd (y, x))→ (ebvAnd (n, y, x) =ebv n,ebvAnd (x, y))
ebvAnd-sort2:
syntaxp (¬ebvAndOrd (y, x))
→
(ebvAnd (n, y, ebvAnd (n, x, z)) =ebv ebvAnd (n, x, ebvAnd (n, y, z)))
ebvAnd-cancel:
ebvAnd (n, x, ebvNot (n, x)) =ebv ebvFill (n, false)
ebvAnd-zero:
syntaxp (quotep (y)) ∧ (y =ebv ebvFill (n, false))
→
(ebvAnd (n, x, y) =ebv y)
Figure 9.5: Some examples of ACL2 theorems that also serve as rewrite rules to simplify
the SMT problem.
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theorem proving heuristics. In ebvAnd-sort1 and ebvAnd-sort2, syntaxp is used to ensure
that the rules only are used when x and y are not in the target order for ebvAnd expressions,
as defined by ebvAndOrd (x, y). In ebvAnd-zero, syntaxp is used to ensure that the rule is
only applied when y is constant, which prevents the theorem prover from wasting a lot of
time attempting to prove the hypothesis when ebvAnd-zero is not applicable.
For example, since the target ordering puts euf (0ebv4) before euf (1ebv4), the rewrit-




ebvAnd ( 4, ebvOr (4, 4ebv4, ebvAnd (4, euf (0ebv4), ebvAnd ( euf (1ebv4),
ebvNot (4, euf (0ebv4)))),
ebvAnd (4, 5ebv4, euf (0ebv4)))
then, by theorem ebvAnd-cancel, the formula further simplifies to:
euf (0ebv4)
,euf
ebvAnd ( 4, ebvOr (4, 4ebv4, ebvAnd (4, euf (0ebv4), ebvFill (4, false))),
ebvAnd (4, 5ebv4, euf (0ebv4)))
where ebvFill (n, a) creates an n-bit, bit vector where each bit has the Boolean value a. Next,
using the rewriting strategy implied by ebvAnd-cancel and evaluation, the formula further
simplifies to the following:
euf (0ebv4) ,euf ebvAnd (4, 4ebv4, ebvAnd (4, 5ebv4, euf (0ebv4)))
Then, using the sorting strategy implied by ebvAnd-sort1 and ebvAnd-sort2 and
evaluation the formula is further simplified to:
euf (0ebv4) ,euf ebvAnd (4, euf (0ebv4), 4ebv4)
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The above formula cannot be further simplified by our library of rewrite rules and
thus is passed to the next phase.
9.4.3 ET-ACL2 to NBV Translation
The next step in solving the SMT problem is to translate the ET-ACL2 formula into a
SULFA formula that can be solved with the SAT-based procedure in Chapter 7. The trans-
lation is performed by the ACL2 rewriter, and is relatively simple and fast (only a single
inside-out pass is required), since the ET-ACL2 functions are defined from Boolean list
functions, such as those used in the introductory example from Section 9.2.
Our example translates into the following formula, based on the definitions shown
in Figure 9.2:
nbvEq ( 4, uf ([false, false, false, false])
nBvAnd ( 4, uf ([false, false, false, false]), [false, true, false, false]))
The above formula is in SULFA, since given constant bit widths, nbvEq (n, x, y) and
nBvAnd (n, x, y) are unrollable into list primitives.
9.4.4 Common Subexpression Elimination
Even though the formula is now in SULFA, some more simplification is performed to re-
duce the size of the problem before solving it with our SAT-based procedure. In the com-
mon subexpression elimination phase, new variables are created for expressions that occur
multiple times in the formula. This prevents the SAT-based conversion algorithm from
translating such expressions multiple times. In the example, a variable is created for the
expression uf ([false, false, false, false]), as follows:
¬nbvEq (4, x, nBvAnd (4, x, [false, true, false, false]))
where x := uf ([false, false, false, false])
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Copying the expression for x above would not hinder the performance of our SAT-based
procedure much. However, when a complex expression is copied multiple times, common
subexpression elimination is significant.
9.4.5 Uninterpreted Function Removal
Next uninterpreted functions are removed. Removing them directly from the bit-vector
SMT problem is more efficient than removing them via our SAT-based procedure, since we
can create a specialized removal procedure taking into account that uninterpreted functions
in bit vector SMT problems only occur at the top level and that each uninterpreted function
has a type declaration stating that it inputs and outputs bit vectors of a particular finite width.
The technique to remove uninterpreted functions is the same straightforward
method used by our SAT-based procedure. For example, given m calls of an uninterpreted
function, uf (x1), uf (x2), ...uf (xm), which inputs an n-bit, bit vector, m new variables are
created u1, u2, ...um. Then, the ith call, uf (xi), is replaced with the following expression:
ite (nbvEq (n, xi, x1), u1, ite (nbvEq (n, xi, x2), u2, ...ite (nbvEq (n, xi, xi−1), ui−1, ui)...))
Only a single uninterpreted function call occurs in our example after common
subexpression elimination. Thus, a single variable u1 is created, which replaces x, lead-
ing to the following expression:
¬nbvEq (4, u1, nBvAnd (4, u1, [false, true, false, false]))
9.4.6 SAT-Based Procedure
After removing uninterpreted functions, the problem is then passed to our SAT-based proce-
dure for SULFA formulas described in Chapter 7. In the example, the SAT-based procedure
finds the counterexample u1 7→ [false, true, false, false]. This is also a satisfying instance
the original SMT problem, SMT2.
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addZeros (n, x) ,
{
x, if zp (n)
addZeros (n − 1, cons (false, x)), otherwise.
addZerosC (a, n, y) ,
{
y, if ¬a
addZeros (n, y), otherwise.
nbvDecode1 (n, x, y)
, {
y, if zp (n)
nbvDecode1 (n − 1, cdr (x), addZerosC (car (x), 2n−1, y)) otherwise.
nbvDecode (n, x) , nbvDecode1 (n, x, [t])
ebvDecode (n, x) , ebv (2n, nbvDecode (n, ebvNbv (n, x)))
nbvEncode1 (n,m, x) ,

nat2nbv (n, 0), if zp (m)
nat2nbv (n,m), if car (x)
nbvEncode1 (n,m − 1, cdr (x)) otherwise.
nbvEncode (n, x) , nbvEncode1 (log2(n), n − 1, x)
ebvEncode (n, x) , ebv (2n, nbvEncode (n, ebvNbv (n, x)))
Figure 9.6: The definitions of bit-vector primitives ebvDecode (n, x) and ebvEncode (n, x),
which are used to encode and decode bit vectors into and from exponentially larger one-hot
signals.
9.5 Adding New Functions and Rewriting Strategies
The main advantage to our approach is its flexibility. Whereas most SMT solvers have a
fixed set of primitives and a single simplification strategy, our system is extendable with new
primitives and strategies. Any user created functions and rewrite rules will be treated no
differently from the primitive functions in the original system. For example, the SMT 2006
bit-vector library includes no primitives to encode and decode wires into one-hot signals—
an operation common in the TRIPS Load Store Queue implementation. In Figure 9.6, the
ebvEncode (n, x) and ebvDecode (n, x) functions are defined to implement these opera-
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tions. Now, encoding and decoding can be added to our suite of bit-vector primitives, with
the same mixture of ACL2 and SAT-based verification as the previous bit-vector primitives.
Furthermore, simplification rules, such as the following Encode-decode-elimination rule,
can be proven using the ACL2 theorem prover and added to the ACL2 simplification phase.
Encode-decode-elimination:
syntaxp (quotep (n) ∧ quotep (n2)) ∧ (2n = n2)
→
(ebvEncode (n2, ebvDecode (n, x)) =ebv x)
The above rule states that when n and n2 are constants, and n2 = 2n, then decoding and then
encoding a bit vector x from size n-bits to n2 bits results in something equivalent to x.
Note that libraries of rules over the SMT 2006 primitives can also be created for
domain-specific applications. For example, rules with hypotheses, especially with free vari-
ables, like those discussed in Chapter 4, are inefficient in many applications but critical to
others. Rules for each application can be proven correct, so that soundness of the system
need not rely on soundness of user-generated rules.
9.6 Results
All 8,246 problems in the SMT 2006 QF UFBV32 benchmark suite were solved by the
SULFA SMT solver. The average time to solution on our machine is about 3 seconds, with
a maximum time of 2 minutes 1. These times are not competitive with the fastest SMT
solvers on these benchmarks, but we are the only SMT solver we know of to make use of a
general-purpose rewriter and definition mechanism.
Figure 9.7 shows the result of removing the ACL2 simplification phase from the
SULFA SMT solver. While using the general-purpose theorem prover to perform simplifi-
cation generates overhead, in the great majority of problems, the overhead is smaller than
the benefit from doing simplification. Also, four problems were omitted from Figure 9.7
1An Intel Pentium R© IV Dual Core 3.0 GHz with 2GB of RAM
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Figure 9.7: A graph comparing the performance of the SULFA SMT solver with and with-
out the ACL2 simplification phase. Each point represents a single problem in the SMT
2006 QF UFBV32 bit vector suite. The x-axis is the time (in seconds) required without the
ACL2 simplification phase and the y-axis is the time (in seconds) required with the ACL2
simplification phase. A point is on the line if the same time is required by both techniques.
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because they required over ten minutes to solve without the ACL2 simplification phase (but
could be solved in under ten minutes with the ACL2 simplification phase).
9.7 Summary
The SAT-based procedure for verifying SULFA formulas described in Chapter 7 has been
used, along with the ACL2 theorem prover, to develop a solver for the standard SMT 2006
QF UFBV32 theory of bit vectors. Our solver for the theory of bit vectors was able to solve
all the problems in the 2006 benchmark suite. Furthermore, it is more flexible than any
other known SMT solvers, since it provides a powerful mechanism for extending it with
new primitives and rewrite rules as ACL2 definitions and theorems.
9.8 Development and Bibliographic Notes
The initial high-level design of the SULFA SMT solver was developed during discussions
with Panagiotis Manolios and Sudarshan Srinivasan.
A number of SMT solvers exist that can automatically solve the SMT 2006 bench-
mark problems. The most efficient of these on the 2006 benchmarks are the yices SMT
solver [92] and the STP solver. The design of the STP solver is described in detail in
the proceedings of CAV 2007 [17]. STP includes a simplification phase, similar to the
ACL2 simplification phase in the SULFA SMT solver. Instead of a general-purpose theo-
rem prover though, STP uses a special purpose simplifier. STP also includes a linear arith-
metic mechanism and an automated refined mechanism for arrays that are not implemented
in the SULFA SMT solver. It may be possible to add a similar linear arithmetic mechanism
to the SULFA SMT solver using the ACL2 theorem prover. However, implementing the au-
tomated refinement mechanism requires modifications to the SAT-based SULFA procedure
to enable incremental additions of hypotheses.
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Chapter 10
Integrating ACL2 with the
SixthSense Model Checker
10.1 Introduction
We have developed a hardware verification methodology that uses an industrial model
checker to automate many hardware verification proofs and avoid the semantic embed-
ding of a hardware description language in the ACL2 logic. In this approach, which we
call the ACL2SIX methodology, the ACL2 theorem prover is combined with the industrial
model checker SixthSense through a new proof mechanism, named the ACL2SIX hint. The
ACL2SIX methodology models the hardware design as a set of axioms in the ACL2 logic
that are never explicitly given to the ACL2 theorem prover. Instead, the ACL2SIX hint
proves properties from axioms outside the ACL2 theorem prover by using the SixthSense
model checker on the actual hardware implementation. Theorems proven by the ACL2SIX
hint can then be combined using the ACL2 theorem prover to prove properties beyond the
scope of what can be verified by SixthSense alone.
This chapter gives an overview of the ACL2SIX hardware verification methodology
and then shows how it has been applied to the verification of a high performance multiplier,
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used in a floating-point unit designed at IBM. This methodology is described in more detail
in the proceedings of the Sixth conference on Formal Methods in Computer Aided De-
sign [77]. The verification of the multiplier is also described in more detail at the Sixth
International Workshop on the ACL2 theorem prover and its Applications [71].
10.2 ACL2VHDL Property
First, we define the notion of an ACL2VHDL property, which is a set of first-order formulas
that can be translated into a VHDL assertions. An ACL2VHDL property is of the form:
(n ∈ N) ∧ (n ≤ n0)→ (E0 = E1).
where n is a natural number variable representing the current clock cycle; n0 is a natural
number, representing the number of cycles needed to initialize the hardware; and E0 and E1
are ACL2VHDL bit-vector expressions. An ACL2VHDL bit-vector expression is one of the
following function applications:
• Bit-vector constant generators. Each bit-vector constant generator is a defined
function that maps ACL2 constants to bit-vector constants. A bit vector is a pair
(n, x), where n is the size of the bit vector and x is a natural number representing its
value. A bit is either 0 or 1. For example, given a natural number n, pad0 (n) = (n, 0)
and pad1 (n) = (n, 2n−1), create bit vectors of size n containing all zeroes or all ones
respectively. Furthermore, given an n ∈ {0, 1} the function make-bit (n) = n returns
the corresponding bit.
Bit-vector primitives. A bit-vector primitive is a member of a finite set of functions
that map bit or bit-vector arguments to an output that is either a bit or a bit vector. bit-
vector primitives are defined in both the ACL2 logic and in VHDL, and therefore can
be easily translated from one to the other. Many of the typical bit-vector functions
are implemented, such as follows:
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– bvPlus (x, y) is the bit vector representing the addition of the values represented
by x and y (all values are unsigned and the resulting bit vector is truncated to
the size of x).
– bvTimes (x, y) is the bit vector representing the multiplication of bit vectors x
and y (all values are unsigned and the resulting bit vector is truncated to the size
of x).
– bvNot (x) is the bitwise negation of x.
– bvIf (a, x, y) is either the bit vector x or y, depending on whether bit a is 1 or 0
respectively.
Note that, unlike in Chapters 8 and 9, the above bit-vector primitives do not input the
bit widths explicitly, since the width of bit vectors is encoded as part of its value (e.g.,
the 4-bit, bit vector 1 is encoded as the pair (4, 1)).
In an ACL2VHDL bit-vector expression, the argument to a bit-vector primitive can
be any ACL2VHDL bit-vector expression. Therefore bvPlus (bvNot (x), x) is an
ACL2VHDL bit-vector expression.
• Sigbit and Sigvec represent signals in the hardware design.
Before defining a well-formed application of sigbit and sigvec , first define a cycle
expression as either n or n−n0, where n is a variable symbol, representing the current
clock cycle and n0 is a natural number constant.
Given a constant e, a constant w, and a cycle expression c, then sigbit (e,w, c, 0)
represents the bit associated with the signal named w in the design entity e during
the first half of clock cycle c. Similarly, sigbit (e,w, c, 1) represents the bit associated
with the signal names w in the design entity e during the second half of clock cycle c.
Given a constant e, a constant w, natural number bl, a natural number bh, a cycle
expression c, and a phase number p ∈ {0, 1}, then sigvec (e,w, bl, bh, c, p) represents
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the bit vector formed from bits bl through bh of wire w in design entity e at clock cycle
c and clock phase p. For example, given a design entity ent (an entity is actually a
constant containing file names, module names, and other design info) and a wire
name a, then sigvec (ent, a, 2, 5, n − 1, 0) represents the four bit, bit vector made up
of bits 2 through 5 of wire a during the first half of clock cycle n − 1.
ACL2VHDL properties are further restricted to contain only a single variable sym-
bol, denoting the current clock cycle, and only a single hardware design entity. For example,
the following is an ACL2VHDL property:
(n ∈ N) ∧ (n ≤ 4)→ sigvec (E, a, 0, 4, n − 1, 1) = bvNot (sigvec (E,b, 1, 5, n, 0))
the above property states that for all cycles after the first 4, in the hardware design repre-
sented by entity E, bits 1 through 5 of signal b at the beginning of a clock cycle is equal to
the negation of bits 0 through 4 of signal a in the middle of the previous cycle. Note that the
above property would not be an ACL2VHDL property if the second application of sigvec
were modified to contain a design entity or a clock cycle variable other than those used in
the first application of sigvec .
10.3 Overview of ACL2SIX
We have modified the ACL2 theorem prover to include a new proof procedure, named the
ACL2SIX hint. The ACL2SIX hint is called directly by the user to prove ACL2VHDL
properties. The ACL2SIX hint uses the SixthSense model checker to determine if the given
ACL2VHDL property holds on the hardware design entity it references. If so, then it is
valid; otherwise, a waveform can be viewed showing why the implementation does not
satisfy the given ACL2VHDL property.
Figure 10.1 presents an overview of the ACL2SIX hardware verification methodol-

















Figure 10.1: An overview of the ACL2SIX hardware verification methodology.
property P(w0,w1, ...,wn), where each wi is an application of sigbit or sigvec correspond-
ing to a wire in the design. The property P is decomposed, via user guided proof, into
ACL2VHDL properties. The ACL2SIX hint translates each ACL2VHDL property into
VHDL assertions, checkable by the SixthSense model checker. If one of the resulting as-
sertion is not valid, then a waveform showing how the hardware design does not satisfy the
ACL2VHDL property is presented; otherwise, the validity of P follows from the validity of
its decomposed ACL2VHDL properties.
Note that the SixthSense model checker is mostly automatic. Therefore, by using
SixthSense, a considerable amount of reasoning on the details of the implementation is
avoided. Optional arguments can also be passed through the ACL2SIX hint, to help guide
or configure the SixthSense run for any particular problem.
As an example, consider the circuit in Figure 10.2. A valid property of the circuit
is:
(B→ B)






Figure 10.2: A simple example circuit, in which a true bit A causes bit B and bit C to be
true for all later times.
property can be specified in first order logic as:
(n0 ∈ N) ∧ (n1 ∈ N) ∧ (n0 ≤ n1) ∧ sigbit (stickyBit,B, n0, 0)→ sigbit (stickyBit,B, n1, 0)
where stickyBit is the constant representing the circuit design entity.
Note that the above formula is not an ACL2VHDL formula, since it contains two
different cycle number variables. However, by induction on n1 −n0, it can be reduced to the
following ACL2VHDL property:
(n ∈ N) ∧ (1 ≤ n)
→
bvIf (sigbit (stickyBit,B, n − 1, 0), sigbit (stickyBit,B, n, 0)),make-bit (1))
=
make-bit (1)
the above property is an ACL2VHDL property, and, therefore, can be translated by the
ACL2SIX hint into VHDL assertions. SixthSense can then check that the hardware design
corresponding to stickyBit satisfies the resulting assertions.
10.3.1 Soundness
Our FMCAD paper [77] contains a proof sketch justifying the soundness of the ACL2SIX























































Figure 10.3: An overview of a high performance multiplier design that was verified using
the ACL2SIX methodology.
ACL2 constrained functions where all of the unwritten axioms are constraints. Therefore,
the unwritten axioms do not result in an unsound theory.
A few assumptions must be made to ensure the soundness of the ACL2SIX hint, in-
cluding the soundness of SixthSense itself and that the bit-vector primitives have equivalent
definitions in VHDL and ACL2. Another assumption is that sigbit and sigvec are never
functionally instantiated, which is necessary because functional instantiation assumes that
all of the axioms regarding a function have been given to the ACL2 theorem prover. Orig-
inally, ACL2 had no support for functions with axioms outside the theorem prover itself.
Thus, the soundness depended on a manual check that sigbit and sigvec were not instan-
tiated. The new implicitly theory mechanism described in Chapter 11, however, supports
such functions.
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10.4 Overview of Multiplier Verification
Using the ACL2SIX methodology, we verified a 54x53 bit multiplier design used in an
industrial high performance floating-point unit. An overview of the multiplier design is
shown in Figure 10.3. First, a Booth encoder [63] is used to reduce the multiplication of
two bit vectors into the summation of 27 bit vectors. The summation of 27 bit vectors is
then reduced in successive stages to 18, 12, 6, 3, and then 2 bit vectors. The summation of
the final two bit vectors occurs in a different design.
The correctness of the multiplier design is expressed as the following first-order
property:
(7 ≤ n)→ bvPlus (sum (n, 1), carry (n, 1)) = bvTimes (a-in (n − 4, 2), c-in (n − 4, 2))
where sum (n, p), carry (n, p), a-in (n, p), and c-in (n, p) are the values of the sum, carry, A,
and C wires in Figure 10.3 at cycle number n and phase p. Note that the wires in Figure 10.3
are a slight abstraction of the inputs and outputs of the actual design. For example, the
actual design contains input signals that when true, imply A is zero. Therefore, the function
a-in (n, p) represents an ACL2VHDL bit-vector expression involving multiple inputs in the
actual design.
The correctness theorem of the multiplier in Figure 10.3 is an ACL2VHDL prop-
erty. However, due to the complexity of the design and the well-known problems that occur
during the automatic verification of multipliers, the correctness of the multiplier cannot be
verified automatically by SixthSense. Instead, the ACL2 theorem prover is used to verify
a Booth encoder. Then, SixthSense is used to verify that each vector output by the ACL2
Booth encoder is equivalent to a vector output by the Booth encoder implementation. Sixth-
Sense is also used to verify each individual summation compressor unit, which reduces the
sum of four or three bit vectors into the sum of two bit vectors. Finally, the ACL2 theo-
rem prover is used to show that the multiplier’s correctness theorem follows from the above
theorems.
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Our ACL2 workshop paper [71] presents a more detailed description of the multi-
plier verification.
10.5 Summary
We have integrated an industrial-strength model checker, SixthSense, with an industrial-
strength theorem prover, ACL2. The hardware verification problem is divided into an ACL2
problem, which reasons primarily about high-level arithmetic properties, and a SixthSense
problem, which reasons primarily about low-level details of the VHDL implementation. By
combining the two tools, larger problems can be verified than is possible with SixthSense
alone and a greater degree of automation is provided than is available through the ACL2
theorem prover alone. Furthermore, by accessing the hardware model through the model
checker, we are able to avoid writing a formal semantics for VHDL in ACL2.
10.6 Development and Bibliographic Notes
The work described in this chapter is joint work with Jun Sawada. The translator from
ACL2VHDL properties to VHDL is based on the translator described by Sawada in the
ACL2 workshop [76]. Also, Sandip Ray wrote an early prototype of the ACL2SIX hint.
I completed the implementation of the ACL2SIX hint and used it to verify the multiplier
design.
A significant amount of previous work involves the integration of model checking
and theorem proving. Some examples are that the HOL theorem prover was integrated with
the Voss model checking system [36], a lightweight theorem prover was integrated with
the FORTE automated verification tool [78], a µ-calculus model checker was integrated
with PVS [61], a unifying framework for connecting model checking and theorem proving
has been presented [5], the µ-calculus has been formalized in ACL2 [43], ACL2 has been
integrated with the UCLID automated verification tool [44], and some verification of SMV’s
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compositional model checking has been done in ACL2 [69].
Our work is distinguished from most previous work in its use of a model checker
and theorem prover each of which on its own has been shown to be applicable to industrial
hardware verification problems [52, 72]. Furthermore, our integration technique is unique
in that it avoids a full formal embedding of the logic from one tool in the other. A huge
amount of effort was saved by avoiding the formalization of the semantics of VHDL within
ACL2.
Furthermore, the industrial verification techniques involving FORTE and HOL-Voss
rely primarily on symbolic trajectory evaluation, which can only express finite step prop-
erties (similar to those expressible in SULFA). ACL2VHDL properties, on the other hand,
can express more general invariants. For example, let P be an invariant in some finite state
machine. Thus, the following temporal logic property holds
(P),
where the valid inputs and initial machine assumptions are implicit. The above property can
be expressed directly in ACL2VHDL, but not directly in STE. If given to ACL2SIX, the
above property is translated into a VHDL assertion, which the SixthSense model checker
will then attempt to verify through reachability analysis. Verifying the above property using
STE, on the other hand, may require a non-trivial strengthening of P until some inductive
invariant holds, which can be verified through finite-step properties, as in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 11
A General-Purpose Mechanism for
Integrating External Tools with
ACL2
11.1 Introduction
The initial implementations of the SULFA and SixthSense extensions to the ACL2 theo-
rem prover, described in Chapter 7 and Chapter 10, required modifications to the ACL2
source code. This chapter, however, presents a general-purpose mechanism for extending
the theorem prover with new proof engines without modifying the ACL2 source code. The
general-purpose extension, which was described in more detail at the International Work-
shop on Implementation of Logics [42] and in our paper in the Journal of Applied Logic
[40], is now included in the distributed version of the ACL2 theorem prover.
Aside from avoiding future source code modification, the general-purpose mecha-
nism clarifies the criteria needed for an extension of ACL2 to be sound. The correctness cri-
teria effectively form a contract between the extension writer and user, of which the ACL2
system itself need not be a part. The ACL2 system merely ensures that only extensions
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on which the user has agreed to trust are used. Therefore, potentially unsound extensions
can be distributed, even with the theorem prover, since a careful user will only trust sound
extensions.
Our mechanism relies on a new proof engine called a clause processor. Section 11.2
describes verified clause processors, which use the theorem prover to ensure soundness of
the combined system. Section 11.3 discusses unverified clause processors, which rely on
the writer of the clause processor to ensure soundness of the combined system. These
unverified clause processors use a new mechanism, called a trust tag, to ensure that the
only proof engines used are those the user has acknowledged as trusted.
11.2 Verified Clause Processors
An ACL2 clause is a list of ACL2 terms, representing a disjunction of those terms. A clause
processor is a function that inputs an ACL2 clause and outputs a (hopefully simpler) list of
clauses from which its input clause can be derived. For example, given the following ACL2
clause:
[p(IF A B C)q, pDq]
which represents the ACL2 formula
(IF A B C) , ’NIL ∨ D , ’NIL
then a clause processor that implements case splitting might produce the following list of
clauses:
[[p(EQUAL A ’NIL)q, pBq, pDq], [pAq, pCq, pDq]]
which represents
(A = ’NIL ∨ B , ’NIL ∨ D , ’NIL) ∧ (A , ’NIL ∨ C , ’NIL ∨ D , ’NIL).
Since ACL2 clauses can be expressed as ACL2 constants, a clause processor func-
tion can be written in ACL2. Furthermore, sometimes verified clause processors can be
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created, which reduce the soundness of the clause processor to the soundness of the under-
lying ACL2 system.
The interface to a verified clause processor has two components: (i) the clause
processor rule class, which identifies an ACL2 function as a clause processor and (ii) the
clause processor hint mechanism, which directs the theorem prover to use a clause processor
on a particular problem. Before describing the clause processor rule class and hint in more
detail, the following terminology is introduced:
• first (X), given a list X, is the first element of the list.
• rest (X), given a list X, is the list formed from X after deleting the first element.
• insert (e, X) is the list formed from the list X by inserting the element e at its front.
• |X|, given a list X, is the length of the list.
• list (x0, x1, ..., xN) is the list composed of elements x0 through xN , which may also be
written as [x0, x1, ..., xN].
• [] is the empty list.
• We use the same definition of MakeFn and MakeIf as in Chapter 5. Given a func-
tion symbol f and ACL2 terms X1 through Xn, define MakeFn (n, X1, X2, ..., Xn) as the
term representing the application of f to arguments X1 through Xn.
MakeIf (x, y, z) , MakeFn (pIFq, x, y, z).
• Given an ACL2 function application E and a natural number i, or Arg (i, E), is
defined, as in Chapter 5, as the ith argument of E. For example,
Arg (1, p(IF A B C)q) = pAq.
• NA (E), given a function application E ∈ E, is its number of arguments. For example,
NA (p(IF A B C)q) = 3.
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• Given an ACL2 term E, the size of E, or |E|, is also defined as in Chapter 5:
|E| ,

0, if E is a constant




|Arg (i, E)|, otherwise.
• Args (E), given an ACL2 term E representing a function application returns the list
of ACL2 terms representing the arguments of that function application. For example,
Args (p(F A B C)q) = [pAq, pBq, pCq.]
• Given a list of ACL2 terms C, define
disjoin (C) ,
 pNILq, if C = []MakeIf (first (C), pTq, disjoin (rest (C))), otherwise.
Intuitively, disjoin (C) is the ACL2 term representing the disjunction of the elements
of C.
• Given a list of lists of ACL2 terms F, define
conjoin* (F)
,  pTq, if F = []MakeIf (disjoin (first (F)), conjoin* (rest (F)), pNILq), otherwise.
Intuitively, conjoin* (F) is the ACL2 term representing the conjunction of each
disjoin (C), where C is an element of F. For example, conjoin* ([[pAq, pBq], [pCq]])
is:
(IF (IF A ’T (IF B ’T ’NIL))
(IF (IF ’C ’T ’NIL) ’T ’NIL)
’NIL)
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ev (conjoin* (tool0 (C, args)), tool0-env (C, σ, args))
→
ev (disjoin (C), σ)
Figure 11.1: A formula stating the correctness of the clause processor tool0 .
which represents (a ∨ b) ∧ c.
Using the above terminology, Figure 11.1 illustrates an ACL2 theorem stating the
correctness of an arbitrary clause processor tool0 (C, args). The clause processor is correct
if for any ACL2 clause C and substitution σ such that the clause evaluates to true under σ,
there exists a substitution σ′ (provided by tool0-env (C, σ, args)) such that the conjunction
of clauses returned by the clause processor evaluates to true under σ′.
A verified clause processor with the name tool0 is introduced by tagging the theo-
rem in Figure 11.1 with the new clause processor rule-class. Only theorems that match the
syntax of the formula in Figure 11.1, for some clause processor tool0 , evaluator ev , and
function tool0-env , may be tagged with the new clause processor rule class.
Once a clause processor rule with the clause processor tool0 has been added to
ACL2’s rule database, then clause processor hints referring to tool0 may be used. The
hint tells the ACL2 theorem prover when encountering a given goal to replace it with
tool0 (C, args), where C is the proof object at that point in the proof and args is any user
guidance passed to the clause processor hint.
11.2.1 Example
As an example, we have developed a verified clause processor that sorts the arguments of
32 bit, bit-vector addition. The ACL2 function BV-ADD implements binary 32 bit, bit-vector
addition. Since modular addition is commutative and associative, all permutations of the
summands in 32 bit, bit-vector addition are equivalent. Thus,
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(BV-ADD A (BV-ADD B (BV-ADD C D)))
is equivalent to
(BV-ADD A (BV-ADD C (BV-ADD B D))).
Sorting the summands in a bit-vector addition helps to create a normal form that is important
in many verification problems, including the verification of the multiplier in Chapter 10.
A naive approach to sorting is to use the ACL2 general-purpose rewriter to rewrite
all instances of (BV-ADD X Y) to (BV-ADD Y X) and (BV-ADD X (BV-ADD Y Z)) to
(BV-ADD Y (BV-ADD X Z)) when the term being substituted for X is greater than the
term being substituted for Y by some syntactic measure. However, this approach requires
O(N2) applications of the rewrite rules to sort a nested BV-ADD term with N arguments.
Figure 11.2 defines a verified clause processor that uses mergesort to sort the sum-
mands of a nested BV-ADD term. The clause processor, named sortBVAddCP (L) is defined
as a mutually-recursive function described as follows:
• Given a list X, the function makeBVAdd (X) creates the nested BV-ADD term such
that the ith element of X is the ith summand in makeBVAdd (X). For example,
makeBVAdd (list (pAq, pBq, p(F X)q)) = p(BV-ADD A (BV-ADD B (F X)))q.
• Given an ACL2 term E, the function sortBVAdd (E) creates an equivalent term with
BV-ADD summands sorted. For example,
sortBVAdd (p(BV-ADD B (BV-ADD C A))q) = p(BV-ADD A (BV-ADD B C))q,
This is accomplished by collecting the summands into a list, using mergesort to sort
the list, and then using makeBVAdd to make a BV-ADD term from the sorted list. In
our example, (BV-ADD B (BV-ADD C A)) is collected into the list [pBq, pCq, pAq],
which is then sorted to created [pAq, pBq, pCq], before using makeBVAdd to create




first (L), |L| < 2
MakeFn (pBV-ADDq, first (L), makeBVAdd (rest (L))), otherwise.
sortBVAdd (E)
, 
E, if |E| < 2
MakeFn (Fn (E), sortBVAddL (Args (E))), if Fn (E) , pBV-ADDq
makeBVAdd (mergesort (collect (E))), otherwise.
sortBVAddL (L)
, {
[], if L = []
insert (sortBVAdd (first (L)), sortBVAddL (rest (L))), otherwise.
collect (E)
, 
list (E), if |E| < 2
list (sortBVAdd (E)), if Fn (E) , pBV-ADDq
insert (sortBVAdd (Arg (1, E)), collect (Arg (2, E))), otherwise.
sortBVAddCP (L) , list (sortBVAddL (L)).
Figure 11.2: The mutually-recursive definition of a clause processor, sortBVAddCP (L),
which sorts the arguments of all instances of BV-ADD that occur in L. In the above definition,
E is always an ACL2 term, L is always a list of ACL2 terms, and mergesort (L) sorts a list
of terms using the mergesort algorithm.
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• Similarly, the function sortBVAddL (L), given a list of ACL2 terms L, creates a list
of terms equivalent to L with BV-ADD summands sorted.
• The clause processor sortBVAddCP (L), given a list of ACL2 terms L representing
an ACL2 clause, creates an equivalent (singleton) list of clauses with the summands
within BV-ADD subterms sorted.
The correctness of the sortBVAddCP (L) can be stated as:
ev (conjoin* (sortBVAddCP (C)), σ)→ ev (disjoin (C), σ)
which is proven using the ACL2 theorem prover. The proof involves the following key
lemmas:
1. perm (x, y)→ ev (makeBVAdd (x), σ) = ev (makeBVAdd (y), σ)
which states that any permutation of a nested BV-ADD applications evaluates to the
same result.
2. perm (x,mergesort (x))
which states that the mergesort algorithm always returns a permutation of its input.
The sorting clause processor is added to the ACL2 system the sortBVAddCP cor-
rectness theorem with the clause processor rule class. Once it has been added, a hint can be
used to apply sortBVAddCP to any ACL2 clause.
The verified clause processor shows significantly better performance than the naive
approach. A nested BV-ADD with 500 summands is sorted by the verified clause proces-
sor in 0.01 seconds and a nested BV-ADD with 1000 summands is sorted in 0.02 seconds.
By contrast, the naive approach that relies on the general-purpose rewriter requires 11.24
seconds and 64.41 seconds respectively 1.
1These results were obtained on a 2.6GHz Pentium R© IV desktop computer with 2.0GB of RAM.
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11.3 Basic Unverified Clause Processors
For some clause processors, it is difficult or impossible to verify the property in Figure 11.1
using the ACL2 theorem prover. For example, a clause processor that implements the
SULFA decision procedure described in Chapter 5 cannot be proven correct using the ACL2
theorem prover. One reason is that such a proof requires a second order axiom about all
ACL2 functions: the expansion of any function application is equal to its body. Also, ad-
mitting the decision procedure as a function in the ACL2 logic would be impossible, since
its proof of termination requires ordinals greater than ε0.
The unverified clause processor mechanism allows clause processors that are not
proven correct to be added to the ACL2 theorem prover. Like a verified clause processor,
an unverified clause processor is an ACL2 function that maps an ACL2 clause to a list of
clauses. Unlike verified clause processors, unverified clause processors may use program-
mode ACL2 functions, which are not required to terminate on all inputs. Furthermore,
unverified clause processors can use raw Lisp procedures (i.e., functions defined in the
Common Lisp environment in which ACL2 executes), which may make operating system
calls executing external programs or reading and writing files.
Unverified clause processors are implemented using a new feature, called trust tags.
A trust tag is a tag associated with a block of code that the user must declare trustworthy
before being executed. Before the declaration of a trust tag, the authors of ACL2 were es-
sentially responsible for its soundness. After a trust tag is declared, however, the soundness
depends on the soundness of ACL2 and the soundness of the block of code associated with
the trust tag. The block of code associated with a trust tag can be any arbitrary Lisp code,
including code that alters ACL2’s internal state.
Trust tags allow non-authors of the theorem prover to develop new features without
having to distribute their own versions of the ACL2 theorem prover. Instead, new features
can be distributed in an ACL2 file that is linked in dynamically with the ACL2 system, in the
same manner that ACL2 theorem and function databases are. To use any features associated
207
with a trust tag, however, users must declare their intention to trust the new features (or their
author). Each trust tag is associated with the file containing its associated block of code,
providing careful users a means to find and inspect each block of code before declaring it
trustworthy.
The correctness criteria needed for a user to trust an unverified clause processor
is carefully laid out in our paper in the Journal of Applied Logic [40] and in the ACL2
documentation [37]. When a user declares the extension of ACL2 with an unverified clause
processor to be trustworthy they are declaring that the unverified clause processor meets
the correctness criteria. For the most part, an unverified clause processor is sound unless it
produces a list of clauses that do not imply its input clause. There are some subtle issues,
however, which are explained in the paper. For instance, each unverified clause processor
is associated with a list of supporting functions that extend ACL2’s ground zero theory, on
which the correctness of the clause processor depends. If a clause processor depends on a
function definition that is not listed, then extending ACL2 with it may be unsound.
11.3.1 Applications
The integration of ACL2 with other verification tools has been an area of considerable inter-
est. ACL2 has been previously integrated with the Cadence SMV model checker [69] and
the UCLID automated verification tool [44], as well with SAT solvers and the SixthSense
model checker, as discussed in Chapters 7 and 10. In the past, the extension of ACL2 with
an external verification tool has necessitated “hacking” the ACL2 source code, which, as
evidenced by the subtlety of the unverified clause processor correctness criteria, is an error
prone process. Now, an extension to ACL2 requires only a single definition of a clause
processor, which has a well-documented specification.
We have used the new unverified clause processor interface to develop a clause
processor for SULFA formulas, based on the SAT-based SULFA proof technique described
in Chapter 7. Furthermore, we have applied the SULFA clause processor to the Load Store
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Queue protocol described in Chapter 8 and used it to develop the general-purpose SMT
solver described in Chapter 9. The SULFA clause processor and the general-purpose SMT
solver are now distributed with the ACL2 theorem prover [37].
11.4 Unverified Clause Processors with Implicit Theories
The unverified clause processors described in Sections 11.2 and 11.3 work under the as-
sumption that a clause processor proves properties that follow from the axioms currently
in the ACL2 theorem prover’s database. However, as discussed in Section 10.3.1, the inte-
gration of ACL2 with SixthSense requires the introduction of an implicit theory, an ACL2
theory that is not formally introduced into the ACL2 system. In particular, the ACL2SIX
system contains axioms about the functions SIGBIT and SIGVEC that are derived from the
hardware design, which is external to the ACL2 system.
Support for implicit theories has been created using a new mechanism called encap-
sulation templates. Function symbols introduced using encapsulation templates are similar
to constrained functions introduced through the encapsulation principle described in Sec-
tion 3.5.1. The difference is that the axioms given to the theorem prover in an encapsulation
template are not assumed to be all the axioms about the introduced function symbols. There-
fore, the functional instantiation proof technique described in Section 3.6.3 is disallowed
on function symbols introduced in an encapsulation template, since functional instantiation
needs a full list of axioms regarding the function symbol (or symbols) being instantiated.
If an unverified clause processor is associated with an encapsulation template, then
it may prove properties about an implicit theory. The correctness criteria for an unverified
clause processor with an implicit theory is explained in our paper [40], as well as in the
ACL2 documentation [37]. The main idea is that it must be possible to replace the encapsu-
lation template with an admissible encapsulation event that contains all the axioms needed
for the unverified clause processor to be correct. Thus, an unverified clause processor with
an implicit theory is verifying properties about an admissible ACL2 theory that is simply
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not given to the theorem prover.
The ACL2SIX hint described in Chapter 10 has been implemented as an unverified
clause processor with an implicit theory, called the ACL2SIX clause processor. The func-
tions SIGBIT and SIGVEC are introduced using an encapsulation template. The justification
of the soundness of the clause processor is the same as the justification provided in our FM-
CAD paper [77]. Essentially, there exists a potential hardware model based on the VHDL
design, which contains axioms only about SIGBIT and SIGVEC, from which each theorem
proven by the ACL2SIX clause processor can be derived.
11.5 Summary
We have designed and implemented a general-purpose mechanism for dynamically extend-
ing the ACL2 theorem prover with new proof techniques, called clause processors. Our
general-purpose mechanism supports both verified and unverified clause processors, in-
cluding unverified clause processors that extend a theory with an implicit theory, containing
axioms not directly provided to the theorem prover.
Verified clause processors, unverified clause processors, and unverified clause pro-
cessors with implicit theories have each been implemented. We developed a verified clause
processor that uses mergesort to efficiently sort the summands in bit-vector addition op-
erations. An unverified clause processor was implemented based on the SULFA decision
procedure described in Chapter 7. Finally, an unverified clause processor with an implicit
theory was developed from the SixthSense integration described in Chapter 10.
The unverified clause processors mechanism is superior to previous approaches
used to integrate ACL2 with external tools. Previous attempts to integrate ACL2 with ex-
ternal tools required developers to create their own version of the ACL2 theorem prover,
which complicates the implementation and distribution of such tools. Furthermore, we
have developed a correctness criteria for unverified clause processors, which formalizes the
requirements needed to ensure the soundness. Having such criteria simplifies both the pro-
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cess of developing sound extensions and evaluating the potential for unsoundness risk with
a given extension. The new mechanism also requires the user to declare an unverified clause
processor as trustworthy before it is used. Therefore, distributions can include extensions
with various levels of unsoundness risk, and users can determine the level of acceptable risk
suitable for their work.
11.6 Development and Bibliographic Notes
The design of trust tags, encapsulated templates, and the new clause processor mechanisms
is joint work with Matt Kaufmann, J Moore, Sandip Ray. The design was then implemented
by Matt Kaufmann. Besides helping to design the mechanism, I created the initial applica-
tions for the new mechanism, including the sorting verified clause processor described in
Section 11.2 and the SULFA clause processor described in Section 11.3. Sandip Ray trans-
lated my implementation of the ACL2SIX hint, described in Chapter 10, into an unverified
clause processor with an implicit theory.
Some related work involves the development of “interface logics” [23], that com-
bine automated reasoning tools by defining a single logic L such that each reasoning tool
is a sub-logic of L. Similarly, Berezin’s thesis involves the creation of a unified logic for
combining theorem proving and model checking [5].
The PVS theorem prover contains decision procedures based on model checkers
and SAT solvers [61, 12], though we are not aware of any general-purpose mechanism to
integrate external tools with PVS.
Previous work with the HOL family of theorem provers [20], such as Isabelle [59]
and HOL4 [26], integrates external proof tools as oracles using the “tagging” system in-
troduced by Else Gunter [22]. Oracles have been used to integrate Isabelle with model
checkers and arithmetic decision procedures [56, 4]. Furthermore, the PROSPER project
[13] uses oracles within HOL98 to integrate several verification tools. Oracles have also
been used to solve large Boolean propositional formulas within HOL4, by appealing to
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eternal SAT solvers and BDD engines [18, 34]. Furthermore, the ACL2 theorem prover
itself has been connected with HOL4 through an HOL4 oracle [19].
The tagging system within HOL is somewhat different from the trust tags discussed
in this chapter. A tag in HOL is implemented in the logic as an additional hypothesis on
each theorem that requires the use of a given oracle. Thus, in HOL, one can track external
tool dependencies at the granularity of theorems. ACL2 trust tags, on the other hand, track
dependencies at the level of files. Our approach has the disadvantage that a user cannot use
only the portion of a file that does not depend on a given external tool. However, in practice,
we believe this disadvantage is not likely significant, since ACL2 users already frequently
move events across files. Furthermore, tracking dependencies at the level of files, at least
within the ACL2 theorem prover, leads to a cleaner implementation.
Some work also exists that uses external tools to search for proofs within a more
general framework. Ivy is one such system, which uses Otter to find ACL2 proofs for
certain theories [46]. Hurd also describes an interface for connecting HOL with first-order





This chapter provides an overview of the hardware description language, DE2, which is
described in more detail in our paper in the proceedings of the Conference on Correct
Hardware Design and Verification Methods (CHARME) [31].
DE2 has unique features that make it suited for formal verification:
• DE2 is a hierarchical language and supports hierarchical verification. A design, or
DE2 module, is constructed by composing submodules. Similarly, the verification of
a module can be constructed from the verification of its submodules.
• DE2 has a simple, two-pass semantics, in which a module is defined by two passes
through its submodules. Having a simple semantics greatly simplifies the composi-
tion process. Furthermore, the DE2 language is restricted to finite state machines,
so that modules can be modeled as functions that input and output an implicit state
structure.
• The semantics of the DE2 language is deeply-embedded in the ACL2 logic, meaning
that a DE2 description is an ACL2 constant and ACL2 functions are defined that
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provide a formal semantics for the DE2 language.
• The formal semantics of DE2 also serves as an efficient evaluation and testing mech-
anism for DE2 circuits.
• An infrastructure has been created to automate the verification of DE2 designs in
ACL2.
• The infrastructure also supports the verification of (possibly infinite) sets of DE2
designs, described by ACL2 functions, and the verification of optimization and sim-
plification programs that operate on DE2 code.
• The structure of the DE2 language closely corresponds to a subset of Verilog, which
enables the formal verification of Verilog circuits.
• The DE2 language is designed to be extensible. Parameters, which are inputs that
must be constant in a synthesizable design, are built into the language. Parameters
promote reusability by allowing a single module description to represent an infinite
number of actual modules. Extensibility is also promoted by allowing primitive mod-
ules to be defined by the user, rather than built in to the language.
• Annotations are built into DE2 as first class objects, rather than comments. Thus,
users can embed non-functional information directly into the design and write ACL2
functions that reason about such information. For example, information about testing,
layout, and power can be embedded in annotations and reasoned about using ACL2
functions.
This chapter begins with an introductory example of a DE2 module in Section 12.2.
Section 12.3 and 12.4 then describe the syntax and semantics of DE2 in more detail. Sec-
tion 12.5 then overviews the DE2 verification system and Section 12.6 describes a circuit














(FF0 (C) (FFN 1) (B))
(B0 (B) (BUFN 1) ((BV-OR 1 A C)))))
Figure 12.1: A simple example circuit and its DE2 description, in which a high bit A causes
bit B and bit C to be high for all later times.
12.2 Introductory Example
As a first example, the sticky-bit circuit (previously described in Chapter 10), is shown in
Figure 12.1, along with its DE2 description. The sticky-bit circuit has a single input, A, a
single output B, and an internal wire C.
The DE2 description is an ACL2 term that specifies the name of the circuit and
contains various named annotations, such as TYPE, PARAMS, and OCCS, that describe the
circuit. The sticky-bit circuit’s OCCS annotation describes that the sticky-bit module is
built from two submodules, a flip-flop and a buffer. The occurrence
(FF0 (C) (FFN 1) (B))
describes that sticky-bit contains an instance, named FF0, of a 1 bit flip-flop module (an n
bit flip-flop module has a description named FFN), with input B and output C. Similarly, the
occurrence
(B0 (B) (BUFN 1) ((BV-OR 1 A C)))
describes that sticky-bit contains an instance, name B0, of a 1 bit buffer module (an n bit























Figure 12.2: DE2 descriptions of N bit buffer and flip-flop modules.
((BV-OR 1 A C)),
which is the “or” of the 1 bit, bit vectors (or wires) A and C.
The TYPE annotation is used to differentiate between primitive modules and non-
primitive modules, where primitive modules do not instantiate submodules. The TYPE an-
notation is actually a non-functional annotation, because it is not used in the DE2 formal
semantics. However, a type checker ensures that TYPE annotations are present and correct.
Similar checkers and annotations can be created to contain and ensure the consistency of
other information. For example, we have developed annotations to record whether signals
are active-high or active-low, whether signals are data or control signals, and to record
coverage points (logic that is high when some interesting case is being tested).
The descriptions of the flip-flop and buffer submodules, which are used in the
sticky-bit module, are shown in Figure 12.2. Note that both modules contain PARAMS
annotations and LAMBDA module occurrences. The PARAMS annotation enables the module
descriptions to be used to create any N bit buffer or sequence of N flip-flops. The LAMBDA
module is an unnamed module that, given its state and inputs, explicitly creates its state and
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output using an ACL2 term (a call to the LIST function). Note that any state declared by the
STS annotation, which is normally an implicit input and output of the submodule, is made
explicit by the use of LAMBDA modules.
The ST-DECLS annotation is another annotation that does not affect the semantics
of a module. The ST-DECLS annotation declares that a piece of state is implemented using
a bit vector with a specific width. DE2, in principle, can be used with infinite memory
models. By declaring the state to be a finite bit vector, however, the ST-DECLS annotation
enables the use of finite-state verification tools.
As stated in Chapter 10, one property we may wish to prove about the sticky-bit
module in Figure 12.1 is:
(B→ B)
which states that once the B signal is high, it remains so for all time.
One way of writing this using the semantics of DE2 is:
(n0 ∈ N) ∧ (n1 ∈ N) ∧ (n0 < n1) ∧ stickyBitsInp (netlist) ∧
nth (0,RunOuts (n0, pBV-EVq, pSTICKY-BITq, params, γ, S , netlist))
→
nth (0,RunOuts (n1, pBV-EVq, pSTICKY-BITq, params, γ, S , netlist))
where
• RunOuts (n, ev,m, params, γ, S 0, netlist) is part of the DE2 semantics described in
Section 12.4; it returns a list of outputs of the module named m after n clock cycles,
given parameters params, given a list of at least n cycles of inputs γ, given initial state
S 0, and given a list of DE2 descriptions netlist including m and its submodules. The
ev input specifies an evaluator to be used, in this case the bit vector evaluator BV-EV,
under the substitution env, to evaluate ACL2 terms in the DE2 description or inputs.
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• stickyBitsInp (netlist) is a predicate that is true when the sticky-bit module descrip-
tion shown in Figure 12.1 are in netlist, as well as descriptions of its required sub-
modules shown in Figure 12.2.
• nth (i, x) is the function that returns the ith element of the list x.
The above property can then be proven using the methodology described in Sec-
tion 12.5.
12.3 Formal Syntax
A circuit is described in DE2 as a netlist of module descriptions. Both the netlist and
each module description is represented as a Lisp expression recognized by the following
grammar:
netlist ::= (module-list)
module-list ::= ε | module module-list
module ::= (symbol module-body)
module-body ::= ε | annotation module-body
annotation ::= (symbol expression)
where expression is an arbitrary Lisp expression, such as ((A B) (C D E) F).
The grammar in Figure 12.3 recognizes the built-in annotations, PARAMS, OUTS,
INS, WIRES, STS, and OCCS. Intuitively, the built-in annotations describe a module’s sub-
modules and wiring.
12.4 DE2 Semantics
The state of a machine with top-level module m after n steps, or cycles, is defined as:
218
annotation ::= (PARAMS sym-list) | (OUTS decl-list) | (INS decl-list) |
(WIRES decl-list) | (STS sym-list) | (OCCS occ-list)
decl-list ::= ε | (symbol param) decl-list
occ-list ::= ε | occurrence occ-list
occurrence ::= (symbol occ-out-list (symbol param-list) wire-list) |
(symbol occ-out-list (lambda-module param-list) wire-list)
lambda-module ::= ((LAMBDA (sym-list) (LIST expr-list)) param)
occ-out-list ::= ε | occ-out occ-out-list
occ-out ::= symbol | (symbol param param)
expr-list ::= ε | wire expr-list | param expr-list
wire-list ::= ε | wire expr-list
wire ::= symbol | constant | (N-NILS param) |
(BV-CONST param param) | (BV-BIN-CONST param param) |
(BV-IF wire wire wire) | (UNARY-AND param wire) |
(UNARY-OR param wire) | (BV-AND param wire wire) |
(BV-OR param wire wire) | (BV-NOT param wire) |
(BV-XOR param wire wire) | (BV-EQ param wire wire) |
(BV-LEQ param wire wire) | (BV-DECODE param wire) |
(GET-SUBLIST wire param param) | (G wire param param) |
(APPEND-N param wire wire) | (A-N param wire wire) |
(BV-DUPLICATE param param wire) | (BV-ADD param wire wire) |
(UPDATE-SUBLIST wire param param wire) |
(US wire param param wire)
param-list ::= ε | param expr-list
param ::= symbol | number | (1- param) | (1+ param) |
(+ param param) | (- param param) | (EXPT param param)
sym-list ::= ε | symbol sym-list
Figure 12.3: A grammar specifying the syntax of the built-in annotations, used to specify
the functionality of a DE2 module. Note that symbol is an arbitrary symbol and number is
an arbitrary number.
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RunSt (n, ev,m, params, γ, S 0, netlist)
,  st, if n = 0de (ev,m, params, γn−1, S n−1, env, netlist), otherwise.
where
• S n−1, is the recursively computed machine state at time n − 1:
S n−1 , RunSt (n − 1, ev,m, params, γ, S 0, netlist).
• Similarly, S 0 is the initial state of the machine, denoted as an ACL2 term, to be
evaluated using the ev evaluator under the substitution env.
• ev is a symbol specifying an evaluator for ACL2 terms. This chapter assumes
ev = pBV-EVq, specifying the bit-vector evaluator. Note that a wire expression in
Figure 12.3 recognizes an ACL2 term involving bit-vector primitives. If a different
evaluator were used, then a different set of primitives would be recognized. The
BV-EV evaluator is also used to evaluate simple arithmetic terms, including those
needed to evaluate the param expressions in Figure 12.3.
• env is a substitution mapping symbols to constants.
• netlist is an ordered list of DE2 module descriptions, including the descriptions of m
and all its submodules.
• params is a list of ACL2 terms corresponding to the module’s PARAMS annotation.
Each term evaluates to a natural number, when evaluated by the ev evaluator under
the substitution env.
• γ contains all the inputs to the module such that γi is a list of inputs, corresponding
to the module’s INS annotation, after i clock cycles. Each input is an ACL2 term that
can be evaluated to a constant using the ev evaluator under the substitution env.
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• de (ev,m, params, ins, S , env, netlist) is the state of the machine m described by netlist
netlist at the next cycle, given its parameters params, inputs ins, and state S (all ACL2
terms evaluated by the ev evaluator under the env substitution) during the current
cycle.
The output of machine m after n cycles is defined as
RunOuts (n, ev,m, params, γ, S 0, netlist)
,
se (ev,m, params, γn, S n, env, netlist)
where
• ev, S 0, params, γ, and netlist are the same as in RunSt .
• S i is the machine state after i clock cycles, defined as:
S i , RunSt (i, ev,m, params, γ, S 0, netlist).
• se (ev,m, params, ins, S , env, netlist) is the output list of the machine m described by
netlist netlist at the next cycle, given its parameters params, inputs ins, and state S
(all ACL2 terms evaluated by the ev evaluator under the env substitution) during the
current cycle.
Thus, the semantics of a module are defined through the functions:
se (ev,m, params, ins, S , env, netlist)
de (ev,m, params, ins, S , env, netlist)
which return the outputs and next state of a module.
Intuitively, given the inputs and state of a DE2 module, the value of each wire can
be computed through a linear traversal of the submodule occurrences, as given by the OCCS
annotation. The se function returns the module outputs by computing the wire values and


























Figure 12.4: The ADD ADDR circuit adds (by bitwise disjunction) the block addressed by
ADDR to the mask X, when EN is high. The DECODER unit translates an n bit, bit vector
into 2n bit, bit vector with only the nth bit high. For example, given a four bit, bit vector
with value 3, the DECODER outputs a sixteen bit, bit vector with value 8 (the third bit is
high, the rest low).
DE2 module’s state by computing the wire values and then making a second, “dual” pass,
through the submodule occurrences, in which the state of each submodule is updated. For
example, in Figure 12.1, the wire B is computed during the first pass and, in the second
pass, the FF0 submodule occurrence updates its internal state using the new value of B. A
more detailed description of the se and de functions can be found in our CHARME paper
[31].
As another example, the ADD ADDR circuit, has the schematic shown in Fig-
ure 12.4 and the Verilog and DE2 descriptions shown in Figure 12.5. The ADD ADDR
circuit is a slight generalization of a circuit present in the implementation of the TRIPS
Load-Store Queue Protocol, described in Chapter 8. It adds an address to its input mask,
when its enable input EN is high. It uses a decoder submodule to translate the n bit input
address into a 2n bit, bit vector, in which only the nth bit is high. Then a multiplexer selects
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module ADD_ADDR (Q,X,EN,ADDR);











(OUTS (Q (EXPT 2 N)))
(INS (X (EXPT 2 N))
(ADDR N)
(EN 1))
(WIRES (DEC (EXPT 2 N)))
(OCCS
(D0 (DEC) (DECODER N) (ADDR))
(B0 (Q) (BUFN (EXPT 2 N))
((BV-IF EN




Figure 12.5: A Verilog and a DE2 description of the ADD ADDR circuit shown in Figure 12.4.
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(TWO-INV
(OUTS (Q0 1) (Q1 1))
(INS (A 1) (B 1))
(OCCS
(A0 (Q0) (BUFN 1) (BV-NOT 1 A))






Figure 12.6: The DE2 description on the left implements the internals of the TWO-INV
module drawn on the right. The schematic on the right further uses the TWO-INV module
to implement a one bit buffer. No DE2 description, however, can be created that wires the
TWO-INV module to itself to create such a buffer.
whether to add the decoded signal into the mask, based on the enable bit. Parameters are
used to generalize the input and output bit widths.
Note the close correspondence between the Verilog and DE2 descriptions in Fig-
ure 12.5. The syntax and semantics of DE2 correspond closely to a restricted subset of
Verilog. This enables many Verilog circuits to be easily translated into DE2 and simplifies
the Verilog to DE2 compiler described in Section 12.5. It also makes compilation from DE2
to Verilog trivial.
12.4.1 Limitations of the Two Pass Model
The fact that all wire values are calculated in a single traversal of the submodule occurrences
greatly simplifies the DE2 semantics and thus the verification of DE2 modules. However,
it also restricts the circuits that can be written in DE2. If the output of a submodule A is
wired to the input of a submodule B, then A must occur prior to B in the list of submodule
occurrences.
A combinational loop in a hardware designs prevents it from being represented in
DE2. In practice, this restriction is not severely limiting, since combinational loops rarely
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Figure 12.7: An overview of the DE2 verification system.
ACL2 functions evaluated by the ev evaluator.
The submodule ordering restriction within DE2, however, rules out more than com-
binational loops. For example, a DE2 description of the TWO-INV module is shown on the
left in Figure 12.6 and its schematic is shown on the right. The TWO-INV module simply
contains two independent inverters. Each output of the module is the inversion of one of its
inputs. The DE2 description shown on the left of Figure 12.6, is a valid DE2 description,
but it cannot be wired to implement the buffer shown in the schematic on the right. Even
though the schematic clearly has no combination loops, the ordering restriction prevents it
from being described because the output of an instantiation of TWO-INV cannot affect its
input. The only way to create a DE2 description of the schematic in Figure 12.6 is to break
the TWO-INV module in two, so the inverters may be ordered.
12.5 The DE2 Verification System
Having a semantics for DE2 written in the ACL2 logic enables many forms of verifica-
tion. In Figure 12.7, we illustrate our verification system, which is built around the DE2
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language.
The DE2 verification system can be used to verify Verilog designs, which are de-
noted in the upper left of Figure 12.7. We have developed a compiler that automatically
translates a subset of Verilog to DE2 descriptions, which enables the verification of designs
of practical interest, such as the Load Store Queue protocol described in Chapter 8. Fur-
thermore, DE2 descriptions can also be compiled automatically into Verilog descriptions,
which enables DE2 descriptions to use traditional synthesis and timing tools that operate
on Verilog.
To assist in the verification of DE2 designs, a verifying compiler has been devel-
oped from DE2 descriptions to cycle-accurate ACL2 models of those descriptions. Here,
verifying compiler means a compiler that produces, along with its output, a proof that its
output is equivalent to its input. For each design it compiles, our verifying compiler pro-
duces an ACL2 proof that the DE2 description input to it is equivalent, according to the
semantics of DE2, to the cycle-accurate ACL2 model it produces. The ACL2 model pro-
duced is essentially a model in first-order logic, where each wire in a DE2 module has a
corresponding function. Furthermore, a function produces the next state of the finite state
machine described by each module from its previous state. Some simple reductions, such
as cone-of-influence are performed during the translation process, and these are verified by
the ACL2 theorem prover on a case-by-case basis.
The specification of the design begins in the form of English documents, charts,
graphs, C-models and test code, which is represented in the upper right of Figure 12.7.
This informal specification is then translated manually into a formal ACL2 specification.
Through user-guided proof, the formal specification is reduced to invariants and equivalence
properties in SULFA. If possible, the SULFA properties are verified automatically by the
SAT-based procedure in Chapter 7. If the SAT-based procedure, due to the state explosion
problem, fails to verify the SULFA properties, then they are further broken down by user-
guided proof until they can be successfully verified by some automatic procedure.
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The DE2 verification system can also be used to verify circuit generators, such
as the ripple-carry adder generator described in Section 12.6. The circuit generators are
implemented as ACL2 functions that produce DE2 code. By proving, through the DE2
semantics, that the ACL2 functions always produce correct code we verify a potentially
infinite number of implementations in a single verification effort.
Similarly, ACL2 functions that modify DE2 descriptions can also be verified. Such
functions can be used to optimize the DE2 implementation or simplify it for future verifi-
cation. Thus it is possible to use the DE2 verification system to translate a Verilog design
to DE2, run verified optimizations on it, and then translate it back into Verilog.
It is also possible to build static analysis tools, such as extended type checkers,
that check the correctness of DE2 annotations. DE2 annotations are first-class objects (i.e.,
they are not embedded in comments) that can include all manner of functional and non-
functional properties and parameters relating to a DE2 module. An extended type checker
can then input the DE2 module and read its annotations. The type checker can be written in
ACL2 and can therefore be analyzed and used within the verification effort. For example,
the ST-DECLS annotation is used to produce a finite memory model that enables the use of
finite-state verification tools.
12.6 Circuit Generator Example
This section describes circuit generators and their verification through a simple ripple-carry
adder example. Figure 12.8 illustrates the schematic of an n bit ripple-carry adder, built
from full-adders. Every submodule in a DE2 module must exist in all implementations of
that module, regardless of parameters. Therefore, the n bit ripple-carry adder in Figure 12.8
cannot be described as a parameterized DE2 module. A DE2 module can, however, describe
an n bit ripple-carry adder for any specific value of n. For example, the DE2 description of
a 4 bit ripple-carry adder is shown on the right in Figure 12.8.











































(OUTS (SUM 4) (COUT 1))




(B0 ((C 0 0)) (BUFN 1) (CIN))
(C1 ((SUM 0 0) (C 1 1))
(FULL-ADDER)
((G A 0 0) (G B 0 0) (G C 0 0)))
(C2 ((SUM 1 1) (C 2 2))
(FULL-ADDER)
((G A 1 1) (G B 1 1) (G C 1 1)))
(C3 ((SUM 2 2) (C 3 3))
(FULL-ADDER)
((G A 2 2) (G B 2 2) (G C 2 2)))
(C4 ((SUM 3 3) (C 4 4))
(FULL-ADDER)
((G A 3 3) (G B 3 3) (G C 3 3)))
(B1 (COUT) (BUFN 1) ((G C 4 4)))))
Figure 12.8: A general schematic for an n bit ripple-carry adder is shown on the left. Its
DE2 description in the 4 bit case is shown on the right.
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ated to produce its DE2 description. To write such a function, first recall that a DE2 de-
scription is a list of modules. We thus define the following functions to manipulate lists:
• MakeDE (x0, x1, ..., xN) is the Lisp expression created by composing the Lisp expres-
sions x0 through xN . For example,
MakeDE (p(A B)q, pCq, pDq) = p((A B) C D)q.
Note that MakeDE is equivalent to Lisp’s LIST function, but this dissertation uses
MakeDE , rather than LIST, in order to distinguish between mathematical lists and a
Lisp expressions.
• AppDE (x, y) is the Lisp expression created by appending the Lisp expression y to the
end of the Lisp expression x. For example,
AppDE (p(A B)q, p(C)q) = p(A B C)q.
Note that both x and y must be enclosed in parentheses, i.e., they cannot be constants
or symbols. AppDE (x, y) is equivalent to Lisp’s APPEND function.
• SymName (s, n), given a Lisp symbol s and a natural number n, produces the symbol
with n appended to s. For example,
SymName (pBq, 33) = pB33q
To define the n bit ripple-carry adder in DE2, we first define the function





MakeDE ( SymName (pCq, n),
MakeDE ( MakeDE (pSUMq, n − 1, n − 1),MakeDE (pCq, n, n))
MakeDE (pFULL-ADDERq),
MakeDE ( MakeDE (pGq, pAq, n − 1, n − 1),
MakeDE (pGq, pBq, n − 1, n − 1),
MakeDE (pGq, pCq, n − 1, n − 1)))
For example, GenRipOcc (3) returns:
(C3 ((SUM 2 2) (C 3 3))
(FULL-ADDER)
((G A 2 2) (G B 2 2) (G C 2 2)))
which instantiates a full adder submodule, with module description named FULL-ADDER,
and names this occurrence as C3. The expressions (G A 2 2), (G B 2 2), and
(G C 2 2) are ACL2 terms returning the second bit of bit vectors named A, B, C respec-
tively. The C3 submodule receives these inputs and outputs its sum and carry bits onto the
second bit of the bit vector named SUM and the third bit of the bit vector named C.
The following function composes m ripple-carry adder occurrences to form the
OCCS annotation for an n bit ripple-carry adder module.
GenRipOccs (m, n)
, 
MakeDE (firstOcc), if m = 0
AppDE (GenRipOccs (m − 1, n),MakeDE (lastOcc)) if m = n + 1
AppDE (GenRipOccs (m − 1, n),MakeDE (GenRipOcc (m))), otherwise.
where
• firstOcc , p(B0 ((C 0 0)) (BUFN 1) (CIN))q.
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• lastOcc , MakeDE (pB1q, p(COUT)q, p(BUFN 1)q, lastOccIns).
• lastOccIns , MakeDE (MakeDE (MakeDE (pGq, pCq, n, n))).
For example, GenRipOccs (2, 1) is:
((B0 ((C 0 0)) (BUFN 1) (CIN))
(C1 ((SUM 0 0) (C 1 1))
(FULL-ADDER)
((G A 0 0) (G B 0 0) (G C 0 0)))
(B1 (COUT) (BUFN 1) ((G C 1 1)))))
The following function generates the description for an n bit ripple-carry adder:
genRipple (n)
,
MakeDE ( SymName (pRIPPLE-CARRY-q, n),
MakeDE (OUTS,MakeDE (SUM, n),MakeDE (COUT, 1)),
MakeDE (INS,MakeDE (A, n),MakeDE (B, n),MakeDE (CIN, 1)),
MakeDE (WIRES,MakeDE (CARRY, n)),
AppDE (MakeDE (OCCS),GenRipOccs (n + 1, n)))
The DE2 description shown in Figure 12.8 is equal to the four bit ripple-carry
adder, genRipple (4). To complete the description of the ripple-carry adder a netlist must be
formed including both genRipple (4) and a DE2 description of the FULL-ADDER submod-
ule.
The specification of the ripple-carry adder can be written as:
(n ∈ N) ∧ (n > 0) ∧ RippleInp (n, netlist) ∧ bvp (n, a) ∧ bvp (n, b)
→
bvToNat (n, sum) = (bvToNat (n, c0) + bvToNat (n, a) + bvToNat (n, b)) mod 2n
231
where
• sum , nth (0, se (pBV-EVq, ripName, params, ins, S , env, netlist)), which is the SUM
output of the ripple carry adder module.
• ripName , SymName (pRIPPLE-CARRY-q, n), which is the name of the ripple carry
adder module.
• a is the evaluation, using the bit-vector evaluator, ’BV-EV, of the first input
(nth (0, ins)), under the substitution env.
• b is the evaluation, using the bit-vector evaluator, ’BV-EV, of the second input
(nth (1, ins)), under the substitution env.
• c0 is the evaluation, using the bit-vector evaluator, ’BV-EV, of the third input
(nth (2, ins)), under the substitution env. This input is the one bit carry input.
• bvToNat (x) is the natural number corresponding to the bit vector x.
• bvp (n, x) is the predicate that is true when x is an n bit, bit vector.
• RippleInp (n, netlist) is the predicate that is true when netlist is a list containing the
DE2 description of the n bit ripple-carry adder created by genRipple (n), as well as
all its submodule descriptions.
Intuitively, the specification above states that the output of any n bit ripple-carry
adder is the summation of its inputs. It is then proven using the ACL2 theorem prover, from
the definitions of ripple carry adder generator genRipple (n), and the formal semantics of
DE2, specified by the functions se and de .
12.7 Summary
DE2 is a new language for designing and specifying finite state machines. Its embedding
within the ACL2 theorem prover provides a means to formally verify that these machines
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satisfy their specifications. In this chapter, we show how to verify some small hardware
design examples. Chapter 8 provides a more significant example, where a component of
the TRIPS processor [9] is translated from Verilog to DE2 and then verified in ACL2.
Since DE2 programs are ACL2 constants, programs that generate and manipulate
DE2 circuits can also be verified. We have shown how one such circuit generator, which
generates a ripple-carry adder, has been verified.
Furthermore, in industrial hardware designs, all kinds of design data are presently
being added into the code as comments. This process prevents there from being a single
design description that is understandable by all the pre- and post-silicon development tools.
DE2 incorporates all the design data into a single annotation formalism, which ACL2 func-
tions can analyze and manipulate. We believe DE2 is the first language to incorporate all
the design data into a single formalism.
12.8 Development and Bibliographic Notes
The parser used in our Verilog to DE2 compiler was created by Vinod Viswanath.
The DE2 language is a successor to the DUAL-EVAL hardware description lan-
guage in NQTHM[8] and the DE language in ACL2 [28]. The DE language differs from its
predecessors in that it supports user-defined primitives, reusable libraries, parameters and
annotations. DE2 also structures state-holding elements in a different manner than its prede-
cessors. The DE2 language also includes a type system and a more automated verification
system.
In other hardware verification efforts with ACL2, hardware descriptions have been
translated into ACL2 models in the shallow-embedding style [16, 75]. In a first-order theo-
rem prover, however, only a deep-embedding style can reason on functions that operate on
hardware descriptions, such as programs that automatically optimize, simplify or analyze
hardware descriptions. Furthermore, deep-embedding is somewhat more rigorous, since
designs are expressed in a way that more closely matches the actual Verilog or VHDL. For
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example, a typical shallow-embedding approach in ACL2 might express hardware designs
using the functional model produced by our DE2 to ACL2 compiler. In our system, the
DE2 to ACL2 compiler produces a proof of correctness, which would be impossible if we
did not have a formal semantics for the input language.
The notion of shallow-embedding v. deep-embedding styles originate from com-
parisons between different approaches to embed hardware description languages into the
HOL family of theorem provers [66]. Initially, the ELLA and SILAGE languages were em-
bedded into HOL using the shallow-embedding style, and a subset of VHDL was embedded
using the deep-embedding style. More recently, the hardware description language of the
MDG automated proof system was deeply embedded in HOL and used to verify hardware
designs [64].
There has also been considerable interest within the functional language commu-
nity in the development of higher-order hardware description languages. Such languages
have the potential to automate low-level optimization techniques on larger designs. For ex-
ample, the WIRED language has been shown to improve the performance of multipliers by
incorporating layout information into the design of circuit generators [3].
The higher-order functional languages Lifted-FL [2] and reFLect [24] have been
created at Intel, and also combine theorem proving and fully-automated verification tech-
nologies. Differences between DE2 and these language includes DE2’s simpler, two-pass,





There is a large number of directions in which one could continue the work described in this
dissertation. This chapter presents a brief overview of a few, primarily focusing on future
extensions and applications of the SULFA procedure described in Chapter 7.
13.2 Expanding SULFA
Originally, SULFA consisted of ACL2 formulas that could be unrolled into the ACL2 core
primitives if, cons, car, cdr, and consp. Later, SULFA was expanded to include equal
and uninterpreted functions. It is obviously advantageous to recognize as large a decidable
subclass of ACL2 formulas as possible. Thus, one avenue of future work is to continue to
expand SULFA.
One way to expand SULFA is to add more core primitives from Table 3.1. Since
arithmetic is included in ACL2’s core primitives, and arithmetic is undecidable, there is
no decision procedure for formulas made up of all ACL2 core primitives. Nevertheless,
important subclasses, such as linear arithmetic, could be included.
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Another possible SULFA expansion is to include a larger subset of constrained
ACL2 functions. Currently, only uninterpreted functions are supported, i.e., constrained
functions with no constraints. However, some constraints can clearly be allowed without
sacrificing decidability.
13.3 Improving Efficiency
The SAT-based procedure described in Chapter 7 is sufficiently efficient to be applied to
problems of practical interest, such as the data-tile protocol in Chapter 8. Performance,
however, could likely be improved through a number of known optimizations. The two most
promising involve common subexpression elimination and abstraction-refinement loops.
Recall that the algorithm in Chapter 7 creates variables for ACL2 expressions and
that these variables eventually become part of the CNF formula given to SAT. All other
things being equal, it is advantageous to produce a CNF formula with as few variables as
possible. Common subexpression elimination is an optimization that reduces the number of
variables in an expression, and sometimes its translation time to CNF, by creating identical
variables for identical expressions. For example, it is usually more efficient to translate
f (a = b, a = b) into f (x, x), where x , (a = b), than to translate f (a = b, a = b) into f (x, y),
where both x , (a = b) and y , (a = b). Similarly, if g (a, b) unrolls to a = b, then it is best
to translate f (a = b, g (a, b)) into f (x, x) and define x to be a = b.
Note that common subexpression elimination has an inherently inside-out nature.
An expression should not be considered until its common subexpressions have been elim-
inated. For example, a variable should not be created for f (a = b, a = b), but rather a
variable v should be created for a = b and then for f (v, v). Since the algorithm in Chap-
ter 7 is primarily an outside-in algorithm, common subexpression elimination is currently
omitted. A simple preprocessor that eliminates common subexpressions, like the one used
in Chapter 9, would likely improve performance of the SULFA solver on many SULFA
formulas. A more clever form of common subexpression elimination, incorporated into the
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SAT-based procedure itself, may yield even better results.
Another optimization worth noting involves abstraction-refinement loops. The idea
here is to perform abstraction when confronted with a difficult verification problem. If the
abstract formula is valid, then the original formula is also valid. If the counter example pro-
duced is also a counter example to the original formula, then the original formula is invalid.
Otherwise, some form of refinement, likely based on the counter-example, is performed to
create a less abstract problem. Abstraction-refinement loops can be very useful when deal-
ing with shallow problems over large data structures. Also, they can be necessary to avoid
explosion in formula size, when that explosion is not likely to yield a true counter-example.
For example, given an uninterpreted function f (x), if f (x) and f (y) occur in an expression
and x = y does not, it is probably best to assume that x , y so that f (x) and f (y) can be
given independent variables, unless only counterexamples where x = y are found.
13.4 Verification of Larger Hardware Modules
Another area of future work is to apply our methodology to larger hardware designs. Cur-
rently, for the most part, only floating-point units in industrial processors have been formally
verified. In order to make formal methods practical for full-scale industrial hardware verifi-
cation, we must increase our expertise with formal methods outside the floating-point unit.
The data-tile protocol verification effort described in Chapter 8 is one such effort, but this
effort could be continued to verify more of the data tile. Also, some other hardware designs,
such as routers, have never been formally verified.
13.5 Undecidable Domains
Developing decision procedures and identifying decidable classes of problems is a useful
endeavor since it can help direct a verification effort into a domain where fully-automated
procedures are more applicable. Ultimately though, our goal is to reduce the amount of user
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guidance required during large-scale verification, regardless of whether the formula to be
verified can be easily placed into a decidable class. Thus we are interested in techniques that
automatically reduce undecidable problems into decidable domains. One such technique is
to use an abstraction-refinement loop, like the one proposed in Section 13.3. Abstraction
can be used to reduce undecidable formulas into a decidable domain, then refinement can
be used to attempt to hone in on a valid abstraction or a real counter-example. Such an
approach is unlikely to discover any proof that requires induction, but, if it is well designed,
it may prove to be very good at finding counterexamples to invalid conjectures.
Some of the techniques in this dissertation may also prove applicable to general-
purpose simplification. An important intuition behind SAT solving and SAT-based proce-
dures is to put off any exponential time searching or transformations until the last possible
moment. In this manner, easier options are explored first and more information is available
when exponential time searching or transformations are finally undertaken. The ACL2 sim-
plifier, and other general-purpose simplifiers, do not always use this strategy. For example,
the ACL2 simplifier expands lambda expressions (β reduction) and performs case splitting
relatively early in the simplification process, both of which require exponential time. It
would be interesting to explore the development of a general-purpose simplifier that puts
off β reduction and case splitting until the last possible moment, when the best educated
guess can be made as to which one should be performed first.
13.6 Verified SAT-Based Procedure
Some SAT solvers, such as zChaff, can produce a proof of unsatisfiability after determining
that a problem is unsatisfiable [93]. One integration of HOL and SAT uses this proof to
check results from the SAT solver with the HOL theorem prover [91]. A difficulty, however,
is that the HOL theorem prover, like the ACL2 theorem prover, is designed to solve large
scale problems through a hierarchy where only a small portion of the problem needs to be
considered at once. In SAT solvers, no such hierarchical information is kept. Thus, only
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relatively small results from SAT solvers can be checked with HOL. One possible way to
address this within ACL2 is to develop a specialized proof checker, prove it correct using
the ACL2 theorem prover, and then use ACL2’s fast evaluation mechanism to check large
problems.
Once the unsatisfiability of a Boolean CNF formula can be verified by ACL2, the
translation from the original ACL2 problem to Boolean CNF must also be somehow veri-
fied. The SAT-based procedure for solving problems involving the core primitives if, cons,
car, cdr, consp, and equal might be verified and introduced as a verified clause processor,
as described in Chapter 11. The removal of uninterpreted functions also might be verified in
such a manner. The unrolling of functions would require a different approach though since
its correctness and termination follows from the (user-extendable) definitional axioms and




Currently, the floating-point units of many processor designs are formally verified [60, 72],
but formal verification is not attempted on most other parts of industrial designs. We be-
lieve one cause of this disparity is the relative maturity of formal verification techniques
targeted specifically to floating-point units. In this dissertation, we have made advances to
the field of formal verification to improve general-purpose formal verification techniques
and to develop expertise in formal verification beyond the floating-point unit.
• One method to potentially reduce the cost of scalable hardware verification method-
ologies, such as those used on the proof of the FM9801 processor [75], is to increase
the amount of search used to find proofs automatically during interactive theorem
proving. The forward chaining proof strategy has therefore been modified to increase
the likelihood that a theorem marked as a forward chaining rule will be used auto-
matically by the ACL2 theorem prover. The modification increases the number of
theorems proven automatically at a cost of about 2 percent in the time required to
construct a proof. The modified proof strategy is now part of the default forward
chaining proof technique used in the ACL2 theorem prover.
• Another method to reduce verification cost is through the integration of fully-
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automated formal verification techniques with interactive theorem proving. By iden-
tifying the Subclass of Unrollable List Formulas in ACL2 (SULFA) and proving it
decidable, we have found a class of problems within an interactive theorem prover on
which fully-automated techniques may be applied.
SULFA is an interesting subclass in that it can be recognized efficiently and is built di-
rectly from the ACL2 core primitives—the small set of ACL2 primitives listed in Ta-
ble 3.1, from which all other ACL2 functions are defined. Furthermore, unlike most
identified decidable subclasses within first-order logic, SULFA contains a mechanism
for extension with new functions and their defining axioms while maintaining decid-
ability. Many useful properties are in SULFA, including 1,249 formulas in the ACL2
regression suite (3.2 percent). Also, finite-state machine models can be constructed
such that any property concerning only a finite number of steps of the machine is in
SULFA.
We have also developed an efficient recognizer for SULFA formulas and a SULFA
solver that proves and disproves SULFA formulas automatically by translating them
into the Boolean conjunctive normal form (CNF) required by SAT solvers. This tool
is now available as part of the standard distribution of the ACL2 theorem prover.
• The data-tile protocol implementation within the TRIPS processor was verified using
a mixture of the SAT-based SULFA solver and interactive theorem proving. The
verification strategy reduces safety and liveness properties into finite-step SULFA
properties. Significant human effort was avoided by using the SAT-based SULFA
solver instead of verifying the SULFA properties using interactive theorem proving.
Furthermore, the data-tile protocol is a novel component required by TRIPS multi-
tile architecture, which addresses up-coming challenges in computer architecture.
By verifying it, we have helped to build formal verification expertise in a new type of
hardware design, beyond the floating-point units verified formally in industry today.
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• An SMT solver has also been developed for the standard SMT theory of bit vectors by
combining the ACL2 simplifier and the SAT-based SULFA solver. This SULFA SMT
solver is able to verify all 8,246 problems in the SMT 2006 QF UFBV32 benchmark
suite. Furthermore, the SULFA SMT solver provides a greater degree of flexibility
than traditional SMT solvers—the SULFA SMT solver can be extended with new
primitives and rewrite rules, which are verified by interactive theorem proving. We
believe such flexibility is a key component of developing general-purpose algorithms
that can be specialized for different types of hardware units, such as communication
protocols, floating-point units, and load store units.
• We have also explored the integration of fully-automated and interactive theorem
proving techniques through the development of the ACL2SIX hint, which integrates
IBM’s SixthSense model checker with the ACL2 theorem prover. The ACL2SIX hint
is unique in that not only does it decrease the amount of human guidance required in
hardware verification, but it also avoids the need to create and maintain a semantics
for VHDL in the ACL2 logic. The ACL2SIX hint has been applied to the formal
verification of a high-performance multiplier circuit used in an industrial floating-
point multiplier design. The multiplier circuit we verified is beyond the scope of what
can be verified by SixthSense alone and the resulting ACL2 proof is much simpler
than what would be required without SixthSense.
• Originally, both the SAT-based SULFA solver and the ACL2SIX hint required direct
modifications to the ACL2 theorem prover. Discovering how to modify a sophisti-
cated general-purpose interactive theorem prover in a sound manner is a lengthy pro-
cess. A new mechanism has now been developed, however, for dynamically extend-
ing the theorem prover with new proof techniques, called clause processors. Clause
processors may be either verified or unverified. Verified clause processors reduce the
correctness of the proof technique to the correctness of the underlying ACL2 theorem
prover. Unverified clause processors must be declared by their users to be trusted and
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no theorem proven by an unverified clause processor will effect the theorem prover
of a user that has not declared it. The new unverified clause processor mechanism
supports the dynamic extension of ACL2 with either (or both) the SAT-based SULFA
solver or the ACL2SIX hint.
• Another method to simplify the formal verification of hardware designs is to develop
hardware description languages that are more amenable to formal verification. The
DE2 hardware description language has thus been developed with hardware verifica-
tion in mind. Its novel annotations feature provides the ability to incorporate spec-
ification into code, including specifications of non-functional behavior, e.g., power
specifications, extended type signatures, and layout information. DE2 also has a sim-
ple semantics, making the task of formal verification of DE2 designs easier. The
semantics of DE2 are also written in the logic of the ACL2 theorem prover, which
provides access to a highly-automated, scalable hardware verification tool.
The main focus of the above contributions has been to decrease the amount of user
guidance required by large-scale hardware verification. Our contributions have been divided
along a broad front: from developing new hardware description languages to increasing the
automation and flexibility of formal verification techniques and developing expertise with
those techniques on complex processor designs.
Furthermore, our work points to further possible improvements.
• The DE2 language could be applied to the verification of non-functional design fea-
tures, such as power, and the verification of programs that operate on circuits, such
as timing and power optimization programs.
• The subclass of ACL2 formulas can be expanded to include properties involving
arithmetic and constrained functions, as well as some properties that currently re-
quire induction.
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• The performance of the SAT-based SULFA solver can be improved with improved
SAT solvers, improved conversion techniques, and support for abstraction with auto-
mated refinement.
• A tighter integration between SixthSense and ACL2 can be created. A definition
extension principle can be created to admit functions that are unrollable into bit-
vector primitives. Also, multiple clock cycle variables can be supported to admit
more sophisticated linear temporal logic properties.
By continuing to improve formal verification techniques and developing expertise
over a larger set of hardware designs, we believe that formal verification will become cost-
effective over an ever increasing set of hardware designs, eventually leading to the formal
verification of entire large-scale industrial processors.
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